Teja

The ecological, social, economic, cultural, religious, spiritual and geopolitical importance of the Himalaya as and its centrality for many Asian societies and cultures is well known. The “abode of snow” is home to an imposing geographical biological diversity and a multitude of flourishing human concerns and constructs. These have remained visible in hunting–gathering communities to pastoral–agrarian societies and their settled cultures, and also in the economies of modern trade and industry.

The Himalayas have created and developed a unique ecology that has become the basis for the existence of the natural as well as cultural systems of a large part of South Asia. It stands like a subcontinental arc and connects the tropical rainforests of Myanmar and Arunachal Pradesh with the sparse and cold semi-desert of Ladakh, and the great northern plains of the Indian subcontinent with the Tibetan plateau. It is dynamic and active in many ways, making the plains below fertile and alive, transforming the landscape extraordinarily.

Different communities arrived and settled here over millennia, developing their culture and spreading out in many directions.

The Himalayas have created many unique physiographic formations all over its geography, and humans developed these “natural wonders” into their “culture areas,” where they started cultivating their myths and developing these as their “holy” places and “sacred” destinations.

• Among these wonders, there exists a natural amphitheatre consisting of two beautiful peaks Kailas and Gurla, and two big lakes Manasarovar and Rakastal (in short, KGMR). Four great rivers of South Asia have their origins here. All these places are traditionally known to people as “sin destroying localities.” Kailas and Manasarovar are at the heart of this sacred geography.
• Geology, geography, climate, and altitude jointly evolved this sacred, difficult, beautiful and exceptional region of western Tibet.2 Attracted by these elements, many communities, cultures, and religions related themselves with this natural and cultural complex over the last 2,000 years or more. These include four major religions of the east as well as modern tourists, explorers, scientists, non-believers and agnostics.3
• Kailas is a mountain standing with a beautiful crown looking over its reflection in the waters of Manasarovar. According to Kangri Karchhak (the Tibetan Kailas Puran) (Pranavanand 2007: 8), Kailas is located at the centre of the universe, towering in the sky like a handle of a millstone.
• Halfway on its side is kalpavriksha (the wish-fulfilling tree) and it has square sides of gold and jewels, with the eastern face made up of crystal, southern of sapphire, western of ruby, and northern of gold. Further, it is depicted that the peak is clothed in fragrant flowers and herbs, and that there are four footprints of the Buddha on the four sides so that the peak might not be taken away into the sky by the deities of that region, and four chains prevent denizens of the lower regions from taking it down.
• The KGMR region was important for nomad–pastoral communities and as the interactions evolved among different communities, it developed as the destination for barter trade, connecting different regions of Asia.
• These trade routes became the pilgrim routes for many communities belonging to different religions, cultures, and regions. This paper analyses the ecological, cultural and economic role that the Kailas–Manasarovar transboundary culture area has evolved to play eventually in the lives of Asians, focusing more on the Kailas sacred landscape in the Indian region.

Creation of a Mythic Land

Deities emerge with human beings only. The initial hunter-gatherers or pastoralists may have noticed the beauty of Kailas, but they did not have deities and their initial folklore got dissolved in time and space. The initial myths were born much before the birth of any institutional religion and started with respecting or worshipping nature’s expressions.

• With the emergence of organised religions, the deities of these religions were visualised to be residing in a mountain or rock, lake, river, hot spring or cave.
• We need to remember that although Puranic references to Kailas represented states or constructions of knowledge about the site at the time they were recorded, such aspects of that knowledge as were empirical must have been compiled from disparate sources–renunciates, traders, nomadic tribes … characters who left no direct traces of their experiences.
• Collated by one or many agents and authors, permeated through different layers of cultural and sectarian perception, and strategically associated with earlier mythological cycles, the resulting representations were transformed into myth … different conceptual worldviews enables us to see the historical diversity behind model unities.

We may thus analyse them alongside texts of the Buddhist, Jain, and Tantric traditions, each of which preserved and represented discreet understandings of Kailas that were only to coalesce in the colonial period.

He further writes

• These cosmologies informed those of the Buddhists, Jains, and even Tibetan Bonpas, with the Abhidharmakosa, composed by the north-western Indian monk Vasubandhu (4–5th century CE) becoming the foundational exposition of this system in the Buddhist traditions.
• So in the context of Kailas–Manasarovar, the key feature common to these cosmologies, was the idea of a central mountain, Meru, which was the source of four (or more) major rivers, the identity of which varied in different accounts. That model did not remain solely attached to Meru, but also became a fundamental part of the geo-sacral associations of Mount Kailas.

The distinction between Meru the cosmic centre, Meru an actual Himalayan mountain, Kailas in its various conceptions and manifestations became increasingly blurred over time.

• The main religions that associate themselves with the KGMR region are Bon, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Sikhism does not directly relate itself with Kailas. In the late 1930s an alternative mountain and lake were searched by Sikh enthusiasts at Hemkund Sahib near the valley of flowers in Uttarakhand.
• The Kailas–Manas region was one of the important centres of the Bon faith long before Buddhism appeared in Tibet around the 7th century CE during the reign of King Songtsen Gampo (Govinda 1966; Reynolds 2014).
• This shamanistic religion developed in the remote Zhang Zhung kingdom of Western Tibet! Kang Tise (pronounced as Tije), that is, Mount (Mt) Kailas, also known as Yungdruk Gutseg (the nine-storey Swastika mountain) was the “soul mountain” of Bonpos and was supposed to be the emanation body of Tonpa Shenrab Miwoche, the founder of the formalised Bon religion and in the words of Govinda (1966) (Reynolds 2014; Vitali 1999), “the Buddha of Bonpos.”
• Mt Kailas was also imagined as a great chorten (stupa) of rock crystal with several families of gods residing there. Now it is difficult to trace the Bon symbols of Kailas but the idea of the nine-storey swastika may have come from Bon tradition. Later on, many of the Bon symbols were accepted, accommodated and appropriated by Buddhism and Hinduism in their cultural and religious schemes.
• The presiding Buddhist deity of Mt Kailas is Demchok or Demchhog4 (also known as Chakrasamvara, meaning supreme bliss) and his yum (consort) is Dorje-Phangmo or Vajra Varahi (also named as Vajra Yogini) (McKay 2015), who is shown in Tibetan paintings and idols, clinging to him in an inextricable embrace and interlocked in sexual union. Adjacent to the Kailas on the western side is a smaller snow peak Tijung, the abode of Dorje-Phangmo. Gautam Buddha and 500 Bodhisattvas are said to be residing on Kailas, which is also the abode of Buddhist Tantric singer–saint Milarepa.
• This mountain had four gates, with a Chinese tiger, tortoise, red bird, and turquoise dragon guarding the four cardinal points (Tucci 1980: 285–91). For gaining control of this auspicious mountain Kailas (or Tise) from Bonpo influence, there was a “contest of magic” between Milarepa and the Bonpo priest Naro Bhun Chon. At last Milarepa won.
• Since that time the Bonpo started the parikrama (or pradakshina or circumambulation) of Mt Kailas in an anti-clockwise direction. Others do it clockwise. The Bon faith was rooted in nature and acknowledged dark and magical forces and deities which governed mortal lives. Many aspects of this autochthonous belief system later reflected in the rise and growth of Vajrayana in Tibet (Mukharji 2014: 208).
• For Buddhists, Kailas represents a gigantic mandala (a spiritual and ritual symbol in Hinduism and Buddhism, representing the universe) of Dhyani Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. There were 10 sects of the Mahayana school of Buddhism in practice in Tibet when Pranavanand (1939: 55–56) conducted his explorations there before 1940.
• From the beginning of Buddhism in Tibet, different branches of this religion connected themselves with the Kailas region and cosmology was developed around this sacred geography.
• According to the Hindu belief system, Lord Shiva resides there with goddess Gauri, Ganesha, and Kartikeya, also deities in their own right. At its foot is seated Hanuman, the monkey god. Hindus also consider Kailas as the seat of many other deities, including Kuber and name it Mt Meru or the cosmic mountain.
• The name of the Puranic king Mandhata Mahipati is associated with Mt Gurla, the highest mountain in this area. In Hindu tradition, pilgrimage to Kailas (also Kailasnath) became part of the Char Dham Yatra of Uttarakhand and an extension of Muktinath and Pashupatinath Yatra of Nepal.
• In Jain tradition, it is thought that the first Tirthankara Aadinath (Rishav Dev)5 attained nirvana (liberation from all sorrows) near Ghangta Gompa above Darchin. This hill near the south face of Kailas is known as Ashtpada. Guru Nanak also reached there and had dialogues with the Buddhist siddhas.
• Pradakshina is an essential part of each pilgrimage to Kailas and its many forms are still in practice. After completing a certain number of the outer kora (circumambulation) one is entitled to inner kora. It is also to be noted that inner kora is not the pradakshina of Mt Kailas but it is only a journey to Nandi hill.
• There are many names for Manasarovar in Sanskrit, including Achhodsar, Bindusar, Padmhrid, Brahmsarovar, Hemkoot, and Anabhtatv. In Pali, it is named Anotatta. In the Tibetan wall paintings and tankas, Manasarovar and Rakastal are depicted as sun and crescent moon—symbols of the visible forces of light and the hidden forces of darkness, or as lakes of consciousness and demons respectively.

The story goes that Manas was created out of the mind of Brahma, first among the Hindu trinity. Rakastal is also known as Rawanhrid or Rawansarovar. Several other myths about the lakes are still prevalent, such as the story of Ravana, who meditated along the banks of this lake, or that of the golden fish, which went to Rakastal from Manasarovar by creating Ganga Chheu (the water channel which connects Manasarovar with Rakastal). A detailed study of the scattered folklore may come up with useful stories related to local myths.

Geo-ecological Aspects

In the Asian perspective, Kailas is at the centre geographically and ecologically. According to geologists, the Himalayas (including Kailas region) have come up in the place of Tethys Sea. This geodynamic process was in itself a unique episode in the evolution of the Himalayas. At present, the Tethys Himalaya is a very rugged terrain with sculptured landforms and a desolate landscape. It is made up of sedimentary rocks with their age ranging from 600 million to 40 million years. These sediments were part of the Tethys Sea. Gansser (1994) found Kailas geologically unique, having been elevated to more than 22,000 feet above sea level with its strata remaining horizontally undisturbed, despite being encompassed by steeply inclined bedrock.

• He also writes that Kailas stood witness to the birth of Himalaya. On its southern flanks, he found ophiolite—a rock formed hundreds of millions of years ago on the bed of the ancient Tethys Sea ).
• The Himalaya province ends up against mainland Asia, a 30–60 km wide zone of collision of India with Asia demarcating the margin of India. The collision took place 65 to 50 million years ago. The rivers Sindhu and Tsangpo occupy the collision zone.
• To the north of collision zone lies the Ladakh-Kailas and the Karakoram ranges. To the east, the Ladakh-Kailas range is represented by the Nyechentanghla or Gangdese range in southern Tibet. To the north is the Karakoram that ends up in Pamir massif, a mountain knot of sorts. These belts belong to an orogenic province older and quite different from the Himalaya.
• The Holy Kailas is made up of feldspar-rich sandstones, and conglomerates laid down 27 to 10 million years ago in the channel of a broad braided river, a precursor to the Sindhu-Tsangpo. The conglomerate beds rest on the Ladakh-Kailas granites emplaced 70 to 40 million years ago.
• Chheu Gompa is at the centre of this amphitheatre. To its north is Kailas Range with the dominating Mt Kailas at its centre. To the south is Gurla Range with its highest peak Gurla Mandhata, and seen behind is the Himalayas. To the east is Manasarovar, and west has Rakastal, which receives the waters from all sides of Mt Kailas and also Manasarovar
• A circle from Chheu Gompa with a radius of less than 50 kilometres (km), contains the four rivers originating here and flowing in different directions covering large areas of the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent. These rivers have been given very symbolic names.
• To the west from Rakastal flows the Langchen Khambab or elephant-mouthed river (Sutlej or Shatadru); to the north Singhi Khambab or lion-mouthed river (Indus or Sindhu); to the east from Mayum La the Tamchok Khambab or horse-mouthed river (Tsangpo or Brahmaputra); and to the south from Gurla range the Mapcha Khambab or peacock-mouthed river (Karnali).
• In this way, two lead rivers of the Indus–Sutlej system, one each from the Ganga and Tsangpo systems originate from this corner of Tibet. In terms of distance, the origins of Kali, Gori, Alaknanda and Bhagirathi rivers are not very far from this region.
• The waters of southern slopes of Kailas range, northern slopes of Gurla and western slopes of Mayum La with Manasarovar and Rakastal make the initial catchment of river Sutlej, which brings waters to the other side of the Himalayas.
• All other three rivers originate outside but close to this Sutlej catchment. These three rivers also take very interesting routes for entering into north Indian plains. The Indus flows northwards initially, turns north-west and then south-west after meeting with river Kabul.
• The Tsangpo flows 1,700 km eastwards before suddenly turning south-west entering into India. Karnali flows south and enters into Nepal at Hilsa (Humla) and becomes Saryu/Ghaghra before its confluence with Ganga in India.
• Some of the rivers of the Indus Valley and Vedic civilisations (Panchnad or Sapt Sindhu, which includes Indus, Sutlej or Saraswati) originated in the Kailas area. Initially, the descriptions developed in Vedic, epic and Puranic literature were more mythic than actual.
• Later on, the heavenly mountains, lakes, and rivers became earthly and actual, when they were seen and touched by different communities. The ethnic migrations, barter trade and finally the pilgrimage helped in understanding the complex geography of this region, which was already transformed into the “sacred.”
• But the ecological relationship of the Kailas area always remained natural, even when the people of the Indian plains were not aware of the origins of these rivers.
• These rivers contributed in creating the unique ecology of north Indian plains by giving it soil, water, and fertility and connected western Tibet with eastern (Bay of Bengal) and western (Arabian) oceans through north Indian plains, where the Harappan civilisation grew and which later witnessed the rise and growth of Vedic culture.
• These rivers evolved the ecological relationship of western Tibet with North India before the emergence of many communities and cultures here. The trade and pilgrim routes came up later along the rivers and adjoining passes.
• Before the humans, yak, kiang (wild ass), snow leopard, kastura (musk deer), three types of long-haired mountain goats–tahr, serow and bharal (blue sheep), marmot (large squirrels) and varieties of fish and birds have been part of Kailas wilderness. The plains of Parkha (between Kailas and Gurla ranges) create the environment for wildlife and nomad–pastoral life.
• The fish might not be visible as moving to other regions but all other faunal and avian species were not restricted by any kind of political boundaries. They continue challenging the man-made boundaries.

The Making of a Cultural Landscape

The idea of sacred mountains, lakes, and rivers is present in all ancient cultures and religions. It was found in all kind of geographies. Mountains were seen as fathers and lakes and rivers as mothers (McKay 2015: 28–36). As discussed earlier, the initial society of pastoralists saw this wilderness and they were captivated by its beauty.

Before the invention of myths, they started considering the mountains and lakes as sacred. This was some kind of “folk religion,” if it is to be termed at all. The society did not need poetic descriptions or certifications from the scriptures yet. With the birth of institutional religions, a variety of deities were attached to this landscape.

• The Bonpos may be the first to relate this landscape with their religion. Naturally, Tonpa Shenrab Miwoche, the founder of the formalised Bon religion, was associated with the mountains and rocks of western Tibet. Their region was known as Zhang Zhung. Till 7th century, the Bonpos were the sole custodians of this region, as no other community had been challenging them.
• The very initial motifs, symbols, sculptures, designs, geometry and colour schemes were created and developed by the Bonpos. The residue of Bon expressions is traceable in different later motifs, symbols, and designs of Tibetan and some other Himalayan cultures.
• McKay (2015) has done a very detailed survey of the evolution of this region from the “imagined” to the “actual” one. This transformation has an obvious relationship with the increasing mobility of people and their interrelations.
• During the Rigvedic times, Rudra was a minor Himalayan god, who later came to acquire a very powerful position (McKay 2015: 36). The Atharva Veda mentions “snowy mountain” and the river Indus only (p 43).
• Initially, Mt Meru was described as the abode of gods. Later the names Meru and Sumeru came to be used for many imagined and divine mountains and sometimes they were also used for Kailas. There is a reference in Valmiki Ramayana, where Mandodari cries after Ravana was killed and remembers that she travelled with her husband to Mandar and Meru mountains.In the texts of Manaskhand (Skand Puran), Rudrayamal Tantra, Sidh Siddhant Paddhati (Guru Gorakhnath), and Ramcharitmanas (Tulsi Das), Kailas and Meru are described as two different mountains. In Taittiriya Aranyaka “Maha Meru” word is used but it is not geographically consonant with Kailas. Actually, Meru, later on, became the centre of Indian cosmology.
• In terms of the rivers, there is mention of Ganga, Saraswati, and the Yamuna in the Hindu epics but the rivers originating in the Kailas area, Indus, Sutlej, Tsangpo, and Karnali are notable for their absence.
• The pilgrimage to Kailas and Manasarovar had begun before the emergence of sacred Kailas in the epics (Mahabharata and Ramayana). This is supported by Buddhist and Jain texts. Over time, the sources of knowledge about sacred sites increased.
• Traders, migrating tribes and renunciates (including tantric practitioners, siddhas and alchemists) were contributing in this scheme through directly gained knowledge Beautiful places have the elements of becoming sacred, and the power to influence the human mind as well as the religions created by humans.
• Buddhism reached Tibet with several Indic motifs, symbols, and designs. Many of its motifs were also similar to the Hinduism of the time. Some of the symbols and deities transformed and got their place in the Tibetan Buddhist divine hierarchy. Most of the deities, gods, and goddesses of Tibetan Buddhism resemble their Hindu counterparts. Animals and birds associated with these gods were adopted by Buddhist artists. Influence of Tibetan tantric practices was also visible in different monastic expressions. Several Indian gurus visited Tibet and some of them even reached the highest positions. Among them, the best known is Guru Padmasambhava.
• Slowly over centuries, Kailas and Manasarovar became part of Indian (Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain) iconography, sculpture and painting. Temples were built and rocks were carved in the name of Kailas.
• The Kailasnath temple of Ellora is best known among these. The stone statue of King Ravana lifting Mt Kailas with his 20 hands is well preserved at the Virupaksha temple at Pattadakallu near Badami caves (Dharvad, Karnataka).
• At Mahabalipuram, the world’s largest bas-relief sculpture depicts Arjun standing on one leg and doing penance in Kailas. Later the associated stories were expressed thus in pahari paintings,7 too.
• The idea of “multiple Kailas” also evolved as those away from the KSL region or unable to reach Mt Kailas, invented traditions of creating their own “local Kailas” in their regions. Chhota Kailas (Kuti valley, Byans, Pithoragarh), Shri Kailas (Uttarkashi) and Bhurkania Kailas (near Bhimtal, Nainital) in Uttarakhand and Mani Mahesh Kailas, Kinnar Kailas in Himachal are examples of this kind of cultural creativity.
• There is a tradition of circumambulation of Mt Kinnar Kailas. Uttarakhand’s presiding goddess Nanda Devi’s sasural (the in-law’s place) is in Kailas and “Kavilas” is the expression used for the Kailas in local folklore. Nanda Jaat (a yatra or pilgrimage) itself is a parikrama.
• A mountain plateau north of Pashupatinath, Kathmandu is also known as Kailas Same is the case with Mt Khirpani near Tumkot in Humla district of far west Nepal (Karnali valley), a sacred mountain which looks like Kailas, though it is covered with snow only for some months.
• It is visited, circumambulated and worshipped by local communities. Such developments show the deepening of the idea of “KSL” among the Indians and Nepalese belonging to different religions and their sects (Pandey 1989). Simultaneously, trans-Himalayan trade was slowly increasing in volume and benefits.

Colonial Period

The developments in the colonial–imperial period in the context of Tibet and particularly the Kailas region are very interesting and have to be investigated further. The opening of the Himalayas culminated in the opening of Tibet and Central Asia for the British Empire.

The European journey of precolonial Asia starts with East India Company and the Jesuit Fathers. The former had trade and transit in mind and the latter had religion and exploration. Jesuit Fathers proved themselves the very first modern explorers of Asia.

• But a definitive historical shift occurred only with East India Company after the war of Plassey in 1757. Two major landmarks in this history are the establishment of the Survey of India in 1767 (63 years before the birth of Royal Geographical Society, London) and the Great Trigonometrical Survey in 1802.
• In between many expeditions were sent to Tibet and different Himalayan countries and provinces through different routes.
• In 1624, the first Europeans who crossed over a Himalayan pass in Uttarakhand were two Jesuit Fathers, Antonio de Andrade, and Emanuel Marques, as they reached Tsaprang in West Tibet in search of “forgotten Christian brothers” .
• They repeated the difficult journey in 1625 with a third missionary Gonzales de Sousa. On 12 April 1626, they were able to complete the building of the first church in western Tibet. This is the old Zhang-Zhung country located west of the Kailas–Manasarovar region in Sutlej valley.
• They succeeded in converting some Buddhists, though the process could not sustain, as a revolt surfaced against this conversion. Soon the converts were killed and the church was destroyed in 1630 .
• The Jesuits (including Bento de Goes who travelled from Lahore to China in 1603–07 and Stephan Cacella and John Cabral who journeyed from Bengal to Shigatse from 1627 to 1631) became the first to report this part of Tibet to Westerners, although they never saw Mt Kailas and Manasarovar. After these initial explorations of the Jesuits, a few Europeans tried to cross over the Himalayan passes.
• After 1640, it was only in 1912 that an officer crossed over Mana pass and reached the ruins of Tsaprang . The Mana pass was crossed by Adolf von Schlagintweit (one of the three famous German explorer brothers) in September–October 1855 and he returned to Mussoorie on 21 October 1855 crossing over Nilang pass.
• A month before this visit, Adolf and his brother Robert also visited Gartok.
• The first Europeans who passed by Mt Kailas through the plains of Parkha in 1715 were two Jesuit Missionaries—Ippolito Desideri and Emanuel Freyre, en route to Lhasa from Kashmir. Desideri describes the mountain and its religious importance but does not mention its name .
• Ninety-seven years after them, the first Englishman to cross over Niti pass and reach the twin lakes in 1812 was the pioneer British veterinarian William Moorcroft, accompanied by Hyder Hearsay.
• He called it “Cailas,” and also mentioned another name used by the pilgrims, “Mahadeo Ka Ling.”
• Moorcroft described the method of prostration around Kailas. He was the first outsider who described the streams coming from the Kailas range and the river Sutlej as originating from Rakastal. He also found that only a channel comes out from Manasarovar and merges into Rakastal.
• While returning, he was arrested by Gorkhas near Almora, but was later released (Alder 1985: 126–56; Moorcroft 1818: 380–424). Three years later, Uttarakhand (British Kumaon) came under the rule of East India Company after the Anglo–Nepal war and with the Treaty of Sigauli in 1815–16, a new era of pilgrimage and Indo–Tibet trade began.
• G W Traill, Commissioner of British Kumaon, visited the border areas and crossed a difficult pass around 1825. His two reports were based on these visits. He has also mentioned the name of the village Puckasao in Johar as a sadawart village for the pilgrims of Kailas–Manasarovar. In September–October 1846, Henry Strachey made a journey to Rakastal and left behind an impressive description of the area.
• In 1848, Richard Strachey went to the region. In 1849, both brothers revisited Tibet and returned from Niti pass. In 1855, Edmund Smyth and Robert Drummond went to Manasarovar with a boat (Allen 1992: 125–38) and in 1864, Edmund Smyth, Thomas Webber and others again went to the region  Due to these journeys, the KSL region remained a part of the continuous discussion among the Europeans, especially the British.
• During the colonial period, first under East India Company and later under Her Majesty’s rule, a few new initiatives were undertaken on Indo–Tibet trade and pilgrimage. There is a long list of different travellers to the KSL region. After the Younghusband mission (1903), Tibet did not remain a closed territory.In the 1930s and 1940s, Swami Pranavanand, Narayan Swami and Geeta Swami initiated an organised pilgrimage with the help of the Shauka traders. This continued till the Chinese takeover of Tibet and after the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet, another era started. The pilgrimage was entirely closed for the two subsequent decades and trade was closed for three decades.
• In 1981, pilgrimage reopened and partial trade started in 1990. Thirty-four years after this, in 2015, another route to Kailas was opened from Nathu La in Sikkim. Tibet is also opened for international tourists and pilgrims now. The process of modernisation with more airports, rails, roads, buildings and reconstruction/repair of destroyed cultural sites is rapidly going on in Tibet.

Economic Exchange

There is some truth in the statement that “the lure of gold, not Gods, may well have first drawn attention to Kailas region” (Mckay 2015: 50). It can be added that the basic exploratory tendency of humans was also behind this. Many scholars think that barter trade in the trans-Himalayan region was older than the practice of pilgrimage.

This seems to be true that with the traders from different parts of Asia, pilgrims also started coming to the Kailas region, starting with very few initially. This tradition may have been continuing since two to three millenniums.

• Gold, salt, wool, borax, musk pods, fly whisks (yak tails), medicinal herbs, mineral medicines, skins, furs and livestock (yak, horse, goat, and sheep) were the trans-Himalayan products and these were exchanged for different grains (rice and pulses), flour, dry vegetables, sugar, metal works, cotton, puru/phuru (wooden bowls) and some other items as per the region/place from where the items were brought (Nain Singh’s Thokjyalung diary in Bhatt and Pathak [2006: 291–315]; Fisher [1986]; Fürer-Haimendorf [1975]; Traill [1832]; Pilgrim [1844: 171–77]; Pangtey [1992: 45–64]; Raipa [1974: 291–306]).
• The emergence of Kailas–Manas complex as a multireligious and cultural destination and the rise and growth of many trade marts around it in that area in the last many centuries is a fascinating history of human enterprise and religious quest working together. In a case like this, religion, culture, and economy get intertwined.
• The vertical trade routes from the Indian subcontinent were directly or indirectly connected with the main silk routes of the Tibetan traders. The nomadic way of life and transhumance was also practised by those who came from the settled pastoral–agrarian societies of Indian and Nepal Himalaya.
• They are unlike Tibetan nomad–pastoralists. The pastoral way of life was the very natural expression of this geography but cottage industries and barter trade emerged as the endeavour for sustaining the economy and as a means for survival.
• During medieval times the trans-Himalayan trade increased and after the coming of East India Company to Uttarakhand and Himachal, it increased further. It is an interesting fact that Tibet was closed for Europeans but the Himalayan communities were allowed to come to certain marts for bartering.
• However, in the early 20th century, Lhasa was attacked and trade rights were monopolised by the British (Sanwal 1962). This was a significant chapter in the opening of Tibet for the British.
• It is well known that the rulers of Kumaon (Chands), Garhwal (Parmars) and Kashmir (Dogra) had captured parts of western Tibet at different times. However, no ruler was able to control this area politically. The Kings of Kumaon and Garhwal even after winning some parts of western Tibet had to return back.
• This in addition to Zorawar Singh’s tragic end near Taklakot tells us much about the aspects of political sustainability of outsiders in Tibet (Charak 1978: 124–37; Francke 1977: 157–62). Even China is facing continuous protests in Tibet, including more than 140 self-immolations.
• Chand ruler Baj Bahadur Chand (1638–78) attacked Taklakot (Pulan) in 1670 for expanding trade activities and he made the trade route safe from the obstructions and attacks of Humlees, Jumlees and Tibetans (Raipa 1974: 48–49; Sankrityayan 1958: 86–89).
• Laxmi Chand (1597–1621) rehabilitated the deserted Ralam village with people from Darma valley.10 Ralam people have been going to Gyanima mandi (mart) via Darma pass. Panwar rulers Shyam Shah (1611–1629) and Mahipat Shah (1631–1635) attacked Daba (Tibet) as the inhabitants of that area had been attacking and looting the settlements of upper Garhwal for a long time. Mahipat Shah won but his representatives in Daba, the Bartwal brothers, were killed.
• The army was defeated, and most of its members were killed during winter later (Dabral 1971: 244–45, 254–56; Raturi 2007: 378). The same happened with Zorawar Singh in the 19th century (Pranavanand 1939: 68).
• Some of the gompas around Mt Kailas were administered and owned by Ladakh and Bhutan. Nyenri, the first gompa of Kailas, Darchengompa, and Zutulpukgompa fell under the
  aegis of the Maharaja of Bhutan. During the Chinese cultural revolution, these gompas were destroyed and then rebuilt after 1980 (Snelling 1983: 139, 315, 373). F Williamson (qtd in Snelling 1983: 423–25), the political officer in Sikkim, wrote about the Darchin monastry on 6 January 1934,
• The Darchin area, including Kailas, appears to have been granted to the Bhutanese some hundreds of years ago by a King of Ladakh. The grant was confirmed by one of the earlier Dalai Lamas, perhaps the fifth. The confirming document is in the possession of the Maharaja of Bhutan.
• Tibetan dates go in a cycle of sixty years and it has not been found possible to ascertain the date of the document, as the particular cycle in which it was written is not stated.
• Williamson further says that this was a controversial issue since 1921, as neither the ownership nor the legal status of the Darchin monastery was clearly defined. In last few years, the gompas have been rebuilt but the old residence of Bhutanese representatives is in ruins, albeit still standing in the upper part of the Darchin town.
• It is to be noted that the Shauka/Bhotiya community was fully participating in transhumance and semi-nomadic life with trans-Himalayan trade and commerce. In this way, the seasonal migration of Bhotiyas was closely associated with partial agriculture, animal husbandry, cottage industries, and trade.
• They became pioneers in Indo–Tibetan trade and later in the pilgrimages to Kailas. In this way, they connected Indian plains with Tibetan plateau through the exchange of products of the two different regions. This exchange not only fulfilled the needs of the communities living between foothills and mountains of Uttarakhand together with Tibet and western Nepal, but it also connected different communities all over this region.
• For centuries Bhotiyas were the creative link between these regions, assisted by anwals (shepherds), bhurris (servants) and mirasees/tahluwas (shilpkars) (Pant 1989: 28–37; Pangtey 1989: 32). Gorkha oppression bore a negative impact on Indo–Tibetan trade from 1790 to 1815. The border communities were paying tax to three sets of rulers—Gorkhas, Jumlees/Humlees and Tibetans. But trade and pilgrimage continued, involving many others in the process.
• The volume of trade can be observed at three different points during the colonial period. In his first report, Traill has described sugar, gur, spices, European cloth (cotton), and coral as the main items of export and shawl wool, general wool, silk, saffron, cured leather, skins, and horses as the main items of import (Traill 1828: 194).
• Surprisingly there was no reference of salt in this list of items. But in his second report, he mentioned the export items as 30,000 maund (1 maund equals 37 kilograms [kg]) grains, clothes worth ₹ 10,000, hardware/metal items worth ₹ 10,000, 1,000 maund gur, 1,000 maund misri (refined sugar), 10 maund spices, 10 maund dyes (lac and indigo), puru, munga (coral) and pearls.
• Among the import items were 15,000 maunds salt, borax/tincal 1,500 maunds, wool 600 maunds, gold 100 fetangs (uncoiled gold pieces). The other items were pankhi (large woollen shawl), silk, yak tails, medicines, dry fruits, etc. Traill (1832: 44) also mentions that from 1816 to 1821, the volume of the trade increased and for the first time the use of cash was introduced in the trade. The cash could have been in silver coins, which were later used for ornaments too.
• In 1840–41, total export from Johar (Kingri Bingri La), Darma (Darma Pass) and Beans (Lipu La) was of ₹ 79,375 and total imports were of ₹ 1,55,700. The main items of export were sugar candy, gur, cloth, grain, almond, indigo, camphor, dates, pearls, coral, tobacco, hardware and many other things like buttons, knives, and chillies.
• The total bhelees (a lump of raw sugar weighing 2–3 seer, 1 seer equals 1.25 kg) of gur exported were 12,000, grains 21,000 maunds, tobacco 350 maunds, dates 70 maunds and all kind of clothes were more than 15,000 pieces .
• The main items of import were borax 17,000 maunds, salt 5,000 maunds, musk 380 tolas (tola has been used in India to measure gold. At present, one tola is equivalent to 10 grams of gold), pasham wool 22 maunds, course woollens 1,300 pieces, gold dust 1,500 fetangs, goats and sheep 1,000, ponies 60, Ladakhi tamashas (3 anna pieces/coins) 7,000 and kaldar rupee coins of silver 15,000. The other items were saffron, shawls, Chinese silk, tea, etc.
• In the first half of the 20th century, trade activities were stabilised and increased. The statistics of exports and imports from Dharchula mart (through Lipu and Darma passes) in India for 1922 are given in Table 1.

End of a Mobile Economy

• While this trade continued during World Wars I and II, it experienced a first major interruption in 1949–50 with the Chinese takeover of Tibet and in 1960 it literally stopped. With this came an end to a centuries-old economic activity.
• This obstruction to the continuity of relationship of different communities was cleared to some extent only in 1981 when pilgrimage was restarted and in 1991 when border trade reopened. This reopening, however, was different from the traditional pilgrimage and trade which had continued till 1960.
• The trans-Himalayan trade was traditionally carried out through five Himalayan passes in Uttarakhand. The nearest Tibetan marts were allotted to the trading communities of adjoining Indian valleys. These included Taklakot for Beansees and Chaudansees; Chakra for Darmees; Gyanima for Joharees; Shibchilam for the communities of Niti valley and Chhaprang for the traders of Mana.
• When the trade was reopened after more than three decades, a memorandum was signed between India and China on 13 December 1991 and another round of talks commenced from 15 July 1992. This was obviously some cause for hope and excitement among the border communities. An Indian delegation was also sent to Tibet to participate in the trade fair at Taklakot in August 1993.
• In 1992, the total exports were worth ₹ 12.09 lakh and imports worth ₹ 0.86 lakh. The main import items were raw wool (3,626 kg), pashm (1,404 kg), goats and sheep (3,634 numbers), yak tails (460 pieces) and borax (6,225 kg).
• The main items of export were textiles, coffee, vegetable oil, unmanufactured tobacco, gur, misri, phaphar (buckwheat) and wheat flour. The 1993 Indian delegation gave many suggestions for further development in trade. Many of them are yet to be implemented (Tolia et al 1993).
• Twenty-four years after the return of the above delegation, there has been much change in Tibet and an increase in border trade. Now instead of “tented marts,” the Indian and Nepali traders have a permanent and protected market in Taklakot, though all other marts remain deserted. The numbers of traders from India and Chhangru-Tinkar and Humla in Nepal have increased, but the trade has to be further developed. One could understand the current trade practices from the Indian and Nepali traders based in Taklakot, Darchin, and Hilsa.
• The trans-Himalayan trade is no longer carried along the lines of traditional barter; and it has also not yet taken the shape of international trade. This is the end of an old mobile economy.
• A new start is also visible in a much changed Tibet now. Space and facilities given to the traders of India and Nepal in the main market of Taklakot is a new initiative taken by the Chinese and the local government of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
• Though the Tibetan traders are no longer interested in coming to Gunji in India for trade, they do come to Hilsa in Nepal near the border. From Hilsa the traders and pilgrims enter into Tibet. It is interesting to note that once again many traditional items are being exported to Tibet from India and Nepal.
• The puru has become a major item of trade as Tibetans very much like to have it. Puru productions have connections with Kashmir, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and Nepal.11
• Today when old Indian and Nepali traders look back, they tell the story of change in Tibet also. Half a century ago, the Tibetans used to wait for Indian and Nepali items and grains, and these commodities were essential for them. Now Chinese food items and maida (refined flour) are coming to Nepal with many modern products.
• Lhasa beer is visible in Indian and Nepali border shops. But many items like gur, misri, and other sweets are still liked. Metal items, wooden bowls, sticks, cloth, ready-made garments are in much demand in Tibet.
• Nepali restaurants also do good business in Taklakot. Many Nepali traders have been waiting for officially allotted shops as presently they have been paying high rents to private house owners.12

Pilgrimage Routes

• Alongside the reopening of this trade, an increasing craze for the pilgrimage to Kailas–Manasarovar region from all over the world has also become prevalent. Currently, two routes each from Nepal (Simikot-Hilsa and Kodari) and India (Lipulek and Nathu La pass) are open.
• The internal route through Tibet, which has also become a popular route for international tourists, comes through Lhasa. There is a tourist rush from Europe, America and other Western as well as Asian countries. The coming of railways to Lhasa (and now Shigatse) has further increased the number of visitors.13
• Apart from being the ecological snout of North India, the Kailas–Manas complex is unique in its cultural–religious attractions. There is no other multicultural, multireligious destination of this kind, where a variety of visitors are seen together. They walk together and talk to each other.
• In these decades of globalisation, when the rise and growth of monocultures, fundamentalism and parochial nationalism has become eminent, there is much to learn from this region, its nature and culture. Kailas connects, liberates, equalises, democratises, supports diversity, provides spiritual experiences and economic opportunities, and also tells us about the power of the beautiful, sublime and the wilderness.
• There is a need to creatively visualise how this region could be developed further as a common destination for different people. The communities living at this tri-juncture, need a sustainable economy, but not at the cost of ecology and culture.
• There should not be attempts to make this region a Lhasa, Kathmandu, Badrinath, Ayodhya or a Jerusalem. If nature gets minimised from this amphitheatre, there will be a loss of culture too. The pilgrims and traders should try to minimise the encroachments on nature in this area.
• People who visit Kailas–Manasarovar should feel the place, come back and relate their experiences with others. Such an approach will neither destroy nature nor make unwanted inroads into a culture.
• For making the pilgrimage and tourism dignified and decentralised, it is needed that the construction work around KSL gets regulated, more local participation is encouraged and the process of change slowed down. Huge modern introductions in the name of tourism can destroy the very fabric of the KSL.
• Though the total population of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Bonpos, and Sikhs is around 1,530 million and they make around 21% of the world’s population, very few can think of going to the KSL.
• The population around KSL and in the transboundary Kailas region in India and Nepal is very little and scattered. They are mostly nomadic pastoralists, considered poor and backward by others. They are self-reliant communities but are involved very little in the activities around. Hence, there is a challenge as well as an opportunity for this entire region and its communities to involve themselves in creative ways.
• It is further understood that many areas, especially in the Hindukush–Himalaya region, need to be protected from the permanent human influx. In the past, while these distant Himalayan frontiers were only visited by people, these were not places of permanent settlement, given the climatic conditions and inhospitable altitudes.
• Today, with the coming up of better medical, transport and communication facilities, there is a need to stress on pilgrimage and minimise tourism. This is directly related to facilities (coming up of big hotels, roads, airports, vehicles, etc) and patterns of consumption (use of polythene, plastic, and bottles).
• It is to be seen and experimented whether elements of pilgrimage can be made part of the tourism agenda!

In Conclusion

The well-wishers of Himalayan and trans–Himalayan communities can evolve a strategy through which the abuse of nature and culture can be stopped in the KSL region. Regulated tourism and pilgrimage associated with handicrafts, cottage industries, development of museums and training schools for indigenous knowledge systems and care and conservation of the biodiversity in Tibet, India, and Nepal are some creative and participatory ways for a new beginning.

The ecological, social cultural and economic interdependence of three parts of the KSL region is in the interest of all communities living in the three corners of the three adjacent Asian countries. The international borders are there but the landscape and social cultural commonalities dissolve these. This is the power of the KSL and the traditions associated with it.

Notes

1 The name is “Kailas” and not “Kailash,” as many tend to spell it. “Kailash” is not included even in dictionaries.

2 Kailas stands at a height of 6,714 metres (m) or 22,028 feet (ft), and to Tibetans it is known as Kang Rinpoche. Gurla Mandhata or Memonani or Naimona’nyi is of 7,694 m or 25,355 ft. Manasarovar, also known as Tso-Mavang or Tso Rimpoche has the surface elevation of 4,530 m or 14,950 ft. Rakastal or Lang Tso is at the altitude of 4,515 m or 14,900 ft.

3 Based on personal interview with a Chinese couple and Gansser (1994: 90–111); Hedin (1990b: 89–214); Juyal et al (2011: 535–41); Simeon (2011). Also, noted by Pranavanand (1939: 73–74) as, “Thus the Kailas-Manas region engages the attention of a person of any calling or profession, whether … a pilgrim or a tourist, a hermit or a householder, a clergyman or a tradesman, a treasure-hunter or a spirit-hunter, a theist or an atheist, a scholar or a politician, young or old, man or woman.”

4 Kailas, Lapchi and Tsuri are three most important pilgrimages in Tibet. Each place is associated with a holy mountain. Kailas (Kang Rinpoche), Lapchi Gang, Takpa Shelri, are all considered places of Demchok, the wrathful emanation of the Budhha Sakyamuni. The cult of Demchok was initiated in the early 12th century by Phagmo Drupa and propagated by the Drigungpa, Drupa, and later, the Gelugpa. The three sites are identified as the “body, speech and mind” of the deity (Chan 1994: 208).

5 Mahavira, the founder of the Jainism, was considered the 24th Tirthankara (spiritual teacher).

6 The poem by Kalidasa may be the best with the highest form of poetic expression:

“Having soared upwards, be the guest of Mount Kailas (whose high table-land joints were united (were broken) by the arm of the ten faced one), the looking glass of the Goddesses, whose horn-elevation, like the water lily, stands expanding into heaven, like an accumulated burst of laughter of the three eyed one, (reacting) to every region” (Kalidasa 1868: 36).

Also see poem “Meru” by one of the great poets of English language William Butler Yeats (1996: 177).

7 The school of painting developed in Himachal and Uttarakhand principalities after the decline of the Mughal school of painting.

8 Personal observations during Humla and Kailas–Manas tour in July 2016.

9 The income/crop from the sadawart village is meant for supporting the pilgrims. Goonth lands are also dedicated to certain temples and their crop or income from crop was meant for temple purposes.

10 Personal communication with Ram Singh, who mentioned bahees (handwritten registers) of Chand period in this context.

11 Based on interviews with Bhotia traders in Dharchula, Garbyang and Taklakot in 2013, 2015 and 2016 by the author.

12 Based on interviews with Nepali traders in Darchula, Chhangru, Tinkar, Hilsa and Taklakot in 2016.

13 One Indian Swami and pilgrim, in 1930, visualised the future airports in Kailas area (Tapovanam Maharaj 1989: 288).

Therefore, instead of adopting a consensus approach and rallying the entire nation together in the face of the possibility of conflict, the government and the ruling party find it necessary to adopt an adversarial approach.

• While facing the questions from the opposition parties regarding the veracity of the number of the terrorists being killed and details of the extent of damage to the terror infrastructure, the government has been trying to use the armed forces as a shield.
• Shirking its own democratic responsibility to answer these questions on the appropriate platform, it has instead chosen to use every other platform to attack the opposition for doubting the armed forces.
• Along with the fact that, in a democracy, the armed forces are not above critical questioning, such rhetoric is also a brazen attempt to use the armed forces for electoral gains, thereby threatening their non-partisan character that is a hallmark of our democracy. However, a ruling party that envisions politics itself as an act of war would not be bothered about such consequences.
• Such a vision of politics, which looks at the state as a war machine, is endemic to the ruling party and this government. Even demonetisation was presented as an act of war or surgical strike on black money, and anyone questioning or opposing it was deemed a traitor.
• However, the constant warlike mobilisation by this government is targeted towards opposition forces, and thereby against the vast sections of its own citizens who are represented by them. It shows how the ruling party is interested in retaining power and not maintaining democratic institutions of the state.
• The government capitalising on air strikes and labelling those who are asking questions about it as enemies within is a reflection of this permanent war mode. It is not surprising, however, that such thinking is espoused by the party that is guided by a regimented group like Sangh Parivar, whose sole purpose itself is waging war on the so-called enemies within.
• In a democracy, citizens are not to be constantly mobilised for war, but invited to join the dialogue. It is the inherent incapability of the current government to initiate such a dialogue that forces it to militarise the conduct and discourse of politics.

Enabled by and enabling this statist logic are the dominant refugee discourses that, intermeshed with other dominant discourses, place the refugee as a singular, and abnormal figure. They are characterised solely by their displacement, as lacking of a state of belonging, and hence of knowledge, as being without agency, as victims, and as threats to the nation, state and its citizens.

Statist Logic

• One of the only ways to contest and push against and beyond the statist dominant refugee discourses is by centring the multiple, divergent, and non-linear stories of people characterised as refugees, speaking in their own voices, so that they authoritatively own their stories and their renderings.
• Long-standing and mostly unquestioned statist understandings and practices, assumed as natural and foundational, bind the state, its borders, citizens, and governance. Driven by (neo)colonisation and capitalism, the (nation) state, a modern and Western construct, has been universalised and normalised as the most basic territorialised unit of identifiable living.
• The state, thus, embodies a concentration of notional, legal, legitimated, centralised, and organisational (physical) power: administrative, penal and military. And, human beings are made to primarily belong, legitimated and protected only as citizens, subjected to the rules, norms, and (national) identity of this polity.
• However, seeping into and emerging out of the state that professes some sense of enshrined equal citizenship are debilitating, violent, and marginalising biases, prejudices, and discriminations. These are based on state-specific dominant understandings and discourses of religion, region, race, class, gender, language, sexuality, ability, etc.
• Additionally, in certain states such as the US and India, there are particular categorisations such as indigeneity and caste. This creates systematic and systemic hierarchies within the state that—servicing mainly the dominant and privileged within it, eventually—is not just for most. States are also hierarchically organised based on the power they yield over other states—politically, economically, and militaristically—consolidating the centrality of the West and states like the US in world affairs.
• Finally, general and state-specific statist logic permeates the lives of all people. Embedded into the individual, public, media, institutions, and government, and rules, norms, and policies at local, national, regional, and international levels, it lays out who people are and are not, where they can belong and cannot, what they can and cannot be, where and how they can live and cannot, and when, where and how they can move and cannot.
• Thus, when the citizen is the normal, the insider, the one who belongs, the refugee is the abnormal, the deviant, the outsider, the one who does not belong. The deviant is the one who is unable or unwilling to adhere to the given rules, norms, and identity of the state.
• As such, they are not only a threat to the very existence and legitimacy of the state, but also, for this reason, dispensable to it, and able and allowed to be dispensed off by it. Paradoxically, in its very essence, in no state can all its formally designated citizens fit in, and so the deviant is constantly present. In every state, for the very possibility of the existence of the citizen, there has to simultaneously exist the non-citizen, its other. This already-present and always-created deviant is threatening and dispensable to the state not only of their origin, but also, as the dispensed off refugee, to the states of passage, refuge, and resettlement.
• The deviant, in the first instance, is the one who is indigenous/tribal, migrant, dissident, or otherwise marginalised legally, medically, environmentally, socially, economically, politically.
• This is the one who, in their being, finds the state wanting and whom the state finds wanting, and the one who, for this reason, individually and/or collectively, even symbolically, threatens the state and is threatened by the state, and its idea and practice of what and who, constitutes its national identity, its economy, its legitimacy of law and dominant societal norms, and its power—national and international—over its people and others.
• It is this outsider who, when forced to leave their home to be able to live, becomes the refugee. In other instances, the deviant is also this refugee or asylum seeker, and, to different degrees, any other un/documented, over/staying foreigner: immigrant, migrant business person, professional, worker, student, tourist, diplomat, etc.
• Even on their best abiding behaviour, fulfilling all the rules of the (new) state, or being granted legal residency or citizenship, this deviant will not be able to fully ascribe to or be able to be fully recognised as ascribing to that state’s exclusive, racial, class, religious, linguistic, and/or sexual citizen identity. This would be true even when these states profess, constitutionally, tenements of liberalism: pluralism, multiculturalism, and secularism.

As such, statist logic(s), and ensuing ever-present statist practice(s), and discourse(s) are instrumental in displacing people internally and externally, within and from state territories. They also simultaneously and categorically reduce, render, and thus displace people as refugees.

They are sought to be seen as innocent, cunning, lying, exploiting, and/or ungrateful victims, as lacking (of a state and its identity) and as threats (to the state, its identity and its citizens) vis-à-vis the naturalised, normalised, and centralised, nation-state entity, and its constructed and willed national identity, national interests, and citizens.

For the refugee to resettle, the state then has to be (further) unsettled and confronted.

Dominant Refugee Discourses

• Dominant refugee discourses driven and enabled by statist logic authoritatively bind people performatively reproduced as refugees into binaries. It renders the citizen as a central agential subject, and the refugee an othered non-agential object through everyday policy and analytical practices.
• These practices are premised on the salience of particular territorialised discourses of the state, nation, and citizen that simultaneously weave through other similarly normalising and authoritative practices that reproduce dominant binarised categories of gender, race, nationality, religion, tribe, language, sexuality, ability, etc; to the effect that the dominant refugee and other intermeshed discourses and practices, based on and constructing borders of all kinds, seek to and do order and delineate human life itself.
• As per the statist logic of inclusions and exclusions of the dominant refugee discourses, the citizen belongs to a nation, a state, a nation state, with rights and duties, within protection, within (state) boundaries, and with an (state/national) identity. On the other hand, the refugee, displaced and designated as not belonging to a nation state, is without rights, with duties, without protection, within (state) boundaries, and always outside (state) boundaries without an identity.
• And, a permanent solution to the refugee’s displacement, their unfortunate predicament, is that they have to be made to belong again, to a nation state of origin, of first (and subsequent) refuge, or of resettlement. The dominant understanding, acceptance, and practice of statist norms, and living—in nation states, in camps, in cities, towns, and villages, in humanitarian efforts, in everyday interactions with passports, and documents, and their lack—is made possible through the dominant discourse(s), and what they enable the speaking of, writing about, and doing for reproducing the refugee and the citizen.

Contesting the Dominant Logic

• Statist dominant refugee discourses have no space/place for the refugee and their stories, except within the statist logic. It reproduces the refugee in the first place, and to which (displaced, marginalised, resisting, and/or threatening) they can never fully belong. In rendering them and their stories voiceless, unheard, and without authority, the discourses objectify and dehumanise the refugee.
• Only original, non-conventional responses critically, ethically, and politically concerned with issues of voice, representation, authority, and agency, that centre the experiences, stories, analyses, and knowledges of people categorised as refugees, about and beyond, their experiences of displacement, can contest, push, and displace the confining, and violent (even fatal) limits imposed on their lives.
• This person can then say that the refugee is not a refugee, but is violently and continuously made so and enacted upon as such in multiple, divergent, fragmented, situated, polyphonic, dialogical, and deconstructive ways, overcoming the author-function, and content, form, and limits of conventional responses. When the authority of the conventional author is not, and cannot, be present to tell the stories of the dominant refugee and other discourses, these discourses are displaced from their centrality, and authority.
• Such a response is situated within increasingly visible and critical feminist, queer, postcolonial, post-structural, and decolonial/indigenous literature, and efforts in visual art, theatre, films, photography, activism, and academics that make visible the hidden and suppressed histories and stories of people from the margins.
• It lets people own their experiences and analyses, of their oppressions, struggles, negotiations, resistances, overcomings, and victories. It enables them to tell these stories in their own voices, in their own ways, and in their own forums, situating these in traditional or contemporary, individual or collective storytelling practices, directly or indirectly opposed to the dominant discourses.

When the department is taken as a “unit,” it can have at least one appointment from each of the reserved category, only when a minimum of 14 appointments are made in that department. This is not possible in many departments as their numerical strength is much lower than 14 faculty positions. Even if it was the case that 14 appointments were possible, the earmarked percentage of reservation may still not be achieved (known as the 13-point roster). However, when a university/college is taken as a unit and all departments are pooled, every reserved category gets the earmarked percentage of reservation, when 200 appointments are made (known as the 200-point roster). The advantage of the 200-point roster over the 13-point roster is that the deficit of reservation in one department is compensated by other departments.

In order to study the impact of this decision on deprived sections, the Delhi University (DU hereafter) could be a good case due to its location and large number of affiliated colleges. Rosters and Reserved

Positions

It is important to note that the 13-point roster was implemented in DU only in 1997 to provide reservation to SC and ST with the following specifications. The first six seats were kept unreserved, the seventh post was kept reserved for SC, and the 14th post for ST. After the completion of one full cycle, the same cycle was repeated. Later, in order to accommodate the 27% reservation for OBC, every fourth seat was kept reserved for the OBC in the same roster. In this manner, every fourth, seventh, eighth, 12th and 14th position was reserved (Table 1, p 12).

It is clear from column 3 of Table 1 that reservation was 0% for the first three seats. Based on the 13-point roster, as long as there are 14 positions, the percentage of reservation increases for every position marked for the reserved category. Nevertheless, even after completing a full cycle of 14 positions, it reaches its highest level of 35.7%, which is substantially short of the constitutionally mandated 49.5% of reservation. Further, if the strength of a department is below 14 positions, it widens the gap between the constitutionally mandated and actually realised percentage of reservation.

Fallacy of Composition

• The 13-point roster is therefore faulty and was made on the basis of dividing 100 by the percentage of reservation given to any reserved group. Since reservation for OBC is 27% they would be given every fourth position (100/27=3.7→ 4th position), while SC (100/15=6.7→7th position) and ST (100/7.5=13.3→14th position) would be given seventh and 14th positions respectively.
• It is clear from columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, that despite the constitutionally mandated 50% reservation, those belonging to reserved categories were getting only five out of 14 positions, while nine out of 14 positions were being kept unreserved (in one sense it is reserved for the general population!).
• The most interesting part of the calculation of roster is that only reserved positions are calculated using this formula. All the positions left after earmarking reserved positions are assumed to be given to unreserved categories. The fallacy of this calculation of the roster can be understood if we calculate posts allocation for the unreserved category, by the same formula as was used in the case of reserved categories.
• In that case every second post shall be kept unreserved (100/50 =2→2nd position), since 50% posts are supposed to be kept unreserved.
• The answer to this puzzle can be found in the fallacy of the calculations for determining the composition. Had the roster for reserved positions been made, taking all reserved categories together (50%), every second position (100/50=2→2nd position) would have been reserved and all the positions would then be distributed within all reserved categories according to their respective reservation shares that is OBC–27%, SC–15% and ST–7.5%.
• We can see in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, that reservation could have been given to reserved category without breaching 50% cap laid down by Supreme Court, if every even number position is kept reserved in the 13-point roster. This formula will increase the proportion of reservation for SC, ST and OBC from 7%, 7% and 21% respectively in the 13-point roster to 14%, 7% and 29% respectively in the modified 13-point roster suggested by the authors.
• In this way the modified reservation formula will bring up the proportion of reservation provided to each category close to the proportion fixed by our constitution. However, a mathematical juggling has been used by the policymakers to reduce the constitutionally mandated reservation for the deprived sections.
• Moreover, this faulty 13-point roster denies even a single representation from the deprived sections in smaller departments of DU and its affiliated colleges (in all other institutions too) where sometimes a maximum of three teachers are required, for example, in departments such as Sanskrit, history, political science, environment science, all regional languages, etc (since reservation is applied only from fourth position onwards).
• For instance, let us assume that three teachers are required in the Sanskrit department of all the 70 colleges of DU. In this situation, at least 210 teachers of Sanskrit will be appointed without appointing even a single teacher from any reserved category. If six teachers are required in the department, then out of the 420 teachers of Sanskrit only 70 teachers belonging to the OBC category would be appointed without appointing even a single teacher from the SC or ST category.

The Change

• The 200-point roster was adopted from 2013 onwards, across most government institutions, following a UGC circular. According to this roster, all departments were to be pooled and the entire institution (university, college, etc) was to be taken as a unit for the calculation of positions for a particular category. Under this formula, every reserved category gets the earmarked percentage of reservation mandated by the Constitution, when a cycle of 200 appointments is completed (hence the 200-point roster). This formula was implemented after much deliberations and discussions, to rectify the basic problems with the 13-point roster, that is, inadequate representation of reserved categories.
• As the 200-point roster starts to be implemented in any institution, it can be seen that it is tilted in favour of the unreserved category in the beginning (the head) of the appointment process. As more and more appointments are made and we approach 200 seats, the appointments turn in favour of the reserved categories. What this means is that, if we compare every quartile (of seats) with its subsequent quartile in 200-point roster, we find that, the farther we move from the head of the distribution of seat allocation, the percentage share of reserved categories is likely to increase. Since 200 point roster makes a pool of all departments/subjects of an institution, the departments placed prior in the sequence of roster allocations will have proportionately higher percentage of teachers belonging to unreserved category while every subsequent department is likely to have proportionately more number of reserved teachers.
• This would result in interdepartmental disparity in the distribution of reserved and unreserved teachers. The same was observed by the honourable Allahabad High Court (upheld by the Supreme Court) in its decision on 7 April 2017. So while the 13-point roster was giving less representation to the reserved category candidates, the 200-point roster was generating inter department/subject disparity in the distribution of appointment of teachers belonging to general and reserved categories, despite providing comparatively better representation to reserved categories (Vivekanand Tiwari and Anr v Union of India and 5 Ors 2017).
• This is clear from Figure 1 (p 14). For the initial 40 positions, the percentage of reservation provided is less, and as we move close to 200 positions, the percentage of reservation increases, and reaches its highest level of 49.5% at 200th position. Interestingly this percentage of reservation will again start falling when the size of an institution increase over and above 200 positions, and will again reach its maximum of 49.5% on 400th position. In this way this cycle will keep repeating every 200 positions.

• If every second position is given to reserved categories in 200-point roster, as is being suggested by the authors, while keeping the internal sequence of reserved positions unchanged and giving 200th position to general category to maintain 49.5% reservation, this can serve two purposes; one, it can address the apprehension of the Allahabad High Court that the 200-point roster could result in some departments/subjects having all reserved candidates and some having only unreserved candidates; second, it will provide equal representations to reserved categories at both the head and tail end of the 200-point roster distribution. Figure 1 shows this distribution diagrammatically. A comparison of the two distribution shows that the modified 200-point line is smoother and reaches close to the equitable line of 50% from the very beginning, while the 200-point line starts reaching equitable line only after crossing 40 positions with a lot of fluctuations. It is worth mentioning here that high fluctuations are going only against reserved categories.

Denial of Reservation Is Not New

• If we look at the history of implementation of reservation policy in DU (as well as in other central institutions), we find that there has always been some efforts to evade constitutionally mandated reservation irrespective of the political party in power. It is worth mentioning here that reservation for SC/ST and OBC was provided in all the central government jobs in 1950 and 1991 respectively, while it was implemented at DU in 1997 and 2007 respectively.
• Even the late implementation of reservation policy came up with the faulty 13-point roster that gave abysmally low number of positions to the reserved categories. Even within these few reserved positions, appointments have been refused using the clause “none found suitable” (NFS), despite the fact that they fulfilled all required eligibility criteria laid down by UGC. Interestingly, this NFS clause was mostly used for the reserved categories, and rarely, if at all for general category positions. However, after judicial interventions, few frivolous decisions of NFS were reverted.
• There are other ways in which reservation is denied. The reservation policy was misinterpreted: though it was supposed to be given at all levels of recruitment where direct appointments were being made, it was provided only at the level of assistant professor, and denied at higher levels of teaching posts, that is, associate professor and professor. As a result, most of the teaching post advertisements had proportionately higher number of positions for associate professors and professors rather than that of assistant professors.
• This denial of reservation for higher levels of teaching continued till 2007, when UGC instructed all institutions to give reservation at all levels of teaching positions. There again, OBCs were kept out of the loop and were deliberately restricted to the level of assistant professors without any substantial reason.
• The manner in which reservations are denied, takes the form of rolling advertisements, where the number of posts reserved in any department is not earmarked. In the absence of clear mention of any reserved position, many applicants from the reserved categories hesitated to apply.
• Since reserved positions were not mentioned in the advertisement, these institutions were free to allocate the reserved seats in any department after receiving the applications. In a conscious effort to evade reservation, they started giving reservation in only those departments where no application was received from any of the reserved categories. In fact, the idea was not to provide any reservation in a department where the applications from the reserved category were received. It was easy to do so, since the reserved positions were to be earmarked only after receiving the applications.

^{Representation of SC, ST and OBC}

• All such attempts at diluting the efficacy of implementation of reservation has resulted in a meager representation of reserved categories in all central universities. Table 2 shows that the representation of SC/ST/OBC in all central universities of the country in 2016–17, to be only 32% of all the teachers working as assistant professors, against 50% of constitutional provision.
• One may think that lesser representation may be due to the reason that reservation for SC/ST and OBC was implemented in 1997 and 2007 respectively. However, the late implementation of reservation may not affect representation at the level of assistant professor since all those appointed as assistant professor before 2007 would already have been promoted to associate professor under Career Advancement Scheme (CAS).

• If we look carefully, we find that this representation of deprived section was even poorer at higher levels of teaching positions, that is, associate professors and professors, where their combined representation was just 7.8% and 5.4% respectively. The combined representation of all the reserved categories at the level of associate professors and professors was just 7.8% and 5.4% respectively and is far less than that of the Muslims that was 15% and 15.9% respectively. It is worth mentioning here that some castes amongst the Muslims also fall under the category of OBC and ST. If we exclude that figure the representation of non-Muslim deprived sections would be far lesser.

Is the Apprehension Exaggerated?

The judgment of the Allahabad High Court was misread by the UGC while issuing the letter on 5 March 2018 to all educational institutions to advertise vacancies based on the earlier practice of calculating reserve positions based on 13-point roster. The Allahabad High Court, in its judgment, did not instruct the replacement of the 200-point roster with the 13-point roster; its objection was only limited to the present form of 200-point roster, which was resulting in an inequitable distribution of reserved and unreserved posts across departments. This problem could have been easily rectified by making small changes in the 200-point roster.

• However, within a month of the receipt of the UGC letter, a large number of advertisements with new distribution of reserved posts, surfaced in the media. It was hard to believe that the preparation of the roster, which requires significant time in order to follow due process, that is, constitution of a committee, preparation of a new roster, taking approvals, advertising the vacancy, etc, were completed by most institutions within a period of one month.
• The apprehension of the reserved categories is not baseless if we look at the advertisements of faculty positions, post UGC letter dated 5 March 2018, by various central universities. For instance, the advertisement of the Indira Gandhi National Tribal University (IGNTU) (Amarkantak) gives only one seat to SC/ST/OBC out of 53 seats (1%), while the Central University of Tamil Nadu has given only two seats out of 65 (6%). The Central University of Haryana (CUH) and Atal Bihari Vajpeyi Hindi Vishwavidyalaya (ABVHV) did not apportion any vacancy to any reserved category.

  Though the percentage of reservation given was somewhat higher in the Banaras Hindu University (BHU) and Allahabad University, approximately 22.5% and 22% respectively, it was also far below the constitutionally mandated 49.5%. The varying percentage of reservation in various institutions was due to the difference in the date of establishment of these institutions as well as respective size of their departments.

• One can notice a high level of difference in the percentage of positions reserved in old institutions (BHU and Allahabad University) and new institutions (IGNTU, CUH, etc). This is due to the fact that the 13-point roster provides inter-temporal equity between the unreserved and reserved categories by providing present vacancies to unreserved categories while future vacancies were earmarked for the reserved categories (though not to the level mandated by the Constitution).

  However, there is a big disadvantage of intertemporal equity, especially when a new department is established, as mostly unreserved category candidates will be appointed and if the department is abolished later, reserved category will not get any chance to be appointed.

  Thus, we see that whether old or new, all institutions are witnessing drastic fall in the number of vacancies for reserved categories, and apprehensions of reserved categories are not unfounded. This was certainly not what was meant by the Allahabad High Court in its judgment.

Conclusions

Thus, we see that the reserved categories have always been misled, when it comes to being provided their share in the faculty positions. In principle, reserved categories can cross the 49.5% ceiling of reservation when their candidates find place in the merit of general category.

• But, these reserved categories could never attain the constitutionally mandated 49.5% reservation in faculty appointments. In many other competitive examinations they could manage to get into the general category, but one can rarely see this phenomenon in the appointment of faculty.
• This is the reason why we have meagre representation of reserved category candidates compared to their population proportion and earmarked proportions of reservation. There are many reasons for this noticeable change; first, the selection procedure for faculty appointment is completely subjective and based on interviews only.
• Second, reserved category faculty are not found at higher levels, which can influence this very subjective appointment system. Third, reserved posts are calculated on the basis of faulty roster system to provide reservation. Fourth, there have always been attempts to evade reservation by many employing innovative methods.
• It is high time that the present government, which is already being accused of being anti-reservation, take a stand and contest the case in the court in an honest and wholehearted manner. This is also a lesson for the reserved category applicants, not to accept any roster, whether the 13-point or 200-point, without first closely scrutinising its implications.

  Despite the 200-point roster being unjust to reserved categories, this was interpreted as being unjust to unreserved categories by the courts. Had there been every second position reserved in the 200-point roster, it would not have resulted in interdepartmental inequity in the distribution of reserved and unreserved posts, and the Allahabad High Court would not have put a stay on the 200-point roster.

• Interestingly, since the initial departments in the 200-point roster are tilted in favour of unreserved posts, by the time Allahabad High Court stayed the practice, many initial departments had completed the appointment process. It was now the turn of those departments where the proportion of reserved categories was higher, to start appointment process when the Allahabad High Court put a ban on this roster. Does this not again indicate some sort of a pattern?

There is now growing empirical evidence on how climate change disproportionately affects the poor. With climate change, people face shortage of water and food, resulting in increased competition to access these basic necessities. This increases the chances of the intensification of existing conflicts and also creates new ones.The water crisis in Cape Town began in 2015, and the city continues to live under the threat of becoming the first major city in the world to run out of water. However, the poorer neighbour hoods in the city have not only been dealing with reduced access to water for years now, but are more likely to face the brunt of the crisis.

• In the Democratic Republic of Congo, shifts in the timing and patterns of rainfall have led to lower food production and greater competition on arable land, increasing ethnic tensions and conflicts in the country. Such conflicts affect the poor the most, and further lead to an increase in poverty and displacement, pushing people into a vicious trap.
• Frequent floods and droughts caused by climate change lead to food shortages and rise in food prices. This causes ­hunger and malnutrition, the effects of which are felt most strongly by the poor. According to the World Food Programme’s 2018 Global Report on Food Crises, “climate disasters triggered food crises across 23 countries, mostly in Africa, with shocks such as drought leaving more than 39 million people in need of urgent assistance.”
• According to the 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement, “30.6 million new internal displacements associated with conflict and disasters were recorded in 2017 across 143 countries and territories.” This amounts to 80,000 people being displaced every day. The report identifies floods and storms (mainly, tropical cyclones) as the primary causes of displacement, leading to 8.6 million and 7.5 million displacements, respectively.
• Climate refugees can be found all over the world, displaced by coastal flooding in Dhaka, by hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, or due to the desertification of Lake Chad in West Africa. It is estimated that the number of people seeking asylum in the European ­Union due to climate change would see a 28% increase by 2100.
• India ranks fifth globally for the losses it has experienced due to climate change. Around 800 million people in the country live in villages and depend on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. With at least 50% of the farmlands in the country being rain-fed, changes in the pattern of the monsoons will affect their livelihoods the most. Empirical evidence suggests that climate change has led to a decline in wheat yields and has lowered the productivity of workers.
• Studies reveal that small farmers are aware of the long-term changes in the weather pattern and have changed their practices to deal with the resultant socio-economic changes. Small farmers also lack access to credit and other means of insurance, which makes them more vulnerable to climate change. Thus, climate change will make the existing problems of poverty, malnutrition, and farmer suicides worse.
• At the Katowice Climate Conference in 2018, India called out the developed nations for reneging on their promises to provide developing countries with the financial support to combat climate change. It is the poor and developing countries that are being affected by the effects of climate change in the worst way, while having contributed next to nothing in creating the crisis of ­climate change.
• And, it is these very countries that are being left behind both in terms of growth and development and mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change as they try to juggle their commitments to both. If steps are not taken quickly, climate change has the potential to reverse decades of growth and development globally, and particularly in India.
• The warning bells have been tolling for a while now, and the widening disparities between the developed and the developing countries, the rich and the poor, the global North and the South, are emerging clearer than ever where climate change and its effects are concerned.