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The men are on death row for more than a decade, living solitary, tortured, and pitiable lives in jails. One of them turns out to have been a minor when the offence allegedly took place, but no heed is paid to that by any of the courts. When three of them find their death sentences commuted by the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court overturns such commutation and awards the death penalty without hearing them at all. The ­Supreme Court then dismisses their review petitions without an open court hearing.

• It was only when the curative petition in the Supreme Court was placed before a totally different bench and the “error” was discovered that the wheels of justice finally began to turn.
• This case provides ample justification for the rule introduced by the Supreme Court that review petitions in death penalty cases must be heard in open court to bring in transparency to the ­process.
• In the end, the Supreme Court has acquitted all the ­accused, directed the state of Maharashtra to pay compensation to them, and attempted to hold the police accountable for this callous lapse. What it has not done is offer any sort of mea culpa for its own failings in this case.
• While the Supreme Court is fond of justifying the death penalty on the grounds that it must be applied only in the “rarest of rare cases” and after carefully weighing all mitigating and ­aggravating factors in a case, in reality it has been happy to discard the law at the drop of a hat. The judgment awarding the death penalty to the convicts in the “Nirbhaya” case, for example, is long on impassioned rhetoric and short on the law when it comes to awarding the death penalty.
• The very same bench that overturned the death penalty in the Ankush Shinde case also awarded the death penalty in another case on the same day, in a judgment that is empty of any analysis or reasoning on why the death penalty was merited in the matter (Khushwinder Singh v State of Punjab).
• To be fair to the Supreme Court, while it has commuted ­almost all death penalties in the recent past (11 out of 12 in 2018, for instance), the trial courts on the other hand seem to be more perversely enthusiastic about death penalties than ever.
• As the report by National Law University, Delhi on the annual statistics for the death penalty shows, 2018 paradoxically also saw the highest number of death penalties awarded by the trial courts since 2000. If the quality of the investigation, trials, and the judgments in the Ankush Shinde case are anything to go by, it is safe to assume that a large number of such death penalties have been awarded by the courts in cases with grievously faulty trials.
• And, yet, this hardly seems to inform bloodthirsty calls in the public for increasing the imposition of death penalty by the courts.
• Politicians of all stripes are happy to accede to these ­demands, which are ignorant or unconcerned about the ­vagaries of a broken criminal justice system that only ends up crea­ting more victims than punishing any hardened criminals. The courts at the lower level seem happy to go along with the popular mood, imposing the death penalty liberally despite the evident failings in the prosecution’s case or the ability of the ­defen­dant to mount a proper defence.
• It is then up to the appe­llate courts to try and remedy the injustice, but, as the Shinde case shows, they too are fallible. Even when they are eventually acquitted or find their death penalty commuted, the torment suffered by convicts as a result of the endless delays and flawed decision-making in a broken criminal justice system is rarely remedied.
• With the criminal justice system being what it is, it is hard to see the death penalty as anything but an institutionalised form of murder, one that unerringly chooses its victims from the ­oppressed and disenfranchised sections of society. With the political leadership unwilling to do the morally right thing, we can only hope that the Supreme Court will finally awaken to the reality of the situation and put in place an immediate moratorium on the death penalty.

We should not fail to recognise the fact that although most teachers, especially English teachers, in Karnataka have ­become public figures by virtue of their writings in Kannada, they have always exercised tremendous influence on generations of students who cherish their classroom experiences under their teachers.

The media and the public too often overlook the teaching careers of such personalities and valorise their writing selves.

• What interests me in Giraddi is his extraordinary career as a scholar–teacher. He began his teaching career in a small village called Hanumanamatti near Ranebennur in 1963 and, then, went on to teach at Karnatak College, Dharwad.
• This was when Giraddi was initiated into the rich tradition of scholar–teachers that was flourishing in the Dharwad of those days. D R Bendre, the great poet, used to be addressed as “Bendre master.”
• In Dharwad, Giraddi’s literary sensibilities took shape under the tutelage of V K Gokak, another prominent Dharwad intellectual. Giraddi, along with Champa (Chandrashekhar Patil) and Siddalinga Pattanashetty, who are also scholar–teachers and writers, comprised the trio that brought out Sankramana, a leading literary magazine of the time.
• It was the literary activities at Dharwad that contributed immensely to the making of the teacher in Giraddi. While Giraddi in his teaching borrowed heavily from Dharwad’s literary culture, he could also contribute to it considerably drawing from his teaching experience.
• When Karnatak University set up a postgraduate centre in Gulbarga, Giraddi became a university teacher at the ­centre, where, as he used to recall, his leisurely job and the unchallenging students in class gave him ample opportunities in the evenings to engage himself with ­theatrical activities.
• What he taught in his classroom—say, for example, plays—he could practise in the evenings along with amateur theatre participants. Giraddi, thus, was one of those rare teachers who utilised the opportunities provided by his teaching career to cultivate the writer in him.
• Giraddi’s literary engagement with Kannada would not have been possible without his expertise as an academic in English studies, although he did not produce any significant writings in English. Some of his “pure-English” colleagues criticised him for having betrayed the discipline by not writing in English.
• As far as my knowledge goes, ­Giraddi was capable of extraordinary work in English, at least on par with his contemporaries. But, he, like several academics of his generation, made a conscious decision of writing in the bhasha.
• I remember him once telling me that English departments in India should serve the purpose of our local cultures; in Karnataka, for example, they should work for the enunciation of Kannada life.
• This often resulted in his colleague M K Naik, one of the leading proponents of Indian English literature, having differences with him.
• Though ­Giraddi was trained in linguistics at the Central Institute of English and Foreign Languages (CIEFL; now English and Foreign Languages University), Hyderabad, and completed his master’s in linguistics from Lancaster University, United Kingdom, he chose to work for Kannada. Otherwise, he could have settled down at one of the premier institutions elsewhere.
• When I went to do my master’s in English at Karnatak ­University in the late 1990s, I was surprised to find Giraddi the chairman of the English department. I, like several friends of mine, had thought that he was a professor of ­Kannada literature as we had read his short stories in Kannada before going to university.
• That indeed was the beginning of our literary education. But, it was intriguing that ­Giraddi never revealed to us his identity as a Kannada writer in class. He hardly cited examples from Kannada literary texts, nor did he share his experiences of interacting with great Kannada writers. This left many of us disappointed.
• I still find it puzzling why Giraddi kept his engagement with Kannada literature, his most sought-after passion, away from his classroom teaching. I now believe that it is an ­extremely important obligation of English teachers in India to forge their bilingual and bi-literary sensibilities.
• Some of my classmates who had introduced me to Kannada literature were quite upset when Giraddi did not mention anything about the writer and polymath K Shivarama Karanth when he passed away in 1997.
• On that day of gloom in our class, we were eagerly waiting for Giraddi to talk about his experience with Karanth and his writings. But, to our dismay, he went on with linguistic analysis as if all was well in the ­Kannada literary world.
• Giraddi, who was in the news recently for proposing the golden mean, the madhyama maarga (middle path), was a dvaiti (dualist) as far as the use of language was concerned. He spoke only in English in our classes; never did his Kannada interfere with his “English-medium” teaching.
• However, when he spoke in public, he used Kannada as if he did not know English. This was completely at odds with his intellectual conviction of working for the local culture. Sometimes, it is difficult to understand the ways of the people we admire.
• Probably, he did not want to show off his scholarly achievements and, obviously, he was never pretentious about his ­intellectual life. I remember having read about Immanuel Kant maintaining such a disciplined separation; he never talked about philosophy outside his academic interactions. A rare thing to observe in philosophers!
• Giraddi was very dry and monotonous when he taught ­linguistics, but was quite lively when teaching British modernist literature. Our generation of students will never forget the way he taught us T S Eliot and W B Yeats.
• Probably, Eliot was his favourite poet. He taught us Eliot, especially The Waste Land, for half a year. I remember one of my seniors saying that Giraddi would make The Waste Land dance before us.
• It was such an unforgettable experience for us as students that we started saying that “Giraddi Sir is not a Professor of English, but a Professor of T S Eliot.” Of course, Eliot was such an influence on Giraddi that, due to his teaching, Eliot became the favourite of many generations of his students.
• He also drew our attention to the extraordinary merit of Eliot’s prose, not to mention the pleasure and profit one derives from reading it. Thanks to his suggestion, I now take refuge in Eliot’s prose whenever I am feeling low. We could not have discovered the poet in Eliot’s prose, but for Giraddi.
• His teaching of Eliot not only shaped us, but also shaped Giraddi, the critic. I would see him go over to meet G S Amur, the writer and professor of literature whom he admired as his guru, only to learn from his conversations with him.
• The learner never ceased to exist in Giraddi, and he taught us that to be a teacher is to be a learner forever. During our student days, he was at the fag end of his career, retiring when we graduated. But, he was never tired of engaging classes even during his retirement period.
• He used to prepare for classes as if he were doing it for the first time. When he assumed office as chairman of the Karnataka Sahitya Akademi, he would come down from Bengaluru during the weekends to complete his portions of the syllabus enthusiastically.
• As a writer, he inspires us even today to work for Kannada and, as a teacher, he inspires us to love teaching amidst the challenges posed by the resistance to learning. Our challenge is to cultivate literary sensibilities in the age of social media.
• His scholarly teaching showed us that to be a teacher is to lead the life of a scholar, for the teacher cannot come into ­being without the scholar.

This paper analyses the potential benefits of the price deficiency payments system vis-à-vis the existing MSP policy for selected crops such as rice, wheat, gram, tur (arhar) and cotton, and looks at the challenges involved in implementing the proposed system.

It also examines whether price deficiency payments will work better than the existing MSP policy to improve farm productivity and incomes, as well as help reduce the farm subsidy bill of the government. The paper is based mainly on the analysis of secondary data and review of relevant literatures.

Why Price Deficiency Payments?

• The case for price deficiency payments to farmers is made out on the ground that the existing MSP policy, which is being followed in India since 1965 for various agricultural commodities, is highly inadequate and ineffective from a farmer’s perspective and also inefficient from an economic point of view.
• First, the costs of production vary widely from region to region and the existing methodology of fixing MSPs, based on all India weighted average costs, does not necessarily guarantee remunerative prices to all farmers in all regions.
• Second, the farmers in general are unhappy with the MSP programme because the input costs in crop production have recently gone up at a faster pace than the MSPs.
• From 2004–05 to 2014–15, the average annual growth rate of C2 cost of production of paddy was 11.2% in Bihar and 11.9% in West Bengal, while the MSP of paddy increased only at the rate of 10.6% per year.
• Third, MSPs are to some extent effectively implemented only in Punjab, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh for wheat and Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Punjab and Haryana for rice. The farmers in other states hardly benefit from MSPs as there is either a very small or no presence of government procurement agencies.
• The 70th round of National Sample Survey for 2012–13 reveals that only 32.2% of paddy farmers and 39.2% of wheat farmers in the country were aware of the MSP, while only 13.5% of paddy farmers and 16.2% of wheat farmers sold their produce to government procurement agencies (GOI 2014).
• The main reason cited for not selling to these agencies was their non-availability at the local level.
• In the case of commercial crops like cotton and jute, the Cotton Corporation of India (CCI) and Jute Corporation of India respectively intervene only when the market prices fall substantially below the MSPs. There is no effective procurement policy for coarse cereals, pulses and oil seeds.
• Also, the fair and remunerative price fixed for sugar cane generally comes in conflict with state-advised prices and is rarely implemented. Under these circumstances, a majority of the farmers in the country do not really benefit from the MSPs.
• At the same time, the MSP policy has been under attack recently by several economists. It is argued that this policy destroys the power to harness the market potential and kills efficiency (Chand 2013). Chand further argues that
• it is not feasible for public agencies to procure the marketed surplus of each and every commodity everywhere in the country to prevent prices falling below a floor level; nor would this be desirable … So, new mechanisms have to be devised to protect producers against the price falling below the threshold level. (Chand 2012)
• There are other economists who criticise the MSP policy because of its adverse impact on the gross domestic product and food price inflation (Parikh et al 2003; Bhattacharya and Sengupta 2015).
• Moreover, the union government, especially the Ministry of Finance, is worried that higher MSPs of rice and wheat, offered in the recent past, have increased the food subsidy bill. The food subsidy bill increased from ₹72,370.90 crore in 2011–12 to ₹1,05,509.41 crore in 2015–16 (GOI 2016).
• In addition, the increase in MSPs in recent years, resulting in huge procurement and public stock holding of grains, has attracted the attention of the World Trade Organization (WTO), requiring India to find a permanent solution on a best endeavour basis.
• The agricultural trade rules as outlined in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) do not bar public stockholding programmes in developing countries for food security purposes. However, if food is procured at administered prices and not at market prices, then this is deemed support to farmers, and this cannot exceed the limit of 10% of the value of the production in question.
• Therefore, it is not surprising that the policymakers in India are trying to find an alternative mechanism, which would keep the quantum of the subsidy in check and also meet the restrictions on the subsidy imposed by the WTO.
• The main objective of the intended policy shift is to improve farmers’ incomes as well as reduce farm subsidies (GOI 2015a), whereas the objective of the MSP policy is to incentivise farmers to produce more and earn more without caring for subsidy management.

Modus Operandi for Price Deficiency Payments

• The effectiveness of price deficiency payments in either helping the government to reduce its agricultural subsidy bill or improving and stabilising farm incomes will depend on how the programme is conceptualised and operationalised.
• Although, the government has not yet clearly decided the face of the programme, one can refer to several alternative frameworks. Also, one can develop a mechanism based on the experiences of the United States (US) with countercyclical payments or Price Loss Coverage (PLC) schemes in the last several years.
• The first alternative we put forth is that price deficiency payments be based on the difference between the MSPs and farm harvest prices (FHPs).
• The government may continue to fix MSPs for 23 agricultural commodities and provide deficiency payments to farmers for all such commodities whenever the FHPs rule below the MSPs, without purchasing any quantity of the covered crops or purchasing only a limited quantity of any important crop.
• The Ramesh Chand Committee (GOI 2015b) suggested that mechanisms such as deficiency price payment or price insurance should be put in place for price surety for all the crops for which MSP is declared. This is because the MSP cannot be implemented everywhere for all crops through a system of procurement.
• The second alternative suggested is that deficiency payments should be based on the difference between the average of FHPs of the preceding three years and the fourth year price. The NITI Aayog occasional paper proposes that, under the system of price deficiency payment,
• the government would announce a floor price for each crop. This floor may be the average of the market price in the preceding three or four years. Each farmer would register his/her crop and acreage sown with the nearest APMC [agricultural produce market committee] mandi.
• If the market price falls below the floor price, the farmer would be entitled to the difference up to a maximum of, say, 10% of the assumed price that could be paid via direct benefit transfer into an Aadhaar-linked bank account. (GOI 2015a)
• Let us analyse the potential gains and drawbacks of both these propositions.
• Alternative 1: The first proposition involves basing deficiency payments on the difference between the MSPs and FHPs.
  Considering the country as a whole, the average FHPs and MSPs of paddy increased at the rate of 7.84% and 7.77% respectively during the period 1998–99 to 2014–15.
• It may be seen from Tables 1a and 1b (p 54) that the FHPs of paddy were marginally above the MSPs in 13 out of 17 years (1998–99 to 2014–15). From 2010–11 to 2014–15, the average FHP was lower than the MSP only once in 2011–12.
• In fact, the average FHP in the country from 2010–11 to 2014–15 was ₹1,296 per quintal against the average MSP of ₹1,200 per quintal. In such a case, the government does not have to make deficiency payments to farmers.
• But a difference of ₹27 per quintal in 2011–12 would have translated into a cost of ₹4,313 crore for the government based on total production, and ₹3,765 crore based on marketed surplus of paddy.
• In the case of wheat, the FHPs were higher than MSPs in most of the years during the period 1998–99 to 2014–15.
  Figures 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b show the movements of average FHPs and MSPs of paddy (rice) and wheat.
• From 2010–11 to 2014–15, the average of FHPs of wheat was ₹1,324 against the average MSP of ₹1,331. In 2011–12, however, the FHP was lower by ₹126 per quintal in which case the government would have to incur ₹11,529 crore as deficiency payment to farmers.
• If we add the differential value of ₹4,313 crore for paddy production in that year, the total amount for rice and wheat would be ₹15,842 crore based on production figure, and ₹13,818 crore based on marketed surplus.
• In comparison to this, the government’s food subsidy bill due to procurement, distribution and storage of rice and wheat and the gap between their economic costs and the central issue prices worked out to ₹84,553.13 crore per year from 2010–11 to 2014–15. In 2011–12, the food subsidy bill was ₹72,370.90 crore, and in 2015–16 it was ₹1,05,509.41 crore (GOI 2016).
• Thus, the government would make a huge saving by switching to the price deficiency payment system and the farmers would get no less than the MSPs anywhere in the country.
• If the government pays only 10% of the price deficiency to farmers, the amount of average subsidy paid would be even lesser. The challenges involved in the implementation of price deficiency payments could be less in comparison to MSPs as it is not linked to procurement and distribution.
• However, the crops for which MSP has only a notional value, as it is hardly defended even if the FHPs fall below the MSP, tell a different story. In the case of tur (arhar), from 1998–99 to 2014–15, the average of FHPs remained much higher than the MSPs in 14 out of 17 years with huge differences .
• From 2010–11 to 2014–15, the average FHP of tur was ₹3,849 per quintal as against the MSP of ₹3,490 per quintal. In 2011–12, the FHP, however, was as low as ₹3,169 per quintal against the MSP of ₹3,700 per quintal, that is, a difference of ₹531 per quintal.
• In this case, for a production of ₹2.65 million tonne, the government would need to pay ₹1,407.15 crore to the tur growers as deficiency payment. This would amount to ₹1,146.96 crore for the tur sold.
• In reality, the government paid nothing to the farmers; therefore, deficiency payments would mean a net loss of revenue for the government and a gain for the farmers.
• Similarly, in the case of gram, another important pulse crop, the average of FHPs in the country was higher than the MSPs in 14 out of 17 years (1998–99 to 2014–15). Figures 2a and 2b show the temporal variations in average FHPs of tur (arhar) and gram.
• From 2010–11 to 2014–15, the average of FHPs of gram was ₹3,070 against the average MSP of ₹2,835 per quintal. In 2013–14, the average of FHPs of gram in the country was ₹3,049 against the MSP of ₹3,100, that is, less by ₹51 per quintal.
• If the government had to make deficiency payments to the farmers growing gram, the required amount would be about ₹486.03 crore based on production, and ₹407 crore based on marketed surplus of gram in that year. Since gram is not procured by the government, this would be a net revenue loss for the government and net gain for the farmers.
• In the case of cotton, a commercial crop for which there is now an attempt to pilot the system of price deficiency payment, the average of FHPs remained lower than the MSPs in 10 out of 14 years (2001–02 to 2014–15) (Figure 3, Tables 1a, 1b).
• The year-to-year movement of FHP and MSP of cotton is shown in Figure 3. Since, the FHP of cotton was generally lower than the MSP in most of the years, the deficiency payment would hugely benefit the farmers and cause a revenue loss to the government.
• In 2012–13, when the price differential was as much as ₹324 per quintal, the CCI purchased only 392 thousand tonnes of cotton at MSPs out of 34.2 million tonnes of total production.
• The marketed surplus constituted nearly 99% to 100% in the case of cotton; therefore, the MSPs covered only a fraction of the total quantity marketed and the farmers did not benefit much from the MSPs.
• Also, the cotton procurement by the CCI was concentrated mainly in Andhra Pradesh and to a small extent in Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Punjab and Karnataka. The cotton farmers in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh did not benefit much from the cotton purchase operation of the CCI.
• Thus, the farmers in general would benefit immensely if a system of price deficiency payment, using the differential between MSP and FHP, is implemented. At the same time, the government can also reduce its food subsidy bill on rice and wheat.
• Alternative 2: The second proposition involves basing deficiency payments on the difference between the previous three-yearly average price and the fourth year price. If the MSP is rejected as the target or reference price, and the average of past three years FHPs is considered as the reference price, the situation looks more or less similar.
• It can be seen from Figures 4a and 4b (p 57) that the average price of paddy as well as wheat in every fourth year through 2000–01 to 2014–15 was higher than the previous three-yearly average price; therefore, the government does not have to make any deficiency payment to farmers.
• In the case of cotton also, the FHP in every fourth year during the period 2004–05 to 2014–15 was higher than the previous three years’ average price in almost all cases; therefore, the government would not have to make any deficiency payment (Figure 5, p 58).
• In the case of tur, the government would have had to make a small deficiency payment in 2004–05 and 2011–12 and for gram in 2003–04. But, the farmers would have gained because normally they do not receive this kind of benefit, as there is no effective market intervention by the government for pulses.
• Relatively speaking, Alternative 1 seems to be more beneficial to the farmers and Alternative 2 to the government. But, all in all, both the government and farmers in general would be better off switching from the present MSP regime to price deficiency payment system, using both Alternatives 1 and 2.

Production Impact

• The role of MSPs in augmenting crop production in India has changed over time.
• While the price support along with high-yielding variety (HYV) technology played an important role in raising the production of rice and wheat during the 1970s and 1980s (the green revolution period), the supply response to price change has weakened over time.
• According to Vaidyanathan (2010), non-price factors, namely input, technology and institutions, play a fundamental and dominant role in agricultural growth.
• The result of a log linear regression analysis (Table 2) further shows that during the period 1998–99 to 2013–14, MSP significantly influenced output only in the case of wheat.
• For rice, the output response to changes in MSP was positive but statistically non-significant; whereas for cotton and gram, the impact was positive albeit statistically non-significant. For tur, the impact was negative but statistically non-significant.
• The role of irrigation was found to be positive only in the case of rice and cotton. Besides, the role of technology was positive and significant in raising the cotton production. As against this, price deficiency payment, not linked to current production and prices, is not supposed to have any effect on production.
• But, in reality, such payments indirectly result in reducing the price risk and increasing the incomes of participating farmers and, consequently, their ability to invest more and enhance output.
• Although this has yet to be demonstrated in practice and evaluated, a recent study suggests that switching from MSP to deficiency subsidies would be less distortive and less costly, without affecting the output adversely (Kozicka et al 2015).

Regional Variations

• However, if region-specific price deficiency payment mechanism is followed, the farmers in different regions would either benefit or lose differently due to regional variations in the pattern of temporal changes in prices.
• If we adopt MSP as the reference or target price, that is Alternative 1, the difference between FHP and MSP is quite frequent and large in several states in respect of the selected crops. In the case of paddy, the FHPs remained generally lower than the MSP in Bihar, but in Punjab it was higher than the farm harvest prices in most of the years (Tables 3a, 3b, p 58).
• The paddy growers in Bihar would be entitled to deficiency payment, but not those in Punjab. Wheat farmers in both Bihar and Punjab would benefit from deficiency payment based on Alternative 1, but those in Madhya Pradesh would not.
• In Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, the two prices remained largely close to each other. For wheat, the FHPs were mostly lower than MSPs in Bihar and Punjab, and therefore farmers in both these states would gain by way of deficiency payments.
• But, it was higher than the MSP in Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, wheat growers in Madhya Pradesh would not be eligible for deficiency payment as the FHP was higher than the MSP.
• In the case of cotton and gram, FHPs were higher than MSPs in most states in many of the years during the period 1998–99 to 2014–15. But, for tur, the FHPs were higher than MSPs between 1998–99 and 2009–10; however, these remained lower than the MSPs thereafter.
• In other words, the MSP of tur has been ruling higher than the FHPs in the past few years. So, the tur growers may not benefit from the deficiency payment principle; although in reality, all tur and gram cultivators on the whole shall benefit as presently there is no effective implementation of MSP in the country. Even if one considers Alternative 2, farmers might be better off.
• Table 4a through Table 4e (pp 59, 60) show the variations in FHPs in important states over time in respect of selected crops. It can be seen from Table 4a that in Andhra Pradesh the FHP of paddy in every fourth year was higher than the previous three-yearly average price, so no deficiency payment would be required.
• But, in the case of Punjab and Haryana, the fourth year price was lower than the previous three years’ average price in five out of 14 years considered . In other states, the fourth year FHP of paddy was lower than the three-yearly average price in at least two to four years.
• Similarly, in the case of wheat, no deficiency payment to farmers in Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan and Maharashtra was required as the FHP in every fourth year was higher than the previous three-yearly average price.
• But, in Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, deficiency payment would have had to be made. In Punjab, the fourth year price was lower than the previous three years average price only twice in 14 years, while it was thrice in West Bengal .
• In the case of cotton, almost all states had some cyclical variation in FHPs and, therefore, the government would have had to pay the deficiency in prices. In the case of both tur and gram, almost all states except Bihar had witnessed deficiencies in the two prices in the fourth year and, therefore, the government would have had to incur a net loss of revenue, while the farmers would gain.
• The overall emerging scenario suggests that both government and farmers would be better off switching to the price deficiency payment mechanism from the present MSP system, irrespective of whether Alternative 1 or Alternative 2 is followed.

Key Challenges

• It becomes clear from the above discussion that the price deficiency payment system may be a better choice over MSP for both farmers and the government under certain conditions. However, there would be several challenges in the effective implementation of price deficiency payment system.
• First, if centrally fixed MSPs do not benefit farmers of all regions equally, as the costs of production vary from region to region, price deficiency payments, based on one national reference price, could be unequal too because the farm harvest prices also vary from state to state.
• Second, if the MSP system is criticised because of high programme costs, the price deficiency payment may be equally vulnerable on that count.
• In years when production of selected crops is high, market clearing prices may be pushed to very low levels and deficiency payments and, consequently, farm subsidy would increase (Russo 2007).
• The programme costs can be reduced to some extent by limiting payments up to 10% of the price difference, as the NITI Aayog paper indicates; however, this may or may not be politically feasible.
• Third, in an unregulated market, middlemen can create an artificial shortage or glut in order to increase their profits. In the presence of middlemen and traders, holding market power, the effects of price deficiency payments on either government subsidy or farmers’ welfare would be uncertain.
• Fourth, if the price deficiency payment programme is adopted, the government may stipulate to either scrap or phase out the food procurement programme and make the deficiency payment to farmers via direct benefit transfer into their Aadhaar-linked bank account.
• Once this happens, the procurement-based MSP will die a natural death. However, the real value of cash transfers may get eroded in a period of rising prices (Ghosh 2011).
• Fifth, there would be problem in the implementation of price deficiency payments through Aadhaar-linked land record and bank accounts because a large number of farmers do not have either of these. Also, informal tenants, who benefit from the MSP currently, would fail to benefit from any price deficiency payment.
• Sixth, in the absence of MSP based procurement of grains such as rice and wheat, farm market prices may fall. Hence, the gap between any statutorily fixed reference price and the FHP may be quite large, causing a loss to the government exchequer in terms of price deficiency payments.
• Seventh, farmers may view the price deficiency payments as a risk reducing income hedge and may not fully respond to market signals.
• Eighth, price deficiency payments linked to current production would affect farmers’ current production decisions and, therefore, would be questioned for being market distorting.
• Hence, the deficiency payments should be decoupled from current production and appropriately linked to fixed proportion of any past level of production. As a matter of fact, decoupled payments would also influence farmers’ wealth, risks and crop choice, although such influence could be lower than that of coupled payments (Bhaskar and Beghin 2007).
• Finally, another point to consider is that price deficiency payments in the US have shown mixed results. The countercyclical payments under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and the PLC under the Agricultural Act of 2014 have posed many challenges.
• The PLC protects the farmers of the covered crops from a fall in prices below the statutorily fixed reference prices.
• But, the reference prices fixed, based on the high prices existing during the legislation debate of 2010–12, are not only much higher than the target prices fixed in the 2008 act, but also above the current market prices, warranting higher levels of deficiency payments and farm subsidy.
• This could accelerate “the move towards the US breaching its domestic support limit, set by the AoA ($19.1 billion)” (Dhar and Kishore 2016). Also, the US is more vulnerable to sharp swings in its notified support under the product-specific aggregate measure of support because of the nature of its programme and the willingness of the government to provide more support to farmers.
• A similar situation, though unintended, may frighten India’s policymakers, especially if MSPs are used as statutorily fixed reference prices, which are determined by costs of production as well as political considerations and hiked every year.
• In other words, effective implementation of price deficiency payments may be as difficult as the existing MSP policy. In fact, the risks due to price volatility and market imperfections can be often unpredictable and their management would pose a challenge.

Conclusions

• To conclude, the system of price deficiency payment is perhaps a better option than the existing system of MSPs for both the government and farmers.
• However, necessary safeguards and corrective measures have to be initiated, as and when required, to minimise the risks involved.
• Deficiency payments should be designed not only to stabilise or improve farm income but also to improve food security, fiscal prudence and sustainability of agriculture.
• From this perspective, deficiency payments should be limited or targeted to a few specific commodities unlike the PLC programme in the US which covers almost all crops and MSP in India, which covers as many as 23 crops.
• Otherwise, the relative advantages of price deficiency payment system over the MSP policy in terms of subsidy reduction would be lost.
• Besides, updation and digitisation of Aadhaar-linked land records and bank accounts along with legalisation of land leasing would be essential for any price deficiency payment programme to be adequately effective.

Note

• Calculated by the authors, using data sourced from reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, Government of India.

What Is Epistemology?

The concept of epistemology, derived from the Greek word episteme (knowledge) and logos (reason) refers to the theory of knowledge. An important branch of philosophy, it is the study of the nature, origin and limits of human knowledge. The nature of knowledge is as important as the origin of knowledge in generating relevant epistemology.

• No scientific study can be evaluated or justified by the norms of faith or dictates of authority. For example, the discoveries of Copernicus (1473–1543) and Galileo (1564–1642) were epistemologically shocking to the College of Cardinals who had the monopoly of knowledge in the 16th century in Europe. Ultimately only scientific truth and not beliefs can promote and sustain progress.
• Kuhn’s (1962) view of the evolution of science as characterised by long periods of gradual “puzzle-solving normal science” followed by paradigm shifts offers an explanatory hypothesis about the nature of knowledge creation. Ola Olsson (2000: 254) argues that knowledge is created through convex combinations of older ideas and through paradigm shifts. We investigate in what manner this happened in economics.
• The nature of knowledge creation in the discipline of economics, has not been subjected to any in-depth analysis or interrogation. The almost unquestioned dominance (certainly during 1980–2008) of neoclassical economics in the academic profession and the rather pathological antipathy to Marxian epistemology and institutional economics has not been subjected to proper scrutiny.
• What I am concerned here is not Marxism as a creed but Marx’s unique contributions to the knowledge of understanding the dynamics of economic progress and the nature of the process of social history.
• I have provided a comprehensive analysis of economics courses in Indian universities based on an examination of curriculum of 26 Indian universities (Oommen 1987). This lengthy piece, inter alia, refers to the overemphasis on neoclassical economics and the deliberate de-emphasis of Marxian epistemology and economic history in teaching.
• The author was particularly struck by the dominance of Paul Samuelson’s Economics1 (this textbook first published in 1948, ran into several editions) which preferred “economic principles that display some of the logical beauty of Euclid’s geometry” as against that of Marx who defined economics as the science which studies how historically specific systems of economic relations originate, operate and change (Marx 1973: 852–53).
• Samuelson ignores the larger question of fairness in the distribution of wealth and income, but upholds “market efficiency” as the central theme of economics. An alternate textbook of the day imbued with considerable realism written by Joan Robinson and John Eatwell of Cambridge in 1974 titled An Introduction to Modern Economics rarely appeared in the syllabuses.
• My misgivings about the content of syllabuses and method of teachings, have persisted (Oommen 2004: chapter 1, 2012, 2017).2 Recent writings by Piketty (2015, 2017) gave the author hope and encouragement to raise the issue once again. After Piketty: The Agenda of Economics and Inequality, in which nearly two dozen scholars, economists and non-economists, have written, can be taken as a signal for rethinking and reflection on the epistemology of the discipline.
• It is high time that teachers and researchers of the subject ask fundamental questions about how the economy works and for whom it ticks. We may recall that most scholars of political economy in the 19th century placed the issue of distribution at the centre of their analysis, of course motivated by the great social changes they saw around them.

Neoclassical Economics

The neoclassical paradigm is treated as an immutable ingredient of social life, and many of the arguments are presented as non-falsifiable. But as Karl Popper rightly points out, all scientific propositions must be falsifiable. Further, so long as you treat prices, supply and demand, long-run equilibrium, full employment and so on, as an integrated set, the question of private ownership, vested interests, influence, power and such other factors that affect allocation and management of resources in real life, stand automatically ruled out.

• That the arbitrary whims and fancies of the top 1% or even a hardcore of 0.1% can alter the social priorities, needs and options of the rest of humanity itself and manipulate several such vital issues, are conveniently forgotten. Indeed the arc of neo-liberalism is not an innocent artifact but an engineered ideology to justify and perpetuate accumulation process and market society.
• If we accept that the ontological vocation of human beings is to transform the society in which they live, then no social science can be neutral between ends as postulated by the neoclassicals. Indeed economics is an applied social science “as medicine is an applied natural science. Biologists who do not see curing illness as their main job are not doctors even when associated with medical school” (Hobsbawm 1999: 128).
• Two historical events, namely, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia and the Great Depression of the 1930s checkmated the continued ascendancy of the neoclassical paradigm and influenced the growth of new economic ideas in the 20th century. The Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent growth of industrialisation in the Soviet Union exploded the laissez-faire postulates and altered the political, economic and intellectual landscape of the world.
• The Great Depression also severely shook the prevailing faith in the free market capitalist economy. No wonder John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money that sought to explain the Great Depression and to suggest remedies proved to be a spectacular success.The World War II, the post-world war rehabilitation, the growth of post-Keynesianism, the quest for social change in the postcolonial world, the emergence of development economics4 as a subdiscipline of economics, and the rise of innumerable development centres throughout the world (including India) gave a strong setback to the free market paradigm and to neoclassical economics which provided its ideological basis.
• However, with the collapse of Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the increasing questioning of the state spending on welfare and military hardware, the rise of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ronald Reagan in the United States (US) to power led to the re-emergence of the neoclassical paradigm of market-mediated growth.

During the last three decades prior to the financial crisis of 2008 that led to the downfall of Lehman Brothers and several others following the sub-prime lending, neoclassical economics influenced the world’s policy regime. Although challenged, this body of knowledge still rules the roost and continues to enjoy the patronage of most universities, notably in the US.

For those who embrace capitalism as an ideal, individuals are always rational and markets always work perfectly.

From the inception of the Nobel prize in economics by the Sveriges Riksbank of Sweden in 1969 till 2017, 49 prizes for 79 economists (39 of them are US citizens) were awarded. While the bank and the Royal Swedish Academy that give the awards have all the right to set the norms for the choice of awardees, even a cursory review of the citations and certainly the works of most of them show a pronounced bias in favour of neoclassical economics.

There are exceptions like Gunnar Myrdal, Amartya Sen, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz who could not be counted as neoclassicalists. Evidently, abstruse abstractions were chosen for research when the world faces abject poverty, growing inequality in wealth and income, intolerable inequity in the availability of opportunities, and such other acute societal problems. What Robert Solow (Nobel in 1987) while probing “inside the minds of 12 Nobel laureates” in his book Economics for the Curious observed recently (2014a) is worth citing:

The fundamental goal of economics as a discipline is to bring organized reason and systematic observation to bear on both large and small economic problems (and to have some intellectual fun on the way).

How can anyone say that economics is “for the curious” and the creation of “intellectual fun” as its avocation? Does the continued preference given to the neoclassical paradigm and its mathematical formulations provide the signal for future agenda for teaching and research? While so-called representative democracy is at best only a defender of capitalism (Dunn 1992), can the institution of social democracy or democratic values of social inclusion remain silent on questions like, for what and for whom the GDP (gross domestic product) is produced and how the claims on it are actually settled? Why economists shy away from questions of inequality and fairness in distribution? The Nobel prizes in economics do not seem to serve as a beacon for concerned social scientists to confront these and similar questions.

Richard Thaler of Chicago University, well known for his “nudge theory”

won the Nobel prize in economics for incorporating psychological assumptions into individual situations. While this is in refreshing contrast to the rational choice of neoclassical theories and opens up a rich area of study, the danger comes when policymakers like the World Bank use it as a theoretical legitimisation for inane policy options to fight poverty, inequality and the like. It is pertinent to read this author’s critique on World Bank’s “new set of development approaches” to contain poverty which to the bank is a behavioural distortion and that the poor alone have to be blamed for their plight.

• In this section, I wish to raise the question of why the Western academia as well as their colonial counterparts have treated Marxian epistemology and institutional economics with apathy while rewarding neoclassical economics and behavioural economics.
• The huge edifice of knowledge that Karl Marx created has been dismissed as poison and propaganda unsuitable for students. Can anyone consider Das Kapital and for that matter Marx’s writings in general as irrelevant knowledge? No one can refute the fact that Marx provides an excellent framework of analysis of capitalism. Mark Blaug, a noted historian of economic thought, points out that Marx wrote “no more than a dozen pages on the concept of social class, the theory of the state and the materialist conception of history” while he wrote “literally 10,000 pages on economics pure and simple”.
• Unlike the courses in macroeconomics and microeconomics that engage in abstractions, Marx does not see theory and practice or abstract and concrete as belonging to two distinct spheres. For Marx, what is abstract is closely related to what is concrete. In fact, the object of his epistemology was as much to interpret the world as to transform it. Those who love economics for its elegance and beauty are in a different moral universe altogether.
• As Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), Clarence Ayres and other institutional economists argue, contemporary society has been considerably influenced by the folklores and mores of neoclassical economics (Ayres 1952, 1961). As noted above (and explained further in the next section) this paradigm is not an innocent artifact, but a strong ideological underpinning of the capital of the world to have their way and use all their might to perpetuate it as well exemplified in Piketty.
• Like Marxists, institutional economics founded by Veblen and enriched by a large number of economists rejected the neoclassical orthodoxy, including its most popular version by Samuelson, who attempted a grand synthesis of microeconomics (neoclassical economics) and macroeconomics (the Keynesian economics). Institutional economics proceeds on the assumption that human beings are interdependent and social and are influenced by social institutions.
• Institutional economics tries to show that the ability of a given society to use new problem-solving knowledge is limited by the patterns of social, political and economic dominations by the rich and powerful elites of that society. Here it is pertinent to quote two scholars on economic thought to show the indifference of the academic establishments towards these sources of knowledge.
• In many economics departments, the ideological domination of conservative neoclassical economists resulted in a situation in which the study of Veblen’s writings became personally, politically, and ideologically “unwise” as did the study of Marx’s writings. Evidence that a young economist took either Marx or Veblen seriously was often construed as evidence of intellectual incompetence.
• Consequently the institutionalist and Marxist schools of economic theory have remained small.
• Professional marginalisation of those who prefer socially relevant studies is a type of intellectual apartheid that must be fought for the sake of progress, alternate thinking and pursuit of relevant epistemology. It is in this setting that I wish to mention the arrival of Thomas Piketty.
• Several economists like Solow who got the Nobel prize in economics for their neoclassical scholarships have praised Piketty for the quality of his work and relevance of his findings (Solow 2014b). An empiricist par excellence, the historical evidence Piketty produced (covering 300 years and 20 countries) along with his reasoning and above all his accent on relevance rather than elegance should make many a Nobel pundit to sit back and reflect.

The Challenge Posed by Piketty

Social thinkers, economists, policymakers and ordinary people the world over have been shaken by Piketty’s book Capital in the 21st Century. That millions of copies have been sold in over 30 languages is something that the economics profession has to take note of. He has pushed forward our understanding of the working of the economy.

• His impact overflows into all social sciences. Economics has no special claim in explaining social reality and Piketty correctly treats economics as a subdiscipline of social sciences, alongside history, sociology, anthropology and political science
• Given the well-entrenched epistemological foundations of mainstream economics, it is very difficult to dislodge it.
• Boushey et al (2017) provides convincing evidence that show that the agenda for reforms of teaching, research and policy choices is formidable.
• Can the so-called “scientific” world of economists, close their eyes to the Gilded Age unfolding before them, ignore the reality of patrimonial capitalism, relentless “opportunity hoarding” and so on well underway in the world? I may mention a few lessons the discipline may do well to draw from the book:

1. history is the main source of knowledge of the economists and is the laboratory of the discipline;
2. price system knows no morality;
3. there is need for the democratisation of economic knowledge for continuously reinventing democracy. It is very important to note that economic rationality tolerates the perpetuation of inequality and in no way leads to democratic rationality (Piketty 2014: 551);
4. the destabilising growth of income and wealth is a writing on the wall and demands radical policy choices; and
5. in the context of “the past threatening to devour the future,” the call to the economics profession to bring back the political economy tradition of distribution into the centre of its discourse is very important.

Piketty has stressed the point that the profession needs a relook:

To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at the expense of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences.

• Economists are all too often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves. This obsession with mathematics is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without having to answer the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in.
• Hence they must set aside their contempt for other disciplines and their absurd claim to greater scientific legitimacy, despite the fact that they know almost nothing about anything.
• To conclude, I must say that Piketty’s work has upset the apple cart of mainstream economics. To be sure, the mighty defenders of the faith will fight back. Even so, he proved that the balancing forces of growth, competition and technological progress in the past have not succeeded in reducing inequalities and promoting social harmony.
• The world has before it incontrovertible evidence of widening inequality and its dangerous consequences (Oxfam 2014; World Inequality Lab 2018; Stiglitz 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; among others). Democratic societies and democratic values face serious threats. A global conversation and debate has to be initiated at the academic as well as the United Nations level sooner than later. Will the economics profession creatively respond? It is high time that we realise that pedagogy in graduate courses is sterile. The research agenda of universities also must radically change.
• If university departments are going to be funded by corporates, this can only be counterproductive. When the very large majority in the world has little access to quality education, good healthcare, good housing, quick transportation and no entitlements to participate in the market, why do the tribe of economists continue to chew the cud of neoclassical economics and call themselves “social” scientists? Certainly Piketty has not said enough about slavery, power, wealth dynamics, exploitation, and social justice, which should occupy the agenda of economics research and teaching to make it a relevant social science.

The ecological, social, economic, cultural, religious, spiritual and geopolitical importance of the Himalaya as and its centrality for many Asian societies and cultures is well known. The “abode of snow” is home to an imposing geographical biological diversity and a multitude of flourishing human concerns and constructs. These have remained visible in hunting–gathering communities to pastoral–agrarian societies and their settled cultures, and also in the economies of modern trade and industry.

The Himalayas have created and developed a unique ecology that has become the basis for the existence of the natural as well as cultural systems of a large part of South Asia. It stands like a subcontinental arc and connects the tropical rainforests of Myanmar and Arunachal Pradesh with the sparse and cold semi-desert of Ladakh, and the great northern plains of the Indian subcontinent with the Tibetan plateau. It is dynamic and active in many ways, making the plains below fertile and alive, transforming the landscape extraordinarily.

Different communities arrived and settled here over millennia, developing their culture and spreading out in many directions.

The Himalayas have created many unique physiographic formations all over its geography, and humans developed these “natural wonders” into their “culture areas,” where they started cultivating their myths and developing these as their “holy” places and “sacred” destinations.

• Among these wonders, there exists a natural amphitheatre consisting of two beautiful peaks Kailas and Gurla, and two big lakes Manasarovar and Rakastal (in short, KGMR). Four great rivers of South Asia have their origins here. All these places are traditionally known to people as “sin destroying localities.” Kailas and Manasarovar are at the heart of this sacred geography.
• Geology, geography, climate, and altitude jointly evolved this sacred, difficult, beautiful and exceptional region of western Tibet.2 Attracted by these elements, many communities, cultures, and religions related themselves with this natural and cultural complex over the last 2,000 years or more. These include four major religions of the east as well as modern tourists, explorers, scientists, non-believers and agnostics.3
• Kailas is a mountain standing with a beautiful crown looking over its reflection in the waters of Manasarovar. According to Kangri Karchhak (the Tibetan Kailas Puran) (Pranavanand 2007: 8), Kailas is located at the centre of the universe, towering in the sky like a handle of a millstone.
• Halfway on its side is kalpavriksha (the wish-fulfilling tree) and it has square sides of gold and jewels, with the eastern face made up of crystal, southern of sapphire, western of ruby, and northern of gold. Further, it is depicted that the peak is clothed in fragrant flowers and herbs, and that there are four footprints of the Buddha on the four sides so that the peak might not be taken away into the sky by the deities of that region, and four chains prevent denizens of the lower regions from taking it down.
• The KGMR region was important for nomad–pastoral communities and as the interactions evolved among different communities, it developed as the destination for barter trade, connecting different regions of Asia.
• These trade routes became the pilgrim routes for many communities belonging to different religions, cultures, and regions. This paper analyses the ecological, cultural and economic role that the Kailas–Manasarovar transboundary culture area has evolved to play eventually in the lives of Asians, focusing more on the Kailas sacred landscape in the Indian region.

Creation of a Mythic Land

Deities emerge with human beings only. The initial hunter-gatherers or pastoralists may have noticed the beauty of Kailas, but they did not have deities and their initial folklore got dissolved in time and space. The initial myths were born much before the birth of any institutional religion and started with respecting or worshipping nature’s expressions.

• With the emergence of organised religions, the deities of these religions were visualised to be residing in a mountain or rock, lake, river, hot spring or cave.
• We need to remember that although Puranic references to Kailas represented states or constructions of knowledge about the site at the time they were recorded, such aspects of that knowledge as were empirical must have been compiled from disparate sources–renunciates, traders, nomadic tribes … characters who left no direct traces of their experiences.
• Collated by one or many agents and authors, permeated through different layers of cultural and sectarian perception, and strategically associated with earlier mythological cycles, the resulting representations were transformed into myth … different conceptual worldviews enables us to see the historical diversity behind model unities.

We may thus analyse them alongside texts of the Buddhist, Jain, and Tantric traditions, each of which preserved and represented discreet understandings of Kailas that were only to coalesce in the colonial period.

He further writes

• These cosmologies informed those of the Buddhists, Jains, and even Tibetan Bonpas, with the Abhidharmakosa, composed by the north-western Indian monk Vasubandhu (4–5th century CE) becoming the foundational exposition of this system in the Buddhist traditions.
• So in the context of Kailas–Manasarovar, the key feature common to these cosmologies, was the idea of a central mountain, Meru, which was the source of four (or more) major rivers, the identity of which varied in different accounts. That model did not remain solely attached to Meru, but also became a fundamental part of the geo-sacral associations of Mount Kailas.

The distinction between Meru the cosmic centre, Meru an actual Himalayan mountain, Kailas in its various conceptions and manifestations became increasingly blurred over time.

• The main religions that associate themselves with the KGMR region are Bon, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Sikhism does not directly relate itself with Kailas. In the late 1930s an alternative mountain and lake were searched by Sikh enthusiasts at Hemkund Sahib near the valley of flowers in Uttarakhand.
• The Kailas–Manas region was one of the important centres of the Bon faith long before Buddhism appeared in Tibet around the 7th century CE during the reign of King Songtsen Gampo (Govinda 1966; Reynolds 2014).
• This shamanistic religion developed in the remote Zhang Zhung kingdom of Western Tibet! Kang Tise (pronounced as Tije), that is, Mount (Mt) Kailas, also known as Yungdruk Gutseg (the nine-storey Swastika mountain) was the “soul mountain” of Bonpos and was supposed to be the emanation body of Tonpa Shenrab Miwoche, the founder of the formalised Bon religion and in the words of Govinda (1966) (Reynolds 2014; Vitali 1999), “the Buddha of Bonpos.”
• Mt Kailas was also imagined as a great chorten (stupa) of rock crystal with several families of gods residing there. Now it is difficult to trace the Bon symbols of Kailas but the idea of the nine-storey swastika may have come from Bon tradition. Later on, many of the Bon symbols were accepted, accommodated and appropriated by Buddhism and Hinduism in their cultural and religious schemes.
• The presiding Buddhist deity of Mt Kailas is Demchok or Demchhog4 (also known as Chakrasamvara, meaning supreme bliss) and his yum (consort) is Dorje-Phangmo or Vajra Varahi (also named as Vajra Yogini) (McKay 2015), who is shown in Tibetan paintings and idols, clinging to him in an inextricable embrace and interlocked in sexual union. Adjacent to the Kailas on the western side is a smaller snow peak Tijung, the abode of Dorje-Phangmo. Gautam Buddha and 500 Bodhisattvas are said to be residing on Kailas, which is also the abode of Buddhist Tantric singer–saint Milarepa.
• This mountain had four gates, with a Chinese tiger, tortoise, red bird, and turquoise dragon guarding the four cardinal points (Tucci 1980: 285–91). For gaining control of this auspicious mountain Kailas (or Tise) from Bonpo influence, there was a “contest of magic” between Milarepa and the Bonpo priest Naro Bhun Chon. At last Milarepa won.
• Since that time the Bonpo started the parikrama (or pradakshina or circumambulation) of Mt Kailas in an anti-clockwise direction. Others do it clockwise. The Bon faith was rooted in nature and acknowledged dark and magical forces and deities which governed mortal lives. Many aspects of this autochthonous belief system later reflected in the rise and growth of Vajrayana in Tibet (Mukharji 2014: 208).
• For Buddhists, Kailas represents a gigantic mandala (a spiritual and ritual symbol in Hinduism and Buddhism, representing the universe) of Dhyani Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. There were 10 sects of the Mahayana school of Buddhism in practice in Tibet when Pranavanand (1939: 55–56) conducted his explorations there before 1940.
• From the beginning of Buddhism in Tibet, different branches of this religion connected themselves with the Kailas region and cosmology was developed around this sacred geography.
• According to the Hindu belief system, Lord Shiva resides there with goddess Gauri, Ganesha, and Kartikeya, also deities in their own right. At its foot is seated Hanuman, the monkey god. Hindus also consider Kailas as the seat of many other deities, including Kuber and name it Mt Meru or the cosmic mountain.
• The name of the Puranic king Mandhata Mahipati is associated with Mt Gurla, the highest mountain in this area. In Hindu tradition, pilgrimage to Kailas (also Kailasnath) became part of the Char Dham Yatra of Uttarakhand and an extension of Muktinath and Pashupatinath Yatra of Nepal.
• In Jain tradition, it is thought that the first Tirthankara Aadinath (Rishav Dev)5 attained nirvana (liberation from all sorrows) near Ghangta Gompa above Darchin. This hill near the south face of Kailas is known as Ashtpada. Guru Nanak also reached there and had dialogues with the Buddhist siddhas.
• Pradakshina is an essential part of each pilgrimage to Kailas and its many forms are still in practice. After completing a certain number of the outer kora (circumambulation) one is entitled to inner kora. It is also to be noted that inner kora is not the pradakshina of Mt Kailas but it is only a journey to Nandi hill.
• There are many names for Manasarovar in Sanskrit, including Achhodsar, Bindusar, Padmhrid, Brahmsarovar, Hemkoot, and Anabhtatv. In Pali, it is named Anotatta. In the Tibetan wall paintings and tankas, Manasarovar and Rakastal are depicted as sun and crescent moon—symbols of the visible forces of light and the hidden forces of darkness, or as lakes of consciousness and demons respectively.

The story goes that Manas was created out of the mind of Brahma, first among the Hindu trinity. Rakastal is also known as Rawanhrid or Rawansarovar. Several other myths about the lakes are still prevalent, such as the story of Ravana, who meditated along the banks of this lake, or that of the golden fish, which went to Rakastal from Manasarovar by creating Ganga Chheu (the water channel which connects Manasarovar with Rakastal). A detailed study of the scattered folklore may come up with useful stories related to local myths.

Geo-ecological Aspects

In the Asian perspective, Kailas is at the centre geographically and ecologically. According to geologists, the Himalayas (including Kailas region) have come up in the place of Tethys Sea. This geodynamic process was in itself a unique episode in the evolution of the Himalayas. At present, the Tethys Himalaya is a very rugged terrain with sculptured landforms and a desolate landscape. It is made up of sedimentary rocks with their age ranging from 600 million to 40 million years. These sediments were part of the Tethys Sea. Gansser (1994) found Kailas geologically unique, having been elevated to more than 22,000 feet above sea level with its strata remaining horizontally undisturbed, despite being encompassed by steeply inclined bedrock.

• He also writes that Kailas stood witness to the birth of Himalaya. On its southern flanks, he found ophiolite—a rock formed hundreds of millions of years ago on the bed of the ancient Tethys Sea ).
• The Himalaya province ends up against mainland Asia, a 30–60 km wide zone of collision of India with Asia demarcating the margin of India. The collision took place 65 to 50 million years ago. The rivers Sindhu and Tsangpo occupy the collision zone.
• To the north of collision zone lies the Ladakh-Kailas and the Karakoram ranges. To the east, the Ladakh-Kailas range is represented by the Nyechentanghla or Gangdese range in southern Tibet. To the north is the Karakoram that ends up in Pamir massif, a mountain knot of sorts. These belts belong to an orogenic province older and quite different from the Himalaya.
• The Holy Kailas is made up of feldspar-rich sandstones, and conglomerates laid down 27 to 10 million years ago in the channel of a broad braided river, a precursor to the Sindhu-Tsangpo. The conglomerate beds rest on the Ladakh-Kailas granites emplaced 70 to 40 million years ago.
• Chheu Gompa is at the centre of this amphitheatre. To its north is Kailas Range with the dominating Mt Kailas at its centre. To the south is Gurla Range with its highest peak Gurla Mandhata, and seen behind is the Himalayas. To the east is Manasarovar, and west has Rakastal, which receives the waters from all sides of Mt Kailas and also Manasarovar
• A circle from Chheu Gompa with a radius of less than 50 kilometres (km), contains the four rivers originating here and flowing in different directions covering large areas of the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent. These rivers have been given very symbolic names.
• To the west from Rakastal flows the Langchen Khambab or elephant-mouthed river (Sutlej or Shatadru); to the north Singhi Khambab or lion-mouthed river (Indus or Sindhu); to the east from Mayum La the Tamchok Khambab or horse-mouthed river (Tsangpo or Brahmaputra); and to the south from Gurla range the Mapcha Khambab or peacock-mouthed river (Karnali).
• In this way, two lead rivers of the Indus–Sutlej system, one each from the Ganga and Tsangpo systems originate from this corner of Tibet. In terms of distance, the origins of Kali, Gori, Alaknanda and Bhagirathi rivers are not very far from this region.
• The waters of southern slopes of Kailas range, northern slopes of Gurla and western slopes of Mayum La with Manasarovar and Rakastal make the initial catchment of river Sutlej, which brings waters to the other side of the Himalayas.
• All other three rivers originate outside but close to this Sutlej catchment. These three rivers also take very interesting routes for entering into north Indian plains. The Indus flows northwards initially, turns north-west and then south-west after meeting with river Kabul.
• The Tsangpo flows 1,700 km eastwards before suddenly turning south-west entering into India. Karnali flows south and enters into Nepal at Hilsa (Humla) and becomes Saryu/Ghaghra before its confluence with Ganga in India.
• Some of the rivers of the Indus Valley and Vedic civilisations (Panchnad or Sapt Sindhu, which includes Indus, Sutlej or Saraswati) originated in the Kailas area. Initially, the descriptions developed in Vedic, epic and Puranic literature were more mythic than actual.
• Later on, the heavenly mountains, lakes, and rivers became earthly and actual, when they were seen and touched by different communities. The ethnic migrations, barter trade and finally the pilgrimage helped in understanding the complex geography of this region, which was already transformed into the “sacred.”
• But the ecological relationship of the Kailas area always remained natural, even when the people of the Indian plains were not aware of the origins of these rivers.
• These rivers contributed in creating the unique ecology of north Indian plains by giving it soil, water, and fertility and connected western Tibet with eastern (Bay of Bengal) and western (Arabian) oceans through north Indian plains, where the Harappan civilisation grew and which later witnessed the rise and growth of Vedic culture.
• These rivers evolved the ecological relationship of western Tibet with North India before the emergence of many communities and cultures here. The trade and pilgrim routes came up later along the rivers and adjoining passes.
• Before the humans, yak, kiang (wild ass), snow leopard, kastura (musk deer), three types of long-haired mountain goats–tahr, serow and bharal (blue sheep), marmot (large squirrels) and varieties of fish and birds have been part of Kailas wilderness. The plains of Parkha (between Kailas and Gurla ranges) create the environment for wildlife and nomad–pastoral life.
• The fish might not be visible as moving to other regions but all other faunal and avian species were not restricted by any kind of political boundaries. They continue challenging the man-made boundaries.

The Making of a Cultural Landscape

The idea of sacred mountains, lakes, and rivers is present in all ancient cultures and religions. It was found in all kind of geographies. Mountains were seen as fathers and lakes and rivers as mothers (McKay 2015: 28–36). As discussed earlier, the initial society of pastoralists saw this wilderness and they were captivated by its beauty.

Before the invention of myths, they started considering the mountains and lakes as sacred. This was some kind of “folk religion,” if it is to be termed at all. The society did not need poetic descriptions or certifications from the scriptures yet. With the birth of institutional religions, a variety of deities were attached to this landscape.

• The Bonpos may be the first to relate this landscape with their religion. Naturally, Tonpa Shenrab Miwoche, the founder of the formalised Bon religion, was associated with the mountains and rocks of western Tibet. Their region was known as Zhang Zhung. Till 7th century, the Bonpos were the sole custodians of this region, as no other community had been challenging them.
• The very initial motifs, symbols, sculptures, designs, geometry and colour schemes were created and developed by the Bonpos. The residue of Bon expressions is traceable in different later motifs, symbols, and designs of Tibetan and some other Himalayan cultures.
• McKay (2015) has done a very detailed survey of the evolution of this region from the “imagined” to the “actual” one. This transformation has an obvious relationship with the increasing mobility of people and their interrelations.
• During the Rigvedic times, Rudra was a minor Himalayan god, who later came to acquire a very powerful position (McKay 2015: 36). The Atharva Veda mentions “snowy mountain” and the river Indus only (p 43).
• Initially, Mt Meru was described as the abode of gods. Later the names Meru and Sumeru came to be used for many imagined and divine mountains and sometimes they were also used for Kailas. There is a reference in Valmiki Ramayana, where Mandodari cries after Ravana was killed and remembers that she travelled with her husband to Mandar and Meru mountains.In the texts of Manaskhand (Skand Puran), Rudrayamal Tantra, Sidh Siddhant Paddhati (Guru Gorakhnath), and Ramcharitmanas (Tulsi Das), Kailas and Meru are described as two different mountains. In Taittiriya Aranyaka “Maha Meru” word is used but it is not geographically consonant with Kailas. Actually, Meru, later on, became the centre of Indian cosmology.
• In terms of the rivers, there is mention of Ganga, Saraswati, and the Yamuna in the Hindu epics but the rivers originating in the Kailas area, Indus, Sutlej, Tsangpo, and Karnali are notable for their absence.
• The pilgrimage to Kailas and Manasarovar had begun before the emergence of sacred Kailas in the epics (Mahabharata and Ramayana). This is supported by Buddhist and Jain texts. Over time, the sources of knowledge about sacred sites increased.
• Traders, migrating tribes and renunciates (including tantric practitioners, siddhas and alchemists) were contributing in this scheme through directly gained knowledge Beautiful places have the elements of becoming sacred, and the power to influence the human mind as well as the religions created by humans.
• Buddhism reached Tibet with several Indic motifs, symbols, and designs. Many of its motifs were also similar to the Hinduism of the time. Some of the symbols and deities transformed and got their place in the Tibetan Buddhist divine hierarchy. Most of the deities, gods, and goddesses of Tibetan Buddhism resemble their Hindu counterparts. Animals and birds associated with these gods were adopted by Buddhist artists. Influence of Tibetan tantric practices was also visible in different monastic expressions. Several Indian gurus visited Tibet and some of them even reached the highest positions. Among them, the best known is Guru Padmasambhava.
• Slowly over centuries, Kailas and Manasarovar became part of Indian (Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain) iconography, sculpture and painting. Temples were built and rocks were carved in the name of Kailas.
• The Kailasnath temple of Ellora is best known among these. The stone statue of King Ravana lifting Mt Kailas with his 20 hands is well preserved at the Virupaksha temple at Pattadakallu near Badami caves (Dharvad, Karnataka).
• At Mahabalipuram, the world’s largest bas-relief sculpture depicts Arjun standing on one leg and doing penance in Kailas. Later the associated stories were expressed thus in pahari paintings,7 too.
• The idea of “multiple Kailas” also evolved as those away from the KSL region or unable to reach Mt Kailas, invented traditions of creating their own “local Kailas” in their regions. Chhota Kailas (Kuti valley, Byans, Pithoragarh), Shri Kailas (Uttarkashi) and Bhurkania Kailas (near Bhimtal, Nainital) in Uttarakhand and Mani Mahesh Kailas, Kinnar Kailas in Himachal are examples of this kind of cultural creativity.
• There is a tradition of circumambulation of Mt Kinnar Kailas. Uttarakhand’s presiding goddess Nanda Devi’s sasural (the in-law’s place) is in Kailas and “Kavilas” is the expression used for the Kailas in local folklore. Nanda Jaat (a yatra or pilgrimage) itself is a parikrama.
• A mountain plateau north of Pashupatinath, Kathmandu is also known as Kailas Same is the case with Mt Khirpani near Tumkot in Humla district of far west Nepal (Karnali valley), a sacred mountain which looks like Kailas, though it is covered with snow only for some months.
• It is visited, circumambulated and worshipped by local communities. Such developments show the deepening of the idea of “KSL” among the Indians and Nepalese belonging to different religions and their sects (Pandey 1989). Simultaneously, trans-Himalayan trade was slowly increasing in volume and benefits.

Colonial Period

The developments in the colonial–imperial period in the context of Tibet and particularly the Kailas region are very interesting and have to be investigated further. The opening of the Himalayas culminated in the opening of Tibet and Central Asia for the British Empire.

The European journey of precolonial Asia starts with East India Company and the Jesuit Fathers. The former had trade and transit in mind and the latter had religion and exploration. Jesuit Fathers proved themselves the very first modern explorers of Asia.

• But a definitive historical shift occurred only with East India Company after the war of Plassey in 1757. Two major landmarks in this history are the establishment of the Survey of India in 1767 (63 years before the birth of Royal Geographical Society, London) and the Great Trigonometrical Survey in 1802.
• In between many expeditions were sent to Tibet and different Himalayan countries and provinces through different routes.
• In 1624, the first Europeans who crossed over a Himalayan pass in Uttarakhand were two Jesuit Fathers, Antonio de Andrade, and Emanuel Marques, as they reached Tsaprang in West Tibet in search of “forgotten Christian brothers” .
• They repeated the difficult journey in 1625 with a third missionary Gonzales de Sousa. On 12 April 1626, they were able to complete the building of the first church in western Tibet. This is the old Zhang-Zhung country located west of the Kailas–Manasarovar region in Sutlej valley.
• They succeeded in converting some Buddhists, though the process could not sustain, as a revolt surfaced against this conversion. Soon the converts were killed and the church was destroyed in 1630 .
• The Jesuits (including Bento de Goes who travelled from Lahore to China in 1603–07 and Stephan Cacella and John Cabral who journeyed from Bengal to Shigatse from 1627 to 1631) became the first to report this part of Tibet to Westerners, although they never saw Mt Kailas and Manasarovar. After these initial explorations of the Jesuits, a few Europeans tried to cross over the Himalayan passes.
• After 1640, it was only in 1912 that an officer crossed over Mana pass and reached the ruins of Tsaprang . The Mana pass was crossed by Adolf von Schlagintweit (one of the three famous German explorer brothers) in September–October 1855 and he returned to Mussoorie on 21 October 1855 crossing over Nilang pass.
• A month before this visit, Adolf and his brother Robert also visited Gartok.
• The first Europeans who passed by Mt Kailas through the plains of Parkha in 1715 were two Jesuit Missionaries—Ippolito Desideri and Emanuel Freyre, en route to Lhasa from Kashmir. Desideri describes the mountain and its religious importance but does not mention its name .
• Ninety-seven years after them, the first Englishman to cross over Niti pass and reach the twin lakes in 1812 was the pioneer British veterinarian William Moorcroft, accompanied by Hyder Hearsay.
• He called it “Cailas,” and also mentioned another name used by the pilgrims, “Mahadeo Ka Ling.”
• Moorcroft described the method of prostration around Kailas. He was the first outsider who described the streams coming from the Kailas range and the river Sutlej as originating from Rakastal. He also found that only a channel comes out from Manasarovar and merges into Rakastal.
• While returning, he was arrested by Gorkhas near Almora, but was later released (Alder 1985: 126–56; Moorcroft 1818: 380–424). Three years later, Uttarakhand (British Kumaon) came under the rule of East India Company after the Anglo–Nepal war and with the Treaty of Sigauli in 1815–16, a new era of pilgrimage and Indo–Tibet trade began.
• G W Traill, Commissioner of British Kumaon, visited the border areas and crossed a difficult pass around 1825. His two reports were based on these visits. He has also mentioned the name of the village Puckasao in Johar as a sadawart village for the pilgrims of Kailas–Manasarovar. In September–October 1846, Henry Strachey made a journey to Rakastal and left behind an impressive description of the area.
• In 1848, Richard Strachey went to the region. In 1849, both brothers revisited Tibet and returned from Niti pass. In 1855, Edmund Smyth and Robert Drummond went to Manasarovar with a boat (Allen 1992: 125–38) and in 1864, Edmund Smyth, Thomas Webber and others again went to the region  Due to these journeys, the KSL region remained a part of the continuous discussion among the Europeans, especially the British.
• During the colonial period, first under East India Company and later under Her Majesty’s rule, a few new initiatives were undertaken on Indo–Tibet trade and pilgrimage. There is a long list of different travellers to the KSL region. After the Younghusband mission (1903), Tibet did not remain a closed territory.In the 1930s and 1940s, Swami Pranavanand, Narayan Swami and Geeta Swami initiated an organised pilgrimage with the help of the Shauka traders. This continued till the Chinese takeover of Tibet and after the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet, another era started. The pilgrimage was entirely closed for the two subsequent decades and trade was closed for three decades.
• In 1981, pilgrimage reopened and partial trade started in 1990. Thirty-four years after this, in 2015, another route to Kailas was opened from Nathu La in Sikkim. Tibet is also opened for international tourists and pilgrims now. The process of modernisation with more airports, rails, roads, buildings and reconstruction/repair of destroyed cultural sites is rapidly going on in Tibet.

Economic Exchange

There is some truth in the statement that “the lure of gold, not Gods, may well have first drawn attention to Kailas region” (Mckay 2015: 50). It can be added that the basic exploratory tendency of humans was also behind this. Many scholars think that barter trade in the trans-Himalayan region was older than the practice of pilgrimage.

This seems to be true that with the traders from different parts of Asia, pilgrims also started coming to the Kailas region, starting with very few initially. This tradition may have been continuing since two to three millenniums.

• Gold, salt, wool, borax, musk pods, fly whisks (yak tails), medicinal herbs, mineral medicines, skins, furs and livestock (yak, horse, goat, and sheep) were the trans-Himalayan products and these were exchanged for different grains (rice and pulses), flour, dry vegetables, sugar, metal works, cotton, puru/phuru (wooden bowls) and some other items as per the region/place from where the items were brought (Nain Singh’s Thokjyalung diary in Bhatt and Pathak [2006: 291–315]; Fisher [1986]; Fürer-Haimendorf [1975]; Traill [1832]; Pilgrim [1844: 171–77]; Pangtey [1992: 45–64]; Raipa [1974: 291–306]).
• The emergence of Kailas–Manas complex as a multireligious and cultural destination and the rise and growth of many trade marts around it in that area in the last many centuries is a fascinating history of human enterprise and religious quest working together. In a case like this, religion, culture, and economy get intertwined.
• The vertical trade routes from the Indian subcontinent were directly or indirectly connected with the main silk routes of the Tibetan traders. The nomadic way of life and transhumance was also practised by those who came from the settled pastoral–agrarian societies of Indian and Nepal Himalaya.
• They are unlike Tibetan nomad–pastoralists. The pastoral way of life was the very natural expression of this geography but cottage industries and barter trade emerged as the endeavour for sustaining the economy and as a means for survival.
• During medieval times the trans-Himalayan trade increased and after the coming of East India Company to Uttarakhand and Himachal, it increased further. It is an interesting fact that Tibet was closed for Europeans but the Himalayan communities were allowed to come to certain marts for bartering.
• However, in the early 20th century, Lhasa was attacked and trade rights were monopolised by the British (Sanwal 1962). This was a significant chapter in the opening of Tibet for the British.
• It is well known that the rulers of Kumaon (Chands), Garhwal (Parmars) and Kashmir (Dogra) had captured parts of western Tibet at different times. However, no ruler was able to control this area politically. The Kings of Kumaon and Garhwal even after winning some parts of western Tibet had to return back.
• This in addition to Zorawar Singh’s tragic end near Taklakot tells us much about the aspects of political sustainability of outsiders in Tibet (Charak 1978: 124–37; Francke 1977: 157–62). Even China is facing continuous protests in Tibet, including more than 140 self-immolations.
• Chand ruler Baj Bahadur Chand (1638–78) attacked Taklakot (Pulan) in 1670 for expanding trade activities and he made the trade route safe from the obstructions and attacks of Humlees, Jumlees and Tibetans (Raipa 1974: 48–49; Sankrityayan 1958: 86–89).
• Laxmi Chand (1597–1621) rehabilitated the deserted Ralam village with people from Darma valley.10 Ralam people have been going to Gyanima mandi (mart) via Darma pass. Panwar rulers Shyam Shah (1611–1629) and Mahipat Shah (1631–1635) attacked Daba (Tibet) as the inhabitants of that area had been attacking and looting the settlements of upper Garhwal for a long time. Mahipat Shah won but his representatives in Daba, the Bartwal brothers, were killed.
• The army was defeated, and most of its members were killed during winter later (Dabral 1971: 244–45, 254–56; Raturi 2007: 378). The same happened with Zorawar Singh in the 19th century (Pranavanand 1939: 68).
• Some of the gompas around Mt Kailas were administered and owned by Ladakh and Bhutan. Nyenri, the first gompa of Kailas, Darchengompa, and Zutulpukgompa fell under the
  aegis of the Maharaja of Bhutan. During the Chinese cultural revolution, these gompas were destroyed and then rebuilt after 1980 (Snelling 1983: 139, 315, 373). F Williamson (qtd in Snelling 1983: 423–25), the political officer in Sikkim, wrote about the Darchin monastry on 6 January 1934,
• The Darchin area, including Kailas, appears to have been granted to the Bhutanese some hundreds of years ago by a King of Ladakh. The grant was confirmed by one of the earlier Dalai Lamas, perhaps the fifth. The confirming document is in the possession of the Maharaja of Bhutan.
• Tibetan dates go in a cycle of sixty years and it has not been found possible to ascertain the date of the document, as the particular cycle in which it was written is not stated.
• Williamson further says that this was a controversial issue since 1921, as neither the ownership nor the legal status of the Darchin monastery was clearly defined. In last few years, the gompas have been rebuilt but the old residence of Bhutanese representatives is in ruins, albeit still standing in the upper part of the Darchin town.
• It is to be noted that the Shauka/Bhotiya community was fully participating in transhumance and semi-nomadic life with trans-Himalayan trade and commerce. In this way, the seasonal migration of Bhotiyas was closely associated with partial agriculture, animal husbandry, cottage industries, and trade.
• They became pioneers in Indo–Tibetan trade and later in the pilgrimages to Kailas. In this way, they connected Indian plains with Tibetan plateau through the exchange of products of the two different regions. This exchange not only fulfilled the needs of the communities living between foothills and mountains of Uttarakhand together with Tibet and western Nepal, but it also connected different communities all over this region.
• For centuries Bhotiyas were the creative link between these regions, assisted by anwals (shepherds), bhurris (servants) and mirasees/tahluwas (shilpkars) (Pant 1989: 28–37; Pangtey 1989: 32). Gorkha oppression bore a negative impact on Indo–Tibetan trade from 1790 to 1815. The border communities were paying tax to three sets of rulers—Gorkhas, Jumlees/Humlees and Tibetans. But trade and pilgrimage continued, involving many others in the process.
• The volume of trade can be observed at three different points during the colonial period. In his first report, Traill has described sugar, gur, spices, European cloth (cotton), and coral as the main items of export and shawl wool, general wool, silk, saffron, cured leather, skins, and horses as the main items of import (Traill 1828: 194).
• Surprisingly there was no reference of salt in this list of items. But in his second report, he mentioned the export items as 30,000 maund (1 maund equals 37 kilograms [kg]) grains, clothes worth ₹ 10,000, hardware/metal items worth ₹ 10,000, 1,000 maund gur, 1,000 maund misri (refined sugar), 10 maund spices, 10 maund dyes (lac and indigo), puru, munga (coral) and pearls.
• Among the import items were 15,000 maunds salt, borax/tincal 1,500 maunds, wool 600 maunds, gold 100 fetangs (uncoiled gold pieces). The other items were pankhi (large woollen shawl), silk, yak tails, medicines, dry fruits, etc. Traill (1832: 44) also mentions that from 1816 to 1821, the volume of the trade increased and for the first time the use of cash was introduced in the trade. The cash could have been in silver coins, which were later used for ornaments too.
• In 1840–41, total export from Johar (Kingri Bingri La), Darma (Darma Pass) and Beans (Lipu La) was of ₹ 79,375 and total imports were of ₹ 1,55,700. The main items of export were sugar candy, gur, cloth, grain, almond, indigo, camphor, dates, pearls, coral, tobacco, hardware and many other things like buttons, knives, and chillies.
• The total bhelees (a lump of raw sugar weighing 2–3 seer, 1 seer equals 1.25 kg) of gur exported were 12,000, grains 21,000 maunds, tobacco 350 maunds, dates 70 maunds and all kind of clothes were more than 15,000 pieces .
• The main items of import were borax 17,000 maunds, salt 5,000 maunds, musk 380 tolas (tola has been used in India to measure gold. At present, one tola is equivalent to 10 grams of gold), pasham wool 22 maunds, course woollens 1,300 pieces, gold dust 1,500 fetangs, goats and sheep 1,000, ponies 60, Ladakhi tamashas (3 anna pieces/coins) 7,000 and kaldar rupee coins of silver 15,000. The other items were saffron, shawls, Chinese silk, tea, etc.
• In the first half of the 20th century, trade activities were stabilised and increased. The statistics of exports and imports from Dharchula mart (through Lipu and Darma passes) in India for 1922 are given in Table 1.

End of a Mobile Economy

• While this trade continued during World Wars I and II, it experienced a first major interruption in 1949–50 with the Chinese takeover of Tibet and in 1960 it literally stopped. With this came an end to a centuries-old economic activity.
• This obstruction to the continuity of relationship of different communities was cleared to some extent only in 1981 when pilgrimage was restarted and in 1991 when border trade reopened. This reopening, however, was different from the traditional pilgrimage and trade which had continued till 1960.
• The trans-Himalayan trade was traditionally carried out through five Himalayan passes in Uttarakhand. The nearest Tibetan marts were allotted to the trading communities of adjoining Indian valleys. These included Taklakot for Beansees and Chaudansees; Chakra for Darmees; Gyanima for Joharees; Shibchilam for the communities of Niti valley and Chhaprang for the traders of Mana.
• When the trade was reopened after more than three decades, a memorandum was signed between India and China on 13 December 1991 and another round of talks commenced from 15 July 1992. This was obviously some cause for hope and excitement among the border communities. An Indian delegation was also sent to Tibet to participate in the trade fair at Taklakot in August 1993.
• In 1992, the total exports were worth ₹ 12.09 lakh and imports worth ₹ 0.86 lakh. The main import items were raw wool (3,626 kg), pashm (1,404 kg), goats and sheep (3,634 numbers), yak tails (460 pieces) and borax (6,225 kg).
• The main items of export were textiles, coffee, vegetable oil, unmanufactured tobacco, gur, misri, phaphar (buckwheat) and wheat flour. The 1993 Indian delegation gave many suggestions for further development in trade. Many of them are yet to be implemented (Tolia et al 1993).
• Twenty-four years after the return of the above delegation, there has been much change in Tibet and an increase in border trade. Now instead of “tented marts,” the Indian and Nepali traders have a permanent and protected market in Taklakot, though all other marts remain deserted. The numbers of traders from India and Chhangru-Tinkar and Humla in Nepal have increased, but the trade has to be further developed. One could understand the current trade practices from the Indian and Nepali traders based in Taklakot, Darchin, and Hilsa.
• The trans-Himalayan trade is no longer carried along the lines of traditional barter; and it has also not yet taken the shape of international trade. This is the end of an old mobile economy.
• A new start is also visible in a much changed Tibet now. Space and facilities given to the traders of India and Nepal in the main market of Taklakot is a new initiative taken by the Chinese and the local government of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
• Though the Tibetan traders are no longer interested in coming to Gunji in India for trade, they do come to Hilsa in Nepal near the border. From Hilsa the traders and pilgrims enter into Tibet. It is interesting to note that once again many traditional items are being exported to Tibet from India and Nepal.
• The puru has become a major item of trade as Tibetans very much like to have it. Puru productions have connections with Kashmir, Himachal, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and Nepal.11
• Today when old Indian and Nepali traders look back, they tell the story of change in Tibet also. Half a century ago, the Tibetans used to wait for Indian and Nepali items and grains, and these commodities were essential for them. Now Chinese food items and maida (refined flour) are coming to Nepal with many modern products.
• Lhasa beer is visible in Indian and Nepali border shops. But many items like gur, misri, and other sweets are still liked. Metal items, wooden bowls, sticks, cloth, ready-made garments are in much demand in Tibet.
• Nepali restaurants also do good business in Taklakot. Many Nepali traders have been waiting for officially allotted shops as presently they have been paying high rents to private house owners.12

Pilgrimage Routes

• Alongside the reopening of this trade, an increasing craze for the pilgrimage to Kailas–Manasarovar region from all over the world has also become prevalent. Currently, two routes each from Nepal (Simikot-Hilsa and Kodari) and India (Lipulek and Nathu La pass) are open.
• The internal route through Tibet, which has also become a popular route for international tourists, comes through Lhasa. There is a tourist rush from Europe, America and other Western as well as Asian countries. The coming of railways to Lhasa (and now Shigatse) has further increased the number of visitors.13
• Apart from being the ecological snout of North India, the Kailas–Manas complex is unique in its cultural–religious attractions. There is no other multicultural, multireligious destination of this kind, where a variety of visitors are seen together. They walk together and talk to each other.
• In these decades of globalisation, when the rise and growth of monocultures, fundamentalism and parochial nationalism has become eminent, there is much to learn from this region, its nature and culture. Kailas connects, liberates, equalises, democratises, supports diversity, provides spiritual experiences and economic opportunities, and also tells us about the power of the beautiful, sublime and the wilderness.
• There is a need to creatively visualise how this region could be developed further as a common destination for different people. The communities living at this tri-juncture, need a sustainable economy, but not at the cost of ecology and culture.
• There should not be attempts to make this region a Lhasa, Kathmandu, Badrinath, Ayodhya or a Jerusalem. If nature gets minimised from this amphitheatre, there will be a loss of culture too. The pilgrims and traders should try to minimise the encroachments on nature in this area.
• People who visit Kailas–Manasarovar should feel the place, come back and relate their experiences with others. Such an approach will neither destroy nature nor make unwanted inroads into a culture.
• For making the pilgrimage and tourism dignified and decentralised, it is needed that the construction work around KSL gets regulated, more local participation is encouraged and the process of change slowed down. Huge modern introductions in the name of tourism can destroy the very fabric of the KSL.
• Though the total population of Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Bonpos, and Sikhs is around 1,530 million and they make around 21% of the world’s population, very few can think of going to the KSL.
• The population around KSL and in the transboundary Kailas region in India and Nepal is very little and scattered. They are mostly nomadic pastoralists, considered poor and backward by others. They are self-reliant communities but are involved very little in the activities around. Hence, there is a challenge as well as an opportunity for this entire region and its communities to involve themselves in creative ways.
• It is further understood that many areas, especially in the Hindukush–Himalaya region, need to be protected from the permanent human influx. In the past, while these distant Himalayan frontiers were only visited by people, these were not places of permanent settlement, given the climatic conditions and inhospitable altitudes.
• Today, with the coming up of better medical, transport and communication facilities, there is a need to stress on pilgrimage and minimise tourism. This is directly related to facilities (coming up of big hotels, roads, airports, vehicles, etc) and patterns of consumption (use of polythene, plastic, and bottles).
• It is to be seen and experimented whether elements of pilgrimage can be made part of the tourism agenda!

In Conclusion

The well-wishers of Himalayan and trans–Himalayan communities can evolve a strategy through which the abuse of nature and culture can be stopped in the KSL region. Regulated tourism and pilgrimage associated with handicrafts, cottage industries, development of museums and training schools for indigenous knowledge systems and care and conservation of the biodiversity in Tibet, India, and Nepal are some creative and participatory ways for a new beginning.

The ecological, social cultural and economic interdependence of three parts of the KSL region is in the interest of all communities living in the three corners of the three adjacent Asian countries. The international borders are there but the landscape and social cultural commonalities dissolve these. This is the power of the KSL and the traditions associated with it.

Notes

1 The name is “Kailas” and not “Kailash,” as many tend to spell it. “Kailash” is not included even in dictionaries.

2 Kailas stands at a height of 6,714 metres (m) or 22,028 feet (ft), and to Tibetans it is known as Kang Rinpoche. Gurla Mandhata or Memonani or Naimona’nyi is of 7,694 m or 25,355 ft. Manasarovar, also known as Tso-Mavang or Tso Rimpoche has the surface elevation of 4,530 m or 14,950 ft. Rakastal or Lang Tso is at the altitude of 4,515 m or 14,900 ft.

3 Based on personal interview with a Chinese couple and Gansser (1994: 90–111); Hedin (1990b: 89–214); Juyal et al (2011: 535–41); Simeon (2011). Also, noted by Pranavanand (1939: 73–74) as, “Thus the Kailas-Manas region engages the attention of a person of any calling or profession, whether … a pilgrim or a tourist, a hermit or a householder, a clergyman or a tradesman, a treasure-hunter or a spirit-hunter, a theist or an atheist, a scholar or a politician, young or old, man or woman.”

4 Kailas, Lapchi and Tsuri are three most important pilgrimages in Tibet. Each place is associated with a holy mountain. Kailas (Kang Rinpoche), Lapchi Gang, Takpa Shelri, are all considered places of Demchok, the wrathful emanation of the Budhha Sakyamuni. The cult of Demchok was initiated in the early 12th century by Phagmo Drupa and propagated by the Drigungpa, Drupa, and later, the Gelugpa. The three sites are identified as the “body, speech and mind” of the deity (Chan 1994: 208).

5 Mahavira, the founder of the Jainism, was considered the 24th Tirthankara (spiritual teacher).

6 The poem by Kalidasa may be the best with the highest form of poetic expression:

“Having soared upwards, be the guest of Mount Kailas (whose high table-land joints were united (were broken) by the arm of the ten faced one), the looking glass of the Goddesses, whose horn-elevation, like the water lily, stands expanding into heaven, like an accumulated burst of laughter of the three eyed one, (reacting) to every region” (Kalidasa 1868: 36).

Also see poem “Meru” by one of the great poets of English language William Butler Yeats (1996: 177).

7 The school of painting developed in Himachal and Uttarakhand principalities after the decline of the Mughal school of painting.

8 Personal observations during Humla and Kailas–Manas tour in July 2016.

9 The income/crop from the sadawart village is meant for supporting the pilgrims. Goonth lands are also dedicated to certain temples and their crop or income from crop was meant for temple purposes.

10 Personal communication with Ram Singh, who mentioned bahees (handwritten registers) of Chand period in this context.

11 Based on interviews with Bhotia traders in Dharchula, Garbyang and Taklakot in 2013, 2015 and 2016 by the author.

12 Based on interviews with Nepali traders in Darchula, Chhangru, Tinkar, Hilsa and Taklakot in 2016.

13 One Indian Swami and pilgrim, in 1930, visualised the future airports in Kailas area (Tapovanam Maharaj 1989: 288).

Therefore, instead of adopting a consensus approach and rallying the entire nation together in the face of the possibility of conflict, the government and the ruling party find it necessary to adopt an adversarial approach.

• While facing the questions from the opposition parties regarding the veracity of the number of the terrorists being killed and details of the extent of damage to the terror infrastructure, the government has been trying to use the armed forces as a shield.
• Shirking its own democratic responsibility to answer these questions on the appropriate platform, it has instead chosen to use every other platform to attack the opposition for doubting the armed forces.
• Along with the fact that, in a democracy, the armed forces are not above critical questioning, such rhetoric is also a brazen attempt to use the armed forces for electoral gains, thereby threatening their non-partisan character that is a hallmark of our democracy. However, a ruling party that envisions politics itself as an act of war would not be bothered about such consequences.
• Such a vision of politics, which looks at the state as a war machine, is endemic to the ruling party and this government. Even demonetisation was presented as an act of war or surgical strike on black money, and anyone questioning or opposing it was deemed a traitor.
• However, the constant warlike mobilisation by this government is targeted towards opposition forces, and thereby against the vast sections of its own citizens who are represented by them. It shows how the ruling party is interested in retaining power and not maintaining democratic institutions of the state.
• The government capitalising on air strikes and labelling those who are asking questions about it as enemies within is a reflection of this permanent war mode. It is not surprising, however, that such thinking is espoused by the party that is guided by a regimented group like Sangh Parivar, whose sole purpose itself is waging war on the so-called enemies within.
• In a democracy, citizens are not to be constantly mobilised for war, but invited to join the dialogue. It is the inherent incapability of the current government to initiate such a dialogue that forces it to militarise the conduct and discourse of politics.

Enabled by and enabling this statist logic are the dominant refugee discourses that, intermeshed with other dominant discourses, place the refugee as a singular, and abnormal figure. They are characterised solely by their displacement, as lacking of a state of belonging, and hence of knowledge, as being without agency, as victims, and as threats to the nation, state and its citizens.

Statist Logic

• One of the only ways to contest and push against and beyond the statist dominant refugee discourses is by centring the multiple, divergent, and non-linear stories of people characterised as refugees, speaking in their own voices, so that they authoritatively own their stories and their renderings.
• Long-standing and mostly unquestioned statist understandings and practices, assumed as natural and foundational, bind the state, its borders, citizens, and governance. Driven by (neo)colonisation and capitalism, the (nation) state, a modern and Western construct, has been universalised and normalised as the most basic territorialised unit of identifiable living.
• The state, thus, embodies a concentration of notional, legal, legitimated, centralised, and organisational (physical) power: administrative, penal and military. And, human beings are made to primarily belong, legitimated and protected only as citizens, subjected to the rules, norms, and (national) identity of this polity.
• However, seeping into and emerging out of the state that professes some sense of enshrined equal citizenship are debilitating, violent, and marginalising biases, prejudices, and discriminations. These are based on state-specific dominant understandings and discourses of religion, region, race, class, gender, language, sexuality, ability, etc.
• Additionally, in certain states such as the US and India, there are particular categorisations such as indigeneity and caste. This creates systematic and systemic hierarchies within the state that—servicing mainly the dominant and privileged within it, eventually—is not just for most. States are also hierarchically organised based on the power they yield over other states—politically, economically, and militaristically—consolidating the centrality of the West and states like the US in world affairs.
• Finally, general and state-specific statist logic permeates the lives of all people. Embedded into the individual, public, media, institutions, and government, and rules, norms, and policies at local, national, regional, and international levels, it lays out who people are and are not, where they can belong and cannot, what they can and cannot be, where and how they can live and cannot, and when, where and how they can move and cannot.
• Thus, when the citizen is the normal, the insider, the one who belongs, the refugee is the abnormal, the deviant, the outsider, the one who does not belong. The deviant is the one who is unable or unwilling to adhere to the given rules, norms, and identity of the state.
• As such, they are not only a threat to the very existence and legitimacy of the state, but also, for this reason, dispensable to it, and able and allowed to be dispensed off by it. Paradoxically, in its very essence, in no state can all its formally designated citizens fit in, and so the deviant is constantly present. In every state, for the very possibility of the existence of the citizen, there has to simultaneously exist the non-citizen, its other. This already-present and always-created deviant is threatening and dispensable to the state not only of their origin, but also, as the dispensed off refugee, to the states of passage, refuge, and resettlement.
• The deviant, in the first instance, is the one who is indigenous/tribal, migrant, dissident, or otherwise marginalised legally, medically, environmentally, socially, economically, politically.
• This is the one who, in their being, finds the state wanting and whom the state finds wanting, and the one who, for this reason, individually and/or collectively, even symbolically, threatens the state and is threatened by the state, and its idea and practice of what and who, constitutes its national identity, its economy, its legitimacy of law and dominant societal norms, and its power—national and international—over its people and others.
• It is this outsider who, when forced to leave their home to be able to live, becomes the refugee. In other instances, the deviant is also this refugee or asylum seeker, and, to different degrees, any other un/documented, over/staying foreigner: immigrant, migrant business person, professional, worker, student, tourist, diplomat, etc.
• Even on their best abiding behaviour, fulfilling all the rules of the (new) state, or being granted legal residency or citizenship, this deviant will not be able to fully ascribe to or be able to be fully recognised as ascribing to that state’s exclusive, racial, class, religious, linguistic, and/or sexual citizen identity. This would be true even when these states profess, constitutionally, tenements of liberalism: pluralism, multiculturalism, and secularism.

As such, statist logic(s), and ensuing ever-present statist practice(s), and discourse(s) are instrumental in displacing people internally and externally, within and from state territories. They also simultaneously and categorically reduce, render, and thus displace people as refugees.

They are sought to be seen as innocent, cunning, lying, exploiting, and/or ungrateful victims, as lacking (of a state and its identity) and as threats (to the state, its identity and its citizens) vis-à-vis the naturalised, normalised, and centralised, nation-state entity, and its constructed and willed national identity, national interests, and citizens.

For the refugee to resettle, the state then has to be (further) unsettled and confronted.

Dominant Refugee Discourses

• Dominant refugee discourses driven and enabled by statist logic authoritatively bind people performatively reproduced as refugees into binaries. It renders the citizen as a central agential subject, and the refugee an othered non-agential object through everyday policy and analytical practices.
• These practices are premised on the salience of particular territorialised discourses of the state, nation, and citizen that simultaneously weave through other similarly normalising and authoritative practices that reproduce dominant binarised categories of gender, race, nationality, religion, tribe, language, sexuality, ability, etc; to the effect that the dominant refugee and other intermeshed discourses and practices, based on and constructing borders of all kinds, seek to and do order and delineate human life itself.
• As per the statist logic of inclusions and exclusions of the dominant refugee discourses, the citizen belongs to a nation, a state, a nation state, with rights and duties, within protection, within (state) boundaries, and with an (state/national) identity. On the other hand, the refugee, displaced and designated as not belonging to a nation state, is without rights, with duties, without protection, within (state) boundaries, and always outside (state) boundaries without an identity.
• And, a permanent solution to the refugee’s displacement, their unfortunate predicament, is that they have to be made to belong again, to a nation state of origin, of first (and subsequent) refuge, or of resettlement. The dominant understanding, acceptance, and practice of statist norms, and living—in nation states, in camps, in cities, towns, and villages, in humanitarian efforts, in everyday interactions with passports, and documents, and their lack—is made possible through the dominant discourse(s), and what they enable the speaking of, writing about, and doing for reproducing the refugee and the citizen.

Contesting the Dominant Logic

• Statist dominant refugee discourses have no space/place for the refugee and their stories, except within the statist logic. It reproduces the refugee in the first place, and to which (displaced, marginalised, resisting, and/or threatening) they can never fully belong. In rendering them and their stories voiceless, unheard, and without authority, the discourses objectify and dehumanise the refugee.
• Only original, non-conventional responses critically, ethically, and politically concerned with issues of voice, representation, authority, and agency, that centre the experiences, stories, analyses, and knowledges of people categorised as refugees, about and beyond, their experiences of displacement, can contest, push, and displace the confining, and violent (even fatal) limits imposed on their lives.
• This person can then say that the refugee is not a refugee, but is violently and continuously made so and enacted upon as such in multiple, divergent, fragmented, situated, polyphonic, dialogical, and deconstructive ways, overcoming the author-function, and content, form, and limits of conventional responses. When the authority of the conventional author is not, and cannot, be present to tell the stories of the dominant refugee and other discourses, these discourses are displaced from their centrality, and authority.
• Such a response is situated within increasingly visible and critical feminist, queer, postcolonial, post-structural, and decolonial/indigenous literature, and efforts in visual art, theatre, films, photography, activism, and academics that make visible the hidden and suppressed histories and stories of people from the margins.
• It lets people own their experiences and analyses, of their oppressions, struggles, negotiations, resistances, overcomings, and victories. It enables them to tell these stories in their own voices, in their own ways, and in their own forums, situating these in traditional or contemporary, individual or collective storytelling practices, directly or indirectly opposed to the dominant discourses.