Open Prisons are Cost-Effective and Decrease the Burden on the Exchequer of the State

A conventional or closed prison is an opaque institution while open prisons are radically different in principle, appearance and operations. Open prisons are prisons without bars. Unlike closed prisons, the open ones do not have huge boundary walls, tall watch towers or massive metal gates.

The prisoner is allowed liberty, that is, s/he is free from restraint imposed through confinement. An open prison is a trust-based system where the prisoner is kept under minimal surveillance. Prisoners live with their family and have the choice to leave the prison campus during daytime.

However, they have to return before the evening roll call. They are also encouraged to be independent and bear their own expenses and are thus allowed to take up jobs outside the prison campus and earn a living.

Bandi Panchayat

  • The Rajasthan open prisons are selfgoverned institutions; with each having its own bandi panchayatIt consists of not less than five and not more than seven prisoners, keeping in view the number of prisoners in a camp. The panch or the members are elected by the prisoners from within them and the term of each panchayat lasts for a year.
  • The panchayats deal with minor acts of omission/commission/misconduct of the prisoners and may impose minor penalties on the defaulters or curtail facilities. Such penalties are effective only on the approval of the officer-in-charge of the camp.
  • Apart from being responsible for maintaining discipline in the prison, the members of the panchayat also manage the administrative details of the prison. They conduct two daily roll calls of the prisoners, maintain the attendance register, collect electricity bills from the prisoners and ensure overall hygiene.
  • In the case of a severe breach of discipline or misconduct, the bandi panchayat may also decide to send the prisoner back to a closed prison (Chakraburtty 2017: 9).

 

Types of Open Prisons

  • There are about 30 open prisons in Rajasthan (Chakraburtty 2017: 10) and more are under construction. The operational models of these prisons vary in that there are no fixed rules about the location, structure and capacity of the open prisons.
  • Some of the open prisons provide both lodging and employment. Whereas other open prisons provide only lodging and the prisoners have to look for their own employment.
  • The state also has government-run agricultural research institutes like the Bikaner Agricultural Farm (Chakraburtty 2017: 17) which houses prisoners along with their families. The prisoners are allotted work regularly at the research institute and are paid on a monthly basis.
  • They are free to go out of the open prison during daytime. The prisoner is provided with a small residential quarter, where s/he lives with family. The quarters have running water and electricity. In some open prisons the electricity is not provided for free but at a subsidised rate.
  • In the Sanganer Open Prison (Chakraburtty 2017: 12), prisoners are not provided with jobs inside the open prison campus, instead they have to look for jobs themselves. Prisoners go out of the open prison during daytime to earn a living and return to the prison by the end of the day before the evening roll call.
  • Some open prisons are built immediately next to the closed prison, at times even sharing the same boundary wall as that of the closed prison such as in Alwar and Sikkar. Whereas, in some places like Sanganer the open prison is about 30 km away from the Jaipur central jail. Sri Ganganagar district has an open prison in Jaitsar, which is 125 km away from the Sri Ganganagar district jail.
  • The capacity of the open prisons too varies. Sanganer is the largest open prison in the state, housing nearly 400 prisoners along with their families in one campus, whereas an open prison in Bikaner houses only 12 prisoners.
  • Open prisons do not require huge land area or expensive building construction. A minimum of 300 sq feet per prisoner is sufficient for keeping a prisoner along with his/her family members. 
  • The prisoner quarters can be built in an agricultural farm and/or small apartments (two to three floors each) can be raised as prisoner quarters in order to save on land area. Also, most district and central jails have land area surrounding their boundary walls.
  • Small quarters can be built in these areas. There is no rule on how and where an open prison should be built. For example, in Jaitsar Open Prison, prisoners stay in temporary makeshift clay huts, while in Alwar Open Prison, they live in small cottages .

 

 

  • Several gaushalas (cow shelters) also employ prisoners and let them stay on the premises along with their families (Chakraburtty 2017: 22). This is a fairly new system, which was started over the past two or three years. These gaushalas are privately-run institutions and more often than not prisoners are paid wages way below the standard minimum wages.
  • However, not many prisoners complain about this, but it is also manipulative in nature because it makes forced labour appear as a compelling choice. Forced labour is a contemporary form of slavery, which has no place in a democracy.

Cost-effective

  • In open prisons, the prisoners earn their living and provide for themselves which means that the prison department does not have to spend on the prisoners’ food, medicine, water, electricity and wages.
  • The estimated annual expense for the Jaipur central jail (closed prison) is₹18,72,60,000, which is a little over 78 times (Chakraburtty 2017: 4) the annual expense of the Sanganer Open Prison, which is₹24,00,000 .
  • If only the staff salaries are compared in the two set-ups, we find that the government spends 60 times more on staff salaries in closed prisons as compared to the open ones.
  • Due to the much higher number of prisoners in the Jaipur central jail (2,200) as compared to Sanganer (400), the cost-per-prisoner in a closed prison appears less at₹7,093 per month, but even then it is 14 times more than the expense in Sanganer, where it is₹500 per prisoner per month.

 

  • During the time of the study the Jaipur central jail had a staff strength of 339, whereas the sanctioned one was 404. The total expense on the staff salary per month in Jaipur central jail is₹1,20,55,000 whereas in the Sanganer Open Prison it is₹2,00,000 per month. Expense on staff salary in Jaipur central jail is 60 times more compared to Sanganer Open Prison.
  • At the time of the study Sanganer Open Prison operated on only one staff per 80 prisoners. Whereas in Jaipur central jail (closed prison), one staff was required for every six prisoners. The comparison shows that open prisons are less resource-intensive.
  • Security-related expense forms a major part of the prison expense. Prison staff such as wardens and jailors form a part of prison security. Since open prison is a trust-based system and is operated on the principle of self-governance by the prisoners.
  • Thus, utility of prison staff for security purposes is negligible in open prisons. It must be understood here that the prison security expense is not incurred for the safekeeping of the prisoner but to keep the prisoner under surveillance for the safekeeping of the society from the prisoner.
  • When the same group of prisoners who are now staying in an open prison were staying in a closed prison, similar amount of money was spent on them for security purposes due to the perceived threat they posed or as presumed by society.
  • The expenditure on security per prisoner is a nebulous one, founded on a hypothetical assessment of threat to society rather than on an objective analysis of maximum utilisation of optimal resources. Incremental spending in closed prison structures provides diminishing utility on the infrastructural layout, creating excessive overhead resource burdens.
  • On the other hand, an open prison system not only humanises penal measures but strives towards a more economically viable model of incarceration.
  • According to the Rajasthan open prison rules, only convicted prisoners can stay in open prisons. After spending considerable amount of time in a closed prison and after being convicted, the prisoners are sent to an open prison.
  • As per prison rules they are eligible to stay in an open prison if they have shown good conduct, have completed five years inside a closed prison and have been convicted. In reality, however, due to lack of space in open prisons, these prisoners are shifted to open prisons based on seniority in the waiting list.
  • It takes an average 10 years of wait/stay in a closed prison before his/her serial number comes to be shifted to an open prison.
  • Out of the 428 prisoners interviewed, 206 were moved to open prison after completion of an average of nine to 11 years in a closed prison. Of these, 91 were shifted after completion of 11 to 13 years in a closed prison and 120 prisoners came to the open prison after completion of seven to nine years in a closed prison.
  • Eight prisoners were also found to have spent 13 to 15 years in a closed prison before being shifted to an open prison and only three prisoners came to the open prison after spending five to seven years in a closed one.
  • There is a huge population of prisoners in the closed prisons of Rajasthan (elsewhere in India too) who are eligible for stay in open prisons but are languishing in the closed ones. More open prisons are required to accommodate eligible prisoners.

Kinds of Offences

  • There is a long waiting period before a prisoner gets shifted to an open prison and therefore prisoners who are convicted for serious offences, usually under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) (murder) are the ones who become eligible for stay in open prisons.
  • However, the nature of the crime does not determine whether the prisoner is capable of reform or not. The objective of having an open prison is to encourage good behaviour among inmates. They get an opportunity for social reintegration and to make a new beginning. Thus, the rate of recidivism is negligible in open prisons.
  • A majority of prisoners are found to have perpetrated an unplanned or accidental offence. Out of the 428 interviewed prisoners (Chakraburtty 2017: 4) 347 had no previous police record. This means that 81% of the prisoners were first-time offenders.
  • From the detailed interviews or “prisoner narratives,” it was observed that most conflicts that they were involved in were land-related ones and which resulted in grievous hurt and injury, leading to subsequent death.
  • Some accidental deaths have happened during a drunken brawl. Out of the 428 prisoners, 244 prisoners, that is, 57% or more than half of the prisoners were convicted for an offence that was unplanned or had occurred accidentally.
  • Again, 175 prisoners (41%) had perpetrated other types or pre-planned offences, which included extortion and offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. Seven prisoners or 2% had also perpetrated revenge killing.
  • (In these calculations, dowry-related deaths or deaths caused due to domestic violence have not been included in the “unplanned” or “accidental offence”). What needs to be observed here is that even if a prisoner had perpetrated a revenge killing or was convicted under the NDPS Act, after coming to an open prison, no new offence was perpetrated.
  • The objective of incarceration is reform; thus if a prisoner has not reoffended while staying under minimal surveillance in an open prison, then the purpose of incarceration has been served. Also, if imprisonment is seen as a punishment then incarceration could be considered as the final punishment.
  • And incarceration does not necessarily have to be in a closed prison, since an open prison is also a prison.

Escape and Recidivism

  • It was found that prisoners rarely escape from open prisons and that a majority of the reported escapes are actually cases of breach of the parole rule. Parole is temporary leave from prison, in which he or she is allowed to go out of prison for a fixed number of days and return on a fixed date.
  • In most of these instances of breach of parole, the police had rearrested the prisoner from his/her home. On prison record these instances are recorded as absconding prisoners, because on the non-return of the prisoner on the scheduled day, the prison officials file an absconding report with the police.
  • Though these are hardly instances of prison escape, yet on record it appears as if the prisoners are absconding when they have actually breached or jumped parole. Breach of parole is considered an offence, but it cannot be counted as recidivism. The rate of recidivism is negligible in open prisons.
  • It must be pointed out here that obtaining parole involves a highly complex process. The prisoner has to give a personal bond, a secondary bond is given by a guarantor, the police issue clearance and permission is required from the district magistrate before it is granted.
  • It is a time-consuming and expensive process. Some of the problems related to procuring parole are listed below.
  • To avail parole, prisoners have to agree that on breach of the parole terms and conditions, the bond amount will be forfeited. The bond amount, incidentally, is not paid in cash. The bond process entails that the prisoner agrees to a certain amount of money and thereafter, gets a guarantor.

Guarantors Are Loan Sharks

  • A “guarantor” is a third-party individual, who stands guarantee for the prisoner (Chakraburtty 2017: 42) but does not pay the bond amount in cash.
  • He or she submits certain documents of assets owned, such as house registration or land registration documents as security or guarantee against the bond amount. In case of breach of parole terms and conditions (if the prisoner escapes or re-offends), the bond amount gets forfeited as a fine or disciplinary measure.
  • The presence of a guarantor is used as a pressure tactic on the prisoner since the former is expected to be a family member or a friend or fellow villager. Thus the prisoner is obliged to return to prison after the parole term is over and to maintain good conduct while s/he is out on parole.
  • However, not all prisoners own land or have individual or family assets. Thus more often than not, the guarantor is a man from the same village, who is a moneylender. This practice in the parole system creates loan sharks who exploit the prisoner’s vulnerability and poverty in a number of ways.
  • Not all prisoners have family members or family members who are willing to stand as a guarantor.
  • Others do not have the property or financial wherewithal to stand as one. Some prisoners complained that they own small huts in a village, which is their only asset. The land and the clay hut combined does not amount to the₹50,000 that is required.
  • Others pointed out that since their family members have already used land and assets to take bank loans, these cannot be reused as bond guarantee. For a prisoner belonging to another state, the situation becomes more complex because s/he requires a guarantor from Rajasthan and not the home state because the prison administration does not have jurisdiction inanother state and in case of breach of parole no measures can be initiated against the guarantor.
  • Previously, prisoners from other states were not sent to stay in open prisons, for fear that in the absence of family or guarantor they would be more likely to escape. Starting with the past decade, however, prisoners belonging to other states are being sent to stay in open prisons.

Steep Bond Amount

  • To avail of parole a prisoner has to provide two bond amounts—one for himself and the other for the guarantor. The bond amount varies from district to district and is subject to the discretion of the district magistrate. In some districts the standard bond amount is as high as₹1,00,000.
  • Every 11th month from the last parole availed, the prisoner becomes eligible for another one. Some prisoners moved the high court complaining of the high bond amount and were granted relief but every prisoner cannot afford to move the high court once every year.
  • Other prisoners informed that they had stopped applying for parole after coming to an open prison. Going out on parole and the successful completion of multiple paroles, is usually seen as proof of improvement in the behavioural conduct of the prisoner and helps at the time of permanent parole and remission (sentence reduction).
  • Earlier, the Rajasthan prison rules also suggested that only on successful completion of three paroles, that is, 20 days in the first year, 30 days in the second year and 40 days in the third year, will the prisoner become eligible for permanent parole.
  • For prisoners staying in open prisons, three paroles are not mandatory to become eligible for permanent parole. However, due to differences of opinion among the decision-makers in the prison administration and members of the executive committee this new rule has not been put into practice.
  • However, subjecting prisoners to steep bond amounts along with getting guarantors goes against the principle of ensuring good conduct in prisoners.
  • Rather, it creates an atmosphere of discrimination within the psychosocial ecosystem of the prisoner population with the more privileged prisoners availing more number of paroles and becoming eligible for permanent parole and remission.

Police Report

  • The prisoners pointed out that the police often give negative reports, which ensure that their parole application gets rejected by the district or state parole committee. The prisoners feel that the police file such negative reports to evade conducting a fresh inquiry and update the records.
  • They also pointed out that when they became eligible for the first parole, almost all of them received negative police reports. It is an unwritten rule that the first police report is always a negative report and the police submit mechanical negative reports based on the crime that took place years ago and not on the conduct of the prisoner when the parole application is filed.
  • The above problems related to parole explain why inmates breach parole, that is, extend their stay at home. The number of parole breaches may be interpreted as an argument in defence of the open prison system too. The number of parole breaches indicates that though open prison is a system of minimal restraint imposed on the prisoner, they choose to stay out of it.
  • It is commonly argued that open prisons give liberty to inmates and there is negligible restriction imposed on the prisoner, so imprisonment in an open prison does not amount to punishment and the idea of justice is hurt from the perspective of the victim. But this desperation of the prisoner to stay out of open prison shows that it is a prison and psychologically does affect the sense of liberty.
  • Though this is a negative argument it may be used in defence of the open prison system, from the perspective of crime and punishment.
  • The following are the suggestions from the report to which the states have been told by the Supreme Court to submit their responses (Chakraburtty 2017: 27):
  • Open prisons are not resource-intensive and are cost-effective. Thus it is suggested that more open prisons be created across the state (country) to decrease the burden on the exchequer of the state. According to comparative data between Jaipur central jail and Sanganer Open Prison:
  •  Open prison requires only one prison staff per 80 prisoners.
  •  Open prisons are 78 times cheaper than closed ones.
  •  Cost per prisoner in Jaipur central jail is₹7,094 per month.  Cost per prisoner in Sanganer Open Prison is₹500 per month.
  •  Construction of a minimum of two new open prisons in every district:
  • An open prison can be constructed anywhere. It does not require huge campus area. Every closed prison can have an open prison built immediately next to its boundary wall. For example, the Alwar Open Prison, where a cluster of small quarters are built immediately outside the boundary wall of the closed prison.
  • It can be built as a prisoner village like that of the Sanganer Open Prison.
  • It can be built as a housing complex with each building of three or four floors. A prisoner family can be accommodated in a flat of 300 sq ft.
  • Open prisons can also be constructed in remote areas where a cluster of clay huts can be built on an agricultural land or a forest area, for example, the Jaitsar Open Prison. Prisoners’ labour may be utilised in agricultural or forest preservation work.
  •  Open prisons can be started inside university campuses, where prisoners can stay with their families and work inside the campus like the Bikaner CRC.
  •  More prisoners to be kept in open prisons: Prisoners eligible for stay in open prisons should not be restricted to the category of convicted prisoners. Undertrials too should be allowed into these prisons they are an experiment in minimal restraint.
  • It is a trust-based system built on the principle of self-governance and self-discipline, which is rehabilitative in nature. If this system is encouraged and expanded across the country it will have the potential to not only change the prison system but also have a significant impact on crime, recidivism, and eventually help eradicate retributive form of punishment.
  • Earlier, more often than not, harsh restrictions were imposed on prisoners like bar fetters and solitary confinement (till they were declared unconstitutional), not because they were pre-eminently necessary to maintain order and ensure security in jails but from a vague and unfounded fear of jail breaks and prisoners posing a threat to society in general.
  • The open prison experiment would give an opportunity in making a graded and progressive response to the extent of restraint and surveillance necessary to contain prisoners in an inclusive society.
  • Or in other words prisoners may, ordinarily in the first instance, be kept in open jails and only if they show tendencies towards violence or signs of plotting a jailbreak, they may be confined to more restrictive regimes of closed jail systems.
  • The case for undertrial prisoners stands on a better footing than for convicts, as the former are merely suspects who are incarcerated pending an investigation/trial.
  • Restrictions on this category of prisoners ought to be kept at a bare minimum, so that a fine balance may be struck between the fundamental right to liberty, presumption of innocence on the one hand and the requirement of fair and just investigation, protective rights and security of the victim and public interest on the other.
  • This goal can be best achieved in an open jail scenario as the very idea of staying under minimal restriction regime would have the least impact on the basic human rights of undertrials.
  • At present, only convicted prisoners are kept in open prisons. It is a common practice and belief that if undertrials are sent to open prison they will escape. However, prior to the setting up of open prisons prisoners were kept under severe restraint, in the belief that if they were left unchained and not put behind bars they would become violent and kill each other or escape.
  • When open prisons were started it was observed that prisoners did not escape even when they were kept in the open without any security barricades.
  • Similarly, if accused persons are aware of the possibility of being shifted to an open prison, there is a possibility of decrease in the number of absconding persons. Even if bail is not granted to undertrials (which would be the first priority), they are at least not put behind bars.

Reduction in Overcrowding

  • On an average, there are nearly 70% undertrial and 30% convicted prisoners. A lengthy trial is one of the reasons behind the huge population of undertrials in prison. More often than not, undertrials go through a long period of incarceration before being convicted.
  • Thus it would be humane to transfer the convicted prisoners to open prison. A reduction in the number of convicted prisoners from the closed prison will also lead to reduction in overcrowding.
  • Under the immediate context types of undertrial prisoners (UTP) recommended for stay in open prisons:
  •  Woman UTP should be considered for stay in open prison to sustain ties with family and children:
  •  pregnant woman prisoners,
  •  women with young children,
  •  women with disabilities, and
  • aged prisoners.
  •  Aged and physically infirm prisoners (male/female) should be allowed to stay in an open prison so that they can avail of the care and support of their family members.
  •  Nature of offence:
  • onetime offence,
  • accidental offence,
  • petty offence, and
  • low risk prisoner.
  •  Accused persons who have surrendered in court or police station and courted imprisonment.
  •  Cases of prisoners undergoing extradition requests. In cases of persons undergoing extradition trial in countries India has signed extradition treaty with the suggestion of keeping the accused in an open prison. (The United Kingdom governemnt rejected two extradition appeals due to poor conditions prevalent in Indian prisons.)
  •  Equal pay for equal work: Prisoners face an endemic problem of being paid lower wages compared to other workers for the same work. Be it in a gaushala or a farmthe pay/wages situation remains the same. The reason for paying the prisoner less as per some members of the institutions is that, since they are provided housing they are paid less.
  • A prisoner has to stay in the open prison because of legal compulsions. Imprisonment is imposed by the law. To deduct rent from the stay in prison from the wages of a prisoner is a form of exploitation.
  • The prisoners must be paid equal wages for equal work. And in case the institution only employs prisoners, then it should maintain standard sector rate for their wages, which should not be below the minimum wages standardised by government.
  •  Access to legal aid: Though presently only convicted prisoners stay in open prisons they require legal services related to parole rejection, higher bond amount, transfer to another state or another district and similar such issues. Thus it is suggested that legal aid clinics be set up even in open prisons.
  •  Access to health facilities: Health camps should be arranged in open prisons.
  •  Prisoners often face discrimination when it comes to work and remuneration. Also, the prison superintendents should speak to employers and negotiate work shift timings because prisoners have to return to prison before the evening roll call.
  •  Prisoners should be allowed to choose the kind of work. They should be kept in open prisons in areas where there are avenues to utilise their skills.
  •  Prisoners should be kept in their home districts.

Relevance of Open Prisons

  • According to R K Saxena (Chakraburtty 2017: 1), the Rajasthan open prisons are so in the true sense of the term. The first open prison in Rajasthan was set up in Durgapura near Jaipur city, around 1954–55. Prisoners were allowed to stay with family members and allowed choice of work.
  • If the purpose of incarceration is to prepare an inmate for social reintegration and social readjustment it would be wrong to cut him off from society for long. One of the prerequisites of social reintegration is the continued interaction between the prisoner and society.
  • There are two ways of maintaining social interaction. One, by allowing the society to come inside prisons and two, by allowing prisoners to go outside the prison. Open prisons provide for this kind of social interaction between the prisoner and society.
  • Closed or traditional prisons have high security, yet prisoners escape. But that does not prompt the administration to shut them down. Prisoners staying in open prisons know that escaping from there would mean that if they are rearrested, they would be sent back to a closed prison. The fear of this prevents them from trying to escape.
  • Prisoners in open prisons had maintained a fairly good conduct while they were in the closed ones no matter what their offence was. Thus it was rare that a prisoner would escape from an open prison. Ajit Singh, a former director general of police (DGP) of Rajasthan, observes:
  • Contrary to common belief prisoners are not a homogeneous group of violent and hardened criminals. To understand a prisoner, it is important to learn about his family, the circumstances of the offence, whether the offence was planned, accidental, whether committed by a onetime offender or by a hardened habitual offender. (Chakraburtty 2017: 4)
  • Those unfamiliar with the system (Open Prison), may presume that such a system would give rise to prison escapes. The data, however, does not corroborate this fear. There is a general acceptance of the Open Prison Rules among the prisoners.
  • A prisoner allowed the extent of liberty that comes with being in an Open Prison would not normally want to lose it and be a fugitive again. Escape would imply re-arrest and then face life back in confinement of a traditional prison. Thus prison escapes are rare when it comes to Open Prison.
  • I was commissioned to inspect all the prisons of Bihar (Chakraburtty 2015a) and visited all the 58 prisons there and also interacted with 30,070 prisoners (on record) (Chakraburtty 2015b).
  • After witnessing the horror behind bars in the closed prisons, the open prison system of Rajasthan seemed unreal. It is difficult to believe that such an alternative imprisonment system has existed in the country for decades, yet it was not emulated elsewhere in the country.
  • The Rajasthan open prison system is a successful and sustainable alternative to the existing closed prison system. It is cost-effective, leads to social reintegration of the prisoners, reduction in prison over-crowding, the rate of recidivism is negligible and most importantly, it is a humane system, which upholds the right to life and dignity of the prisoner.
  • It is also unfortunate that such a unique and successful prison system has been subjected to neglect in its home state. The Rajasthan open prison model and parole system should be expanded and implemented across the country.
  • There is no logical explanation to continuing a closed prison system that is not only inhuman but also expensive. Funds with the public exchequer should be utilised to combat problems of malnutrition, public health, primary education and not be exhausted over perceived sense of crime and punishment.
  • Open prisons must become the norm and the closed prison must remain a rare exception.

Moratorium on Large Dams and Irrigation Management Transfer

When reforms mean something quite different from the usual connotation of privatisation.

  • The attempt to bring the voices of the marginalised into policymaking and to check widespread corruption in the irrigation sector is fiercely resisted by dominant vested interests. This is particularly true when the status quo has flourished undisturbed for seven decades, as is the case with water governance in India.
  • Part of the strategy in any such context is the marshalling of ideological power in defence of the status quo. This is evident in the article “New ‘Water Management Paradigm’: Outdated Concepts?” by M Dinesh Kumar et al (2017) in a recent issue of the EPW, which is a critique of the Report Submitted by the Committee on Restructuring the CWC and CGWB (Shah et al 2016; hereafter, report).
  • Their critique of the report misrepresents what it actually says. It also launches a full-scale attack on data cited in the report, which is, of course, entirely derived from official sources. This is a classic case of “shooting the messenger,” when it is no longer possible to ignore the message.1 I provide below a point-by-point refutation.

Credibility of the Committee

  • Kumar repeatedly try to question the credibility of the committee set up by the government.
  • It gives me great pleasure and sense of pride to state that the committee comprised some of the world’s leading scholars on water, who not only represent leading research organisations, but also have an impeccable track record of high quality, published academic work, as well as path-breaking work on the ground, aimed at finding solutions to India’s vexed water problems.

Moratorium on Large Dams?

  • Kumar et al claim that the report is proposing a “moratorium on large dams”  Nothing could be farther from the truth. What the report contains is a comprehensive assessment of the physical and financial performance of large dams in India, which is derived entirely from information available in official documents.
  • It takes as its starting point the question: Why does India, even 70 years after independence, continue to suffer successive droughts and floods, year after year, causing great misery to millions of people, and even resulting in suicides by farmers? As the report says:
  • At the epicentre of the present drought is Maharashtra, the State with the highest number of dams in India. Intervening in a debate in the State Assembly on 21 July 2015, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra remarked that the State has 40% of the country’s large dams, but 82% area of the state is rainfed.
  • “Till the time you don’t give water to a farmer’s fields, you can’t save him from suicide. We have moved away from our vision of watershed and conservation. We did not think about hydrology, geology and topography of a region before pushing large dams everywhere. We pushed large dams, not irrigation. But this has to change.”
  • So this is the question the committee posed itself: What has to change in the way we have managed the water in our irrigation commands to ensure that it reaches the farmers most efficiently? On examining the track record of large dam projects, we found that we have invested₹4 lakh crore in major and medium irrigation projects since independence.
  • Official records reveal that the irrigation potential created is 113 million hectares (mha), the potential utilised is 89 mha, and the gap is growing by the year.3 Vast storages of water are not reaching the farmers. We have focused only on the expenditure of vast sums of money for the construction of dams and main canal systems, not on enduring outcomes.
  • This is borne out by the fact that the average cost overrun is as high as 1,382% in major irrigation projects and 325% in medium irrigation projects. We have to shift focus from expenditures to outcomes.
  • And, how does the report propose we do that? By learning from what the best states in India have to teach us, by the reforms that these states have introduced in the last decade or so, and the extraordinary outcomes this has resulted in.
  • These reforms turned around the fortunes of Andhra Pradesh’s Department of Water Resources over the last 10 years, led to Gujarat recording a 11% rate of growth in agriculture over 2000–10, and to a dramatic rise in Madhya Pradesh’s irrigated area from 0.6 to 3 mha during 2009–14.
  • So this is not about a moratorium on large dams at all. That is a different debate and not one that fell within the terms of reference of the committee. The report, of course, does cite official data on the dismal performance of these dams over decades and chronicles their many failures.
  • But the primary concern of the report is with making better use of the trillions of litres of water stored in these dams and ensuring that this water reaches the farmers for whom it is meant.

Irrigation Management Transfer

  • So what does the report learn from the states and, indeed, from hundreds of similar success stories across the world, all cited in the report? That we need to make water management in our irrigation commands more participatory, and understand that water is essentially a multidimensional resource, requiring a multidisciplinary approach towards its management.
  • Kumar et al seek to debunk this approach, completely ignoring the successes achieved in several Indian states. They write:
  • As a matter of fact, WUAs [water user associations] are defunct in all the states, in the absence of devolution of any kind of powers to them. The state irrigation departments that are concerned with irrigation management are not willing to share any of their powers with the farmer organisations.
  • Such delegation of powers happens only on paper.
  • I do not disagree that the states need to do much better in empowering the WUAs to enable them to function more effectively. What the report argues is that where states have done so, the results have been dramatic and, therefore, all states must adopt this model of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT).
  • I agree with Kumar et al that “farmers shift to water-intensive crops once irrigation water is made available,” and that “most scholars in the water sector today agree that the key institutional reform needed in the water sector is to affect behaviour changes for regulating the growth in demand for water in various competitive use sectors”
  • But as shown in the report, this is precisely what successful WUAs have been able to achieve in states where the necessary reforms have been put in place to adequately empower the WUAs.
  • Unlike Kumar et al, I believe that the key role has to be played on the ground by adequately empowered WUAs who pay central attention to resolving issues of equity within themselves. What common pool resources like water do very well is to make all those who share these resources realise that their destinies are closely linked.
  • Of course, such a realisation takes time to sink in, but the benefits of cooperation finally outweigh its costs in such situations, as any student of Elinor Ostrom or even game theory would understand.

Bogey of Federalism

  • It also needs to be appreciated that because water is a state subject in India (except for the inter-state river basins), most of the reforms have to happen at the state level, in order to affect changes in the orientation and working of the agencies which plan, design, execute, and run water projects.
  • They, therefore, claim thatthe committee has taken the wrong patient to the operating table. Ideally, reforms are required to affect changes in the functioning of the state water agencies which plan and develop the water resources. But the committee has not made suggestions for improving their working.
  • It is abundantly clear from these statements that Kumar et al have not read our report with any care whatsoever. First, they seem to forget that the mandate of the committee was “restructuring of the CWC and CGWB,” which is what it has concentrated on.
  • However, it has done so in acute awareness of the fact that water is a state subject under the Indian Constitution and action on water happens primarily in the states. Indeed, this is the reason why the report is replete with examples of the reforms states in India have undertaken in the water sector, and has also taken meticulous care to record the suggestions of the states regarding reform of the CWC and the CGWB.
  • So, how does one resolve this apparent paradox, the fatal flaw Kumar et al appear to find in the committee’s approach? This can be done by emphasising the role of the centre in both incentivising and facilitating reform by the states through the instrument of the National Irrigation Management Fund, from where funds will flow to the states only to the extent that they undertake fundamental reforms in the direction of decentralising management of their irrigation commands by making them people-centred.
  • Indeed, the report argues that the main task of a reformed Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme should be to place all the 99 currently ongoing large dam projects into “reform mode”:
  • As the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation’s draft Vision Document rightly points out, all these 99 projects must be placed in reform mode and funds for these projects must be made conditional upon reforms being put into place from day one.
  • The crucial role of the centre would be to monitor the performance of the states against these commonly agreed benchmarks of reform, and ensure that funds are released as per the adherence by the states to the schedule of reforms in the direction of IMT and empowering WUAs.
  • Thus, both the centre and the states will work together to accelerate the movement towards realising the national goal of har khet ko paani (water for every farm). Recognising that water is a state subject does not mean that the centre can continue to remain a passive and mute spectator as the water crisis goes from bad to worse across India, and as thousands of crores spent on irrigation continue to go down the drain or line the pockets of politicians, officials, and contractors.
  • The report suggests a new way in which the centre can push the states to undertake urgent water reforms. Not by wielding the big but ineffective stick of command-and-control, but by incentivising and facilitating states to move towards reform by learning from the best practices of pioneering states.

National Aquifer Management Programme

  • One of the most baffling critiques offered by Kumar et al concerns the National Project on Aquifer Management (NAQUIM). For some reason, they appear to think that the report advocates mere aquifer mapping and ignores the challenge of groundwater management. Kumar et al claim:
  • The farmers as well as official agencies know well that the resource is fast depleting in many pockets. Participatory aquifer mapping can do little to halt this ongoing menace. The committee has neither suggested any model to fill this institutional vacuum nor been able to visualise how participatory aquifer mapping gets translated into participatory groundwater management under the much-touted National Aquifer Management Programme.
  • This is totally perplexing, because our report has devoted considerable space to address precisely this question, and to outline in detail the reforms needed in NAQUIM to make it an effective programme of participatory groundwater management, once again based on the exemplary work done in states such as Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. Section 2.2 of the report is entirely devoted to this question and it notes with some satisfaction that the new six-year programme that has just been initiated with World Bank assistance for Groundwater Development and Management with a total financial outlay of₹6,000 crore is a step in the right direction, with each of its components exactly reflecting the paradigm shift outlined by our Committee in this report.

River Rejuvenation

  • Perhaps even more perplexing is the claim of Kumar et al that while the committee discusses “rejuvenation of rivers” at length, it failed to offer any practical suggestions on how to achieve it, except talking platitudes about integrated surface and groundwater development. (2017: 93)
  • One of the key proposals of the report is that the CWC and CGWB need to work much more closely together at the river basin level if we are to achieve the national goal of river rejuvenation. As argued in the report:
  • CWC and CGWB cannot continue to work in their current independent, isolated fashion. In India today, we see repeated instances of what the 12th Plan document has called “hydro-schizophrenia,” where the left hand of surface water does not seem to know what the right hand of groundwater is doing.
  • The one issue that brings out the need to unify the two bodies more than any other is the drying up of India’s rivers. The single most important factor explaining the drying up of post-monsoon flows in India’s peninsular rivers is the over-extraction of groundwater.
  • The drying up of base-flows of groundwater has converted so many of our “gaining” rivers into “losing” rivers. If river rejuvenation is, indeed, the key national mandate assigned to the Ministry of Water Resources, then this cannot be done without hydrologists and hydrogeologists working together, along with social scientists, agronomists and other stakeholders.
  • The report further argues thatriver basins must form fundamental units for strategic planning and management of water resources. For this we need to correct the currently skewed and inadequate presence of CWC and CGWB in the river basins and hydrogeological settings of India.
  • The committee found that both the CWC and CGWB have regional centres in only seven of the 22 river basins. There are four river basins where there is either a CWC or CGWB regional centre.
  • There are 11 river basins where neither the CWC nor the CGWB has a regional centre. Both the CWC and the CGWB have regional centres within four of the hydrogeological settings, with one such setting where CGWB alone has one regional office.
  • There are no regional offices of the CWC or the CGWB in one of the six hydrogeological settings. The distribution of such regional centres, currently, is skewed and needs an improved representation.
  • Larger river basins such as that of the Ganga are significantly represented through many regional centres, whereas the Brahmaputra does not seem well represented despite its size. Smaller river basins are poorly represented, and as many as 11 such river basins have no significant presence of these organisations.
  • Hydrogeologically too, the unconsolidated sedimentary aquifers are well represented along with the Himalayan, volcanic, and crystalline aquifer settings. There are fewer regional offices within consolidated sedimentary aquifer formations.
  • It is imperative that we ensure the presence of surface- and groundwater-related interdisciplinary expertise in each of the river basins and hydrogeological settings. To enable this, the National Water Commission (NWC), the committee proposes, by integrating the CWC and CGWB, must operate at the scale of the river basin integrating these interdisciplinary functions.
  • The current regional centres of the CWC and the CGWB in various river basins and across different hydrogeological settings could be used as the first set of NWC centres.
  • Based on a rationale that integrates the size of the river basin and physiographic, hydrological, and hydrogeological factors, the report proposes a network of NWC centres to strengthen the existing regional offices or to establish new ones in the different river basins of India.
  • Our report attempts to rationalise a set of sub-centres under the NWC that can be used to decentralise operations pertaining to surface water and groundwater management. The headquarters of the NWC for each river basin has then been so chosen as to ensure that it is either a CWC chief engineer’s headquarters and/or the regional directorate of the CGWB.
  • The mandate and structure of the NWC will be mirrored in the constitution of the regional river basin centres of the NWC, primarily in the interdisciplinary functions that such centres are expected to perform.
  • The report also indicates how the concept of the NWC can percolate further down to a more decentralised, sub-basin water management.
  • The sub-centres are only a list of indicative locations for the devolution of the NWC mandate, structure, and operations, and can be modified based on more work on the ground, especially on the institutional devolution of the river basin concept for managing water resources.

Need for Legal Changes

  • A running theme of the article by Kumar et al (2017) is that along with the institutional changes suggested in the report, there need to be put in place key legal changes in the regime governing water use in India.
  • I agree entirely. So does the government, for that matter! Which is why, along with this committee, they set up two other committees: one to draft a Model Groundwater Bill for adoption by the states, and another to draft the National Water Framework Law.
  • Happily, both these committees have also submitted these draft laws to the government, which is currently working on their enactment. The work of all three committees must be seen as of one piece, complementing each other.

Where Is the Disagreement?

  • Finally, what makes the abusive tone of Kumar et al towards the report even more difficult to understand is that they do not seem to disagree with its fundamental recommendations. The following words from Kumar et al could actually have been a verbatim quote from the report itself and are a good summary of its main conclusions.
  • No better words than these from Kumar et al to close my response to them:
  • Managing water today is no longer only about developing new sources through conventional means by construction of reservoirs, digging wells and laying canals and pipelines, but also about finding new sources of water and allocating the limited water amongst various competitive uses, while protecting the hydrological integrity of our catchments, rivers, lakes and aquifers.
  • Inter-sectoral water allocation requires greater use of sound economic principles for efficient pricing, introduction of water-use restrictions, etc. Water resource management requires application of ecological sciences, ecological economics and environmental economics.
  • It is quite obvious that our water-sector institutions have to be equipped with more technical manpower, with greater competence and with people from multiple disciplines. They also call for new institutions for basin-wide water allocation and for undertaking resource management action.

Notes

  •  Full of personal abuse and invective, the article by Kumar  is replete with epithets like “wishful thinking,” “professional bias,” “poor knowledge,” “outdated concepts,” “strong ideological bias,” “concocted data,” “statistical lie,” “lot of rhetoric,” “false premises,” “faulty diagnosis,” “misrepresentation of facts,” among others, to describe the committee and its report, completely against the spirit and ethos of academic writing or credible research.
  •  The full text of the report and details about the composition of the committee are available on the website of the Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, Government of India.

Why Are the Reserved Categories Objecting to the 13-point Roster?

When the department is taken as a “unit,” it can have at least one appointment from each of the reserved category, only when a minimum of 14 appointments are made in that department. This is not possible in many departments as their numerical strength is much lower than 14 faculty positions. Even if it was the case that 14 appointments were possible, the earmarked percentage of reservation may still not be achieved (known as the 13-point roster). However, when a university/college is taken as a unit and all departments are pooled, every reserved category gets the earmarked percentage of reservation, when 200 appointments are made (known as the 200-point roster). The advantage of the 200-point roster over the 13-point roster is that the deficit of reservation in one department is compensated by other departments.

In order to study the impact of this decision on deprived sections, the Delhi University (DU hereafter) could be a good case due to its location and large number of affiliated colleges. Rosters and Reserved

Positions

It is important to note that the 13-point roster was implemented in DU only in 1997 to provide reservation to SC and ST with the following specifications. The first six seats were kept unreserved, the seventh post was kept reserved for SC, and the 14th post for ST. After the completion of one full cycle, the same cycle was repeated. Later, in order to accommodate the 27% reservation for OBC, every fourth seat was kept reserved for the OBC in the same roster. In this manner, every fourth, seventh, eighth, 12th and 14th position was reserved (Table 1, p 12).

It is clear from column 3 of Table 1 that reservation was 0% for the first three seats. Based on the 13-point roster, as long as there are 14 positions, the percentage of reservation increases for every position marked for the reserved category. Nevertheless, even after completing a full cycle of 14 positions, it reaches its highest level of 35.7%, which is substantially short of the constitutionally mandated 49.5% of reservation. Further, if the strength of a department is below 14 positions, it widens the gap between the constitutionally mandated and actually realised percentage of reservation.

Fallacy of Composition

  • The 13-point roster is therefore faulty and was made on the basis of dividing 100 by the percentage of reservation given to any reserved group. Since reservation for OBC is 27% they would be given every fourth position (100/27=3.7→ 4th position), while SC (100/15=6.7→7th position) and ST (100/7.5=13.3→14th position) would be given seventh and 14th positions respectively.
  • It is clear from columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, that despite the constitutionally mandated 50% reservation, those belonging to reserved categories were getting only five out of 14 positions, while nine out of 14 positions were being kept unreserved (in one sense it is reserved for the general population!).
  • The most interesting part of the calculation of roster is that only reserved positions are calculated using this formula. All the positions left after earmarking reserved positions are assumed to be given to unreserved categories. The fallacy of this calculation of the roster can be understood if we calculate posts allocation for the unreserved category, by the same formula as was used in the case of reserved categories.
  • In that case every second post shall be kept unreserved (100/50 =2→2nd position), since 50% posts are supposed to be kept unreserved.
  • The answer to this puzzle can be found in the fallacy of the calculations for determining the composition. Had the roster for reserved positions been made, taking all reserved categories together (50%), every second position (100/50=2→2nd position) would have been reserved and all the positions would then be distributed within all reserved categories according to their respective reservation shares that is OBC–27%, SC–15% and ST–7.5%.
  • We can see in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, that reservation could have been given to reserved category without breaching 50% cap laid down by Supreme Court, if every even number position is kept reserved in the 13-point roster. This formula will increase the proportion of reservation for SC, ST and OBC from 7%, 7% and 21% respectively in the 13-point roster to 14%, 7% and 29% respectively in the modified 13-point roster suggested by the authors.
  • In this way the modified reservation formula will bring up the proportion of reservation provided to each category close to the proportion fixed by our constitution. However, a mathematical juggling has been used by the policymakers to reduce the constitutionally mandated reservation for the deprived sections.
  • Moreover, this faulty 13-point roster denies even a single representation from the deprived sections in smaller departments of DU and its affiliated colleges (in all other institutions too) where sometimes a maximum of three teachers are required, for example, in departments such as Sanskrit, history, political science, environment science, all regional languages, etc (since reservation is applied only from fourth position onwards).
  • For instance, let us assume that three teachers are required in the Sanskrit department of all the 70 colleges of DU. In this situation, at least 210 teachers of Sanskrit will be appointed without appointing even a single teacher from any reserved category. If six teachers are required in the department, then out of the 420 teachers of Sanskrit only 70 teachers belonging to the OBC category would be appointed without appointing even a single teacher from the SC or ST category.

The Change

  • The 200-point roster was adopted from 2013 onwards, across most government institutions, following a UGC circular. According to this roster, all departments were to be pooled and the entire institution (university, college, etc) was to be taken as a unit for the calculation of positions for a particular category. Under this formula, every reserved category gets the earmarked percentage of reservation mandated by the Constitutionwhen a cycle of 200 appointments is completed (hence the 200-point roster). This formula was implemented after much deliberations and discussions, to rectify the basic problems with the 13-point roster, that is, inadequate representation of reserved categories.
  • As the 200-point roster starts to be implemented in any institution, it can be seen that it is tilted in favour of the unreserved category in the beginning (the head) of the appointment process. As more and more appointments are made and we approach 200 seats, the appointments turn in favour of the reserved categories. What this means is that, if we compare every quartile (of seats) with its subsequent quartile in 200-point roster, we find that, the farther we move from the head of the distribution of seat allocation, the percentage share of reserved categories is likely to increase. Since 200 point roster makes a pool of all departments/subjects of an institution, the departments placed prior in the sequence of roster allocations will have proportionately higher percentage of teachers belonging to unreserved category while every subsequent department is likely to have proportionately more number of reserved teachers.
  • This would result in interdepartmental disparity in the distribution of reserved and unreserved teachers. The same was observed by the honourable Allahabad High Court (upheld by the Supreme Court) in its decision on 7 April 2017. So while the 13-point roster was giving less representation to the reserved category candidates, the 200-point roster was generating inter department/subject disparity in the distribution of appointment of teachers belonging to general and reserved categories, despite providing comparatively better representation to reserved categories (Vivekanand Tiwari and Anr v Union of India and 5 Ors 2017).
  • This is clear from Figure 1 (p 14). For the initial 40 positions, the percentage of reservation provided is less, and as we move close to 200 positions, the percentage of reservation increases, and reaches its highest level of 49.5% at 200th position. Interestingly this percentage of reservation will again start falling when the size of an institution increase over and above 200 positions, and will again reach its maximum of 49.5% on 400th position. In this way this cycle will keep repeating every 200 positions.

  • If every second position is given to reserved categories in 200-point roster, as is being suggested by the authors, while keeping the internal sequence of reserved positions unchanged and giving 200th position to general category to maintain 49.5% reservation, this can serve two purposes; one, it can address the apprehension of the Allahabad High Court that the 200-point roster could result in some departments/subjects having all reserved candidates and some having only unreserved candidates; second, it will provide equal representations to reserved categories at both the head and tail end of the 200-point roster distribution. Figure 1 shows this distribution diagrammatically. A comparison of the two distribution shows that the modified 200-point line is smoother and reaches close to the equitable line of 50% from the very beginning, while the 200-point line starts reaching equitable line only after crossing 40 positions with a lot of fluctuations. It is worth mentioning here that high fluctuations are going only against reserved categories.

Denial of Reservation Is Not New

  • If we look at the history of implementation of reservation policy in DU (as well as in other central institutions), we find that there has always been some efforts to evade constitutionally mandated reservation irrespective of the political party in power. It is worth mentioning here that reservation for SC/ST and OBC was provided in all the central government jobs in 1950 and 1991 respectively, while it was implemented at DU in 1997 and 2007 respectively.
  • Even the late implementation of reservation policy came up with the faulty 13-point roster that gave abysmally low number of positions to the reserved categories. Even within these few reserved positions, appointments have been refused using the clause “none found suitable” (NFS), despite the fact that they fulfilled all required eligibility criteria laid down by UGC. Interestingly, this NFS clause was mostly used for the reserved categories, and rarely, if at all for general category positions. However, after judicial interventions, few frivolous decisions of NFS were reverted.
  • There are other ways in which reservation is denied. The reservation policy was misinterpreted: though it was supposed to be given at all levels of recruitment where direct appointments were being made, it was provided only at the level of assistant professor, and denied at higher levels of teaching posts, that is, associate professor and professor. As a result, most of the teaching post advertisements had proportionately higher number of positions for associate professors and professors rather than that of assistant professors.
  • This denial of reservation for higher levels of teaching continued till 2007, when UGC instructed all institutions to give reservation at all levels of teaching positions. There again, OBCs were kept out of the loop and were deliberately restricted to the level of assistant professors without any substantial reason.
  • The manner in which reservations are denied, takes the form of rolling advertisements, where the number of posts reserved in any department is not earmarked. In the absence of clear mention of any reserved position, many applicants from the reserved categories hesitated to apply.
  • Since reserved positions were not mentioned in the advertisement, these institutions were free to allocate the reserved seats in any department after receiving the applications. In a conscious effort to evade reservation, they started giving reservation in only those departments where no application was received from any of the reserved categories. In fact, the idea was not to provide any reservation in a department where the applications from the reserved category were received. It was easy to do so, since the reserved positions were to be earmarked only after receiving the applications.

Representation of SC, ST and OBC

  • All such attempts at diluting the efficacy of implementation of reservation has resulted in a meager representation of reserved categories in all central universities. Table 2 shows that the representation of SC/ST/OBC in all central universities of the country in 2016–17, to be only 32% of all the teachers working as assistant professors, against 50% of constitutional provision.
  • One may think that lesser representation may be due to the reason that reservation for SC/ST and OBC was implemented in 1997 and 2007 respectively. However, the late implementation of reservation may not affect representation at the level of assistant professor since all those appointed as assistant professor before 2007 would already have been promoted to associate professor under Career Advancement Scheme (CAS).

  • If we look carefully, we find that this representation of deprived section was even poorer at higher levels of teaching positions, that is, associate professors and professors, where their combined representation was just 7.8% and 5.4% respectively. The combined representation of all the reserved categories at the level of associate professors and professors was just 7.8% and 5.4% respectively and is far less than that of the Muslims that was 15% and 15.9% respectively. It is worth mentioning here that some castes amongst the Muslims also fall under the category of OBC and ST. If we exclude that figure the representation of non-Muslim deprived sections would be far lesser.

Is the Apprehension Exaggerated?

The judgment of the Allahabad High Court was misread by the UGC while issuing the letter on 5 March 2018 to all educational institutions to advertise vacancies based on the earlier practice of calculating reserve positions based on 13-point roster. The Allahabad High Court, in its judgment, did not instruct the replacement of the 200-point roster with the 13-point roster; its objection was only limited to the present form of 200-point roster, which was resulting in an inequitable distribution of reserved and unreserved posts across departments. This problem could have been easily rectified by making small changes in the 200-point roster.

  • However, within a month of the receipt of the UGC letter, a large number of advertisements with new distribution of reserved posts, surfaced in the media. It was hard to believe that the preparation of the roster, which requires significant time in order to follow due process, that is, constitution of a committee, preparation of a new roster, taking approvals, advertising the vacancy, etc, were completed by most institutions within a period of one month.
  • The apprehension of the reserved categories is not baseless if we look at the advertisements of faculty positions, post UGC letter dated 5 March 2018, by various central universities. For instance, the advertisement of the Indira Gandhi National Tribal University (IGNTU) (Amarkantak) gives only one seat to SC/ST/OBC out of 53 seats (1%), while the Central University of Tamil Nadu has given only two seats out of 65 (6%). The Central University of Haryana (CUH) and Atal Bihari Vajpeyi Hindi Vishwavidyalaya (ABVHV) did not apportion any vacancy to any reserved category.

    Though the percentage of reservation given was somewhat higher in the Banaras Hindu University (BHU) and Allahabad University, approximately 22.5% and 22% respectively, it was also far below the constitutionally mandated 49.5%. The varying percentage of reservation in various institutions was due to the difference in the date of establishment of these institutions as well as respective size of their departments.

  • One can notice a high level of difference in the percentage of positions reserved in old institutions (BHU and Allahabad University) and new institutions (IGNTU, CUH, etc). This is due to the fact that the 13-point roster provides inter-temporal equity between the unreserved and reserved categories by providing present vacancies to unreserved categories while future vacancies were earmarked for the reserved categories (though not to the level mandated by the Constitution).

    However, there is a big disadvantage of intertemporal equity, especially when a new department is established, as mostly unreserved category candidates will be appointed and if the department is abolished later, reserved category will not get any chance to be appointed.

    Thus, we see that whether old or new, all institutions are witnessing drastic fall in the number of vacancies for reserved categories, and apprehensions of reserved categories are not unfounded. This was certainly not what was meant by the Allahabad High Court in its judgment.

Conclusions

Thus, we see that the reserved categories have always been misled, when it comes to being provided their share in the faculty positions. In principle, reserved categories can cross the 49.5% ceiling of reservation when their candidates find place in the merit of general category.

  • But, these reserved categories could never attain the constitutionally mandated 49.5% reservation in faculty appointments. In many other competitive examinations they could manage to get into the general category, but one can rarely see this phenomenon in the appointment of faculty.
  • This is the reason why we have meagre representation of reserved category candidates compared to their population proportion and earmarked proportions of reservation. There are many reasons for this noticeable change; first, the selection procedure for faculty appointment is completely subjective and based on interviews only.
  • Second, reserved category faculty are not found at higher levels, which can influence this very subjective appointment system. Third, reserved posts are calculated on the basis of faulty roster system to provide reservation. Fourth, there have always been attempts to evade reservation by many employing innovative methods.
  • It is high time that the present government, which is already being accused of being anti-reservation, take a stand and contest the case in the court in an honest and wholehearted manner. This is also a lesson for the reserved category applicants, not to accept any roster, whether the 13-point or 200-point, without first closely scrutinising its implications.

    Despite the 200-point roster being unjust to reserved categories, this was interpreted as being unjust to unreserved categories by the courts. Had there been every second position reserved in the 200-point roster, it would not have resulted in interdepartmental inequity in the distribution of reserved and unreserved posts, and the Allahabad High Court would not have put a stay on the 200-point roster.

  • Interestingly, since the initial departments in the 200-point roster are tilted in favour of unreserved posts, by the time Allahabad High Court stayed the practice, many initial departments had completed the appointment process. It was now the turn of those departments where the proportion of reserved categories was higher, to start appointment process when the Allahabad High Court put a ban on this roster. Does this not again indicate some sort of a pattern?

Human Rights vs Contract Law in Arbitration Mechanisms

Concerns in International Arbitration

It may be useful to start with a brief discussion of the general concerns raised about international arbitration. One question that has constantly come up is the relation between arbitration and the judiciary. Arbitration is meant to be a non-judicial (but legally supported) means of dispute resolution that would  save time and costs involved in judicial recourse and  deal with concerns about bias (against foreign parties), in cases where the parties to the dispute are of different nationalities.

  • This purpose would not be served if arbitration awards were constantly being challenged by courts. At the same time, completely foreclosing the option of recourse to the judiciary may neither be desirable nor even possible/enforceable.
  • Most methods of international arbitration today (with the exception of those under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the World Trade Organization [WTO]) usually involve—in addition to the specific arbitration rules chosen—rules of procedure of the legal system of the place of arbitration (including the possibility of recourse to the judiciary, if one of the parties wants it).
  • In the Indian case, this tension in the relation between arbitration and the judiciary is reflected, for instance, in recent moves to curtail judicial involvement in arbitration proceedings (in a bid to create a more investment-friendly atmosphere for foreign investors) which stand in contradiction to other moves geared towards protecting the ­interests of Indian parties and the Indian state.
  • The newly set-up tribunal, MCIA, also attempts to deal with this question through its feature of the “sanity check” that aims to ensure that its awards are scrutinised so that they are less likely to be challenged by Indian courts.
  • Another concern that has been raised about international arbitration is about the bias in awards in favour of Western countries, which is part of the rationale of setting up new international tribunals (such as the MCIA in India).
  • However, it is not always clear whether the bias is in the interpretation of the contract and the laws/rules to which it is subject (which seems to be what investors typically talk about) or whether the content of the contract itself is already biased because of unequal bargaining positions of the parties in question (a point that is often raised by those critical of international trade and investment agreements).
  • Further, in the case of the latter, whether and under what circumstances biased contract clauses can be overturned or even raised in the course of an arbitration process, is debatable.
  • One possible exception could be when human rights or public purpose considerations are invoked, a point that relates to a third and more fundamental question that one can raise about international arbitration, which is about the relationship between international arbitration law and other kinds of law.

Relationship between Different Kinds of Law

  • At the onset, it is pertinent to note that arbitration rules, practices, and awards are seen as constituting a distinct form of law, although the current diversity (and sometimes inconsistencies) in this have led to some calls for a more uniform and consistent body of arbitration law (see, for instance, Franck 2005).
  • The question then is whether other kinds of laws, particularly those dealing with human rights or public purpose, should be considered when interpreting and implementing arbitration law. A number of arguments have been made in support of such a position.
  • Thus, Tamar Meshel (2015) argues against the separation of different kinds of laws by drawing on readings of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that talks about the systemic relationship between all kinds of international law.
  • More specifically, he argues that international law is applicable in deciding international investment arbitration disputes even when a particular domestic law or specific arbitration rules have been chosen by the disputing parties, and this would allow for the consideration of human rights too.
  • Further, certain kinds of laws, such as human rights (be it the right to water or other kinds of socio-economic rights) make sense only when integrated across different realms.
  • Yet the usual experience of investment tribunals has been that the adverse effects of trade and investment treaties on human rights have not been acknowledged and instead, it is the text of the contract laid down in the treaties that has been emphasised and upheld.
  • For instance, Meshel (2015) considers the case of the human right to water raised in water-related investments, most of which to date have been in the context of Latin American countries.
  • Meshel points out that while there is some selective recognition of civil and political rights when invoked by investors, in general when the human right to water has been raised as a justification for actions of host nations, international arbitration tribunals have either not acknowledged it at all or acknowledged it without recognising the right in the resolution of the dispute itself or discussing its impact in any meaningful way.
  • In other words, contract law and human rights have been treated as two separate areas of international law.
  • How does one make sense of this separation of different kinds of law and of the privileging of some kinds of law over others? I would like to bring together here two arguments made in very different contexts—Polanyi’s (1944/1957) characterisation of market societies in terms of a disembedded economy and D’Souza’s (2006) discussion of the differences in the character of law under state regulation and market regulation.
  • In his work The Great Transformation, Polanyi talks about how market societies are characterised by attempts to disembed the economy from society, a process that would also require the demarcation of an autonomous domain called the “economy.”
  • It is perhaps most useful to see these attempts as continuous and never entirely successful (à la Block 2003), and therefore a completely disembedded economy and a purely market society as something always in the making. But assuming for analytical purposes that one can think of a (disembedded) economy, such an economy would require a distinct set of laws for its existence and functioning.
  • The growth of contract law and the increased importance accorded to it (whether via distinct institutional mechanisms for its enforcement or its privileging vis-à-vis human rights) needs to be understood in this context.
  • The contract form and contract laws are neither new nor restricted to the economic domain; the idea of individuals or entities entering into a relationship on the basis of (what is attributed to be) their own free will and choice, and the need to lay down and enforce the terms of such a relationship, has been a critical function of many older states too.
  • But the increase in international commerce and investment, particularly in the wake of liberalisation and globalisation processes in the latter half of the 20th century, has led to a large variety of contracts—including between nations—and consequently to an increase in the number and complexity of disputes.
  • Examples of the new kinds of contracts include trade agreements under the WTO, regional trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement and bilateral investment treaties (or BITs).
  • More importantly, the kinds of economic processes and contracts that constitute an important part of the current form of the economy require law to take on particular characteristics, something that D’Souza (2006) refers to as “market regulation.”
  • For the purpose of our discussion, what is crucial about market regulation is the emergence of a whole new set of institutions, legal innovations, and discourses of legitimation that operate on (or privilege) private law principles and of a society wherein “… the contract form of social relations [is taken] to new heights by restructuring the relations between corporations, states and social groups, qua collective/corporate entities as contracting parties” (D’Souza 2006: 16; emphasis in original).
  • The increased emphasis on arbitration as a means of resolving disputes arising out of the new kinds of international trade and investment contracts as also the strict enforcement of contract law in arbitration processes can be seen as examples of this.
  • The dominance of contract law and of particular kinds of legal institutions/instruments is in keeping with the goals of a market society, but the fact remains that other kinds of laws (related to questions of public interest and human rights) and institutional mechanisms supporting these are also simultaneously present. How, then, are the two kept separate?

Human Rights and BITs

  • It is useful to consider the case of BITs in India, which is one of the kinds of contracts in which recourse to arbitration is increasingly taking place. India signed its first BIT with United Kingdom in 1994 and has signed 80-odd BITs since then.
  • But as Prabash Ranjan (2014) points out, until about 2010, there was pretty much no discussion in most BITs of the relationship between investment flows and non-investment issues, including the host country’s regulatory power about the environment, decisions about privatisation, and so on.
  • In general, although there has been a fair amount of debate on the implications of the WTO for different sectors and concerns related to livelihoods and democratic processes, similar work in the context of trade/investment treaties outside the WTO (be it BITs or other trade agreements) is far more limited (Bhutani 2015). The actual provisions within these treaties to take account of concerns about public purpose or human rights also leave a lot to be desired.
  • Thus, while BITs often contain a general exception clause that allow countries
  • to temporarily deviate from their BIT obligations in situations that warrant giving precedence to non-investment objectives over investment protection … in more than 60 Indian BITs these exceptions are very narrowly formulated … to allow deviations from the treaty only in situations of “essential security interest” or in “circumstances of extreme emergency.” (Ranjan 2014: 435)
  • It is only after 2010 when foreign investors started suing India under different BITs and adverse awards against the Indian government were pronounced in a number of arbitration cases that there has been some attention focused on the inequities associated with BITs.
  • Even then, the concern has been more about the bias in favour of Western countries and less about human rights per se. While there have been changes made recently that explicitly bring in consideration of laws relating to human rights and public interest, the manner in which they are likely to interact with contract law still does not allow much room for optimism.
  • Consider, for instance, the new model BITs treaty adopted in December 2015 which is supposed to be used for renegotiation of existing BITs as well as for negotiation of future BITs and investment chapters in trade agreements or agreements about economic cooperation and partnership.
  • While initial draft versions of this talked about compliance of investors and their investments with the law of the host state, including laws relating to human rights (Dahlquist and Peterson 2016), the version finally adopted only mentions this in a softer form under a corporate social responsibility clause, wherein investors are supposed toendeavour to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as statements of principle … that may address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anti-corruption.(Article 12 of the Government of India’s Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty)
  • There are, of course, other avenues to bring in considerations of public policy or human rights. In the context of arbitration, for instance, states which are signatories to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) usually have legislation under which recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award (with the exception of those under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) can be prevented on the grounds that the award is contrary to the state’s own public policy.
  • In the Indian case, while the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had clauses that allowed applications to be made to the judiciary to set aside an arbitral award and also for courts to refuse to enforce a foreign award when an award is in conflict with the public policy of India (Sections 34 and 48 respectively), this was defined only in terms of fraud or corruption in the making of the award, violation of confidentiality, and restrictions on the admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.
  • However, a recent amendment to the arbitration law—the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015—added two new conditions to define when an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, namely if “it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” or “is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice” (Sections 18 and 22).
  • While this amendment seems to provide space to bring together the enforcement of contract laws and laws related to social justice (such as human rights related legislation), the problem is that there is no clarity about what “basic notions of morality or justice” means or the manner in which these would translate into specific domains (whether in terms of legislative and policy frameworks or in terms of actual implementation).

Reconciling Underlying Values

  • Consider, once again, the case of right to water in India. Although there is strong judicial support for the right to water (with the right to water being read as part of the right to life, a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution), an explicit adoption of a legal right to water along with corresponding rules and policies (as in the South African case) is missing.
  • More importantly, there is no clear discussion of what such a right would imply for different dimensions of a right to water, such as the quantity and quality of water to be supplied, system of water delivery, pricing, long-term sustainability of the resource, and so on.
  • This, in turn, would make it difficult to ensure that trade or investment agreements involving or affecting water or arbitration awards made in case of disputes under these, would be compatible with a right to water.
  • Whether national governments even want to ensure such compatibility or have the bargaining power to do so (particularly in negotiations with other countries) is a separate question.
  • However, even if the desire and power to integrate different kinds of laws were present, there is a concern that remains about attempts to do so, which is perhaps the most crucial point in explaining the continuing separation between contract law and human rights.
  • This is related to the differences in values underlying laws. For instance, Hugh Collins (2012) expresses scepticism about whether human rights can just be transplanted to the domain of contract law given that there are fundamental differences in values between public law and private law (of which human rights and contract law can be considered examples respectively).
  • This is a point that is also linked to the earlier discussion about (the construction of) a disembedded economy requiring a particular form of law. Polanyi argues that in pre-market societies, similar principles underlie social relationships and economic activities; also, these principles do not lead to the creation of institutions which are meant exclusively for one purpose.
  • Further, moving away from such a society is not a linear or automatic process. That is, there is work involved in creating new kinds of institutions and in transforming values and principles (be they in the domain of law or others).
  • However, Polanyi’s argument does not stop here. He also talks about continuous resistance to the movement to a market society and introduces the idea of a “double movement,” which, as Kari Polanyi Levitt (2005: 172) argues, signals… an existential contradiction between the requirements of a capitalist market economy for unlimited expansion, and the requirements of people to live in mutually supportive relations in society.
  • The tension between contract law and human rights—the need to integrate these laws versus actual attempts to separate them and the potential difficulty in reconciling the differences in values underlying them—can hence be seen as reflecting the tension between attempts to move towards a different kind of society and resistance to this movement.
  • At stake here is also the question of the role of law and the extent to which changes in legal institutions and instruments can be a means of bringing about change in society, as against merely being a reflection of it.
  • Thus, when there is optimism expressed (in Meshel 2015, for instance) about the possibility that investment arbitration tribunals can strengthen and re-enforce human rights norms that may be negatively affected by trade and investment treaties, even when institutions more directly responsible for enforcing such rights have often not done so, what is being hoped is that arbitration institutions and instruments would take on functions beyond the mandate with which they were originally set up.
  • If this contributes towards common values in law across different domains, the separation and importance accorded to a particular form of economy can potentially be questioned.
  • Whatever one’s opinion about realising this potential, there is little doubt about the need for such a change in various domains, including arbitration. A lot of arbitration today is centred on trade agreements and investment treaties pertaining to crucial resources like oil, gas, energy, and water as well as services that are increasingly essential, such as telecommunications.
  • Hence, it is undeniably important that disputes that arise in this context be resolved by drawing on a wide range of considerations (including, but not limited to, human rights).

Notes

  •  These include both court judgments and legislative tools. For instance, in December 2014, the Supreme Court refused to interfere in an international arbitration matter and directed the parties to the arbitration tribunal.
  • Similarly, in 2015, the government amended The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to encourage arbitration, enable speedy disposal of proceedings, and prevent parties from approaching the court to stall the proceedings (in cases where arbitration is held in India).
  •  For instance, India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2015 requires (with some qualifications) that investors exhaust “local remedies” (that is, the Indian judicial system) before initiating arbitration.
  •  Collins (2012) talks about how in the case of public law, protecting the weaker party is important, while in the case of private law, all parties are considered to be equal; another difference is the greater focus on values of negative liberty in public law and on more positive conceptions of liberty in private law.

Stigmatisation and Exclusion of Tribal ‘Kumari Matas’ in Yavatmal

The fear of stigma amongst victims and their families and defamation of the community/village is overarching. Moralising overtones are also reflected in the language of the state, particularly the bureaucracy, while dealing with these cases. Beyond stigma, these sexually exploited women are further subjected to ostracisation and exclusion.

Nature and Extent of the Phenomenon

  • The issue of Kumari Matas amongst the scheduled tribes of Yavatmal first surfaced in public fora when local newspapers reported the incidence in significant numbers in the tribal belt of Jhari Jamni block (as told to the author by a local official).
  • The Vidarbha Jan Andolan Samiti in 2009 reported over 300 cases of Kumari Matas in Yavatmal, of which 52 cases were from Jhari Jamni block alone. The issue was later taken up in public hearings conducted by the state human rights commission in 2009 (Maitra 2009).
  • However, the Government of Maharashtra initiated action only in December 2013 following the visit of Nirmala Sawant, a member of the National Commission for Women (NCW) to Jhari Jamni.
  • Sawant requested the state government to conduct an enquiry into four blocks of Yavatmal, namely Jhari Jamni, Wani, Maregaon and Pandharkawada, to facilitate the identification and authentication of casestowards rehabilitation.
  • Further, media reports and mobilisation at the local level by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pressurised the state government to take immediate action in this regard. At the forefront of initiating action were the state agencies of the additional tribal development commissionerate at Amravati, Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) office at Pandharkawada, district collector of Yavatmal, and the police, women and child development, and health departments at Yavatmal.
  • The police started an enquiry based on a news report in the Marathi daily Loksatta in March 2014 (Kamble 2014).1 The additional commissioner of police, Maharashtra ordered the superintendent of police, Yavatmal to investigate and identify causes and measures to be taken against such crimes and submit a report to the chief minister.
  • Soon after, the women and child development officer at Yavatmal reported that there were 87 cases of Kumari Matas—39 in Jhari Jamni, 33 in Pandharkawada, nine in Maregaon and six in Wani blocks.2 The report stated that 39 out of the 87 were married.
  • Later in April 2015, the Women and Child Development Department, Yavatmal found 119 cases of Kumari Matas in the district. These were primarily from Jhari Jamni (47) and Pandharkawada (41) while a few cases were from other blocks. As per the latest list providing figures until December 2015, the reported figure of Kumari Matas is 157 in Yavatmal
  • The Women and Child Development Officer (WCDO), Yavatmal identifies two tribes, Kolams and Gonds, among whom the incidence of Kumari Matas is most prominent. Of the total 157 cases, 77 are amongst Kolam, 46 among Gonds, seven among Bhois, six among Pardhans, three each among Gowaris, Banjaras, Andhs, and Mahar/Matangs, two each among Madgis and Kunbis and one each being Muslim, Mali, Baudhha, Dhangar, and Dhobi communities. For a classification of Kumari Matas as per age group and educational status
  • The WCDO Yavatmal further reports that of the total 157 women, 151 (96%) were landless. Of the 157 cases, 82 were below the poverty line, 68 did not have ration cards, five were above the poverty line, and two had Antyodaya cards (WCDO 2015: 6–7). Thus, poverty was common amongst more than 95% of the cases.
  • There is a huge gap between the number of cases claimed by newspaper reports, NGOs, the women’s commission, and actual authenticated cases by the women and child welfare development department at Yavatmal.
  • The gap in the figures can be attributed to low reporting rates and attempts to suppress cases by tribal leaders, headmen, panchayat members, and non-tribal village leaders. It is clear from the report of a police sub-inspector, Yavatmal that the problem of Kumari Matas dates back to the 1990s for some of them had children, from such liaisons, as old as 20 years .
  • The report states that most Kumari Matas had subsequently got married and their children (from the pre-marital relation) were staying with the former’s natal parents. Therefore, out of the total cases reported in the abovementioned surveys only one first information report (FIR) had been filed with the police; most Kumari Matas, in their statements to the police, said that they do not wish to complain against anybody.
  • Contrary to government surveys, the National Commission for Women and the local NGOs in 2010 claimed that there are more than 300 cases of Kumari Matas. Anita Jambhulkar, founder president of Ramai Bahuudeshiya Mahila Kalyan Sanstha, an NGO active in Yavatmal, claims to have a village-wise list of Kumari Matas prepared over the last decade.
  • She has submitted the complete list along with a related project proposal to the Pandharkawada ITDP office. Thus, there is a wide gap in the figures floated by local NGOs and newspaper reports on the one hand and official data authenticated by the women and child development department, Yavatmal.

Suppression of Crime and Moral Overtones

  • Far from acknowledging the phenomenon of Kumari Matas as a criminal one, tribal women have been further victimised, labelled immoral, and stigmatised. The fact that there has been a near 20-year lag in the surfacing of the issue testifies to the suppression and neglect of the exploitation of tribal women.
  • Ironically, the suppression of this issue has been at the hands of the tribal community leaders.
  • In 2014, a police sub-inspector, Pandharkawada police station, submitted a report to the superintendent of police, Yavatmal noting that only one FIR has been lodged on the issue in Mangurda village. The investigation brought out the fact that this issue dates back to the 1990s.
  • It echoes the WCDO’s findings that two specific tribes—Kolams and Gonds—were primarily affected by this phenomenon and also that the communities chose to resolve them as per their traditions and customs in their specific community panchayats. Therefore, cases could not be filed against the perpetrators of the crime.
  • The fear of defamation has been a significant hurdle in deterring tribal women from reporting to the police and seeking justice. The police responded with the following village-level strategy:
  •  Villagers should report the incidence of Kumari Matas,
  • police patils (village police headmen) should conduct village meetings and encourage the reporting of Kumari Matas,
  •  Kumari Matas should be personally met, counselled and guided about legal remedies and available government aid,
  •  each police station jurisdiction should form a committee under the chairmanship of the block executive magistrate, along with the police patil and president of conflict resolution committee in each village as members, to report and enquire into complaints of Kumari Matas.
  • Even so, only two FIRs were filed. Table 4 indicates that majority of the perpetrators are from the same village as that of the victims. This reduces the possibility of cases being reported. The perpetrators being the rural rich and elite of the village form a nexus along with the police patils and tribal leaders to suppress the reporting of such crimes.
  • Further, as per one newspaper report, visiting contractors and middlemen from Andhra Pradesh too were identified as perpetrators from outside the state in this phenomenon. Personal interviews with the staff of the Pandharkawada ITDP in December 2015 revealed that it was difficult to get into villages, where the cases existed.
  • They related that government officials as well as media persons were driven away by the villagers stating fears of defamation of the whole village. The villagers claimed that no girls from their village would get married in the future as the phenomenon of “Kumari Mata” was a disgrace and would bring misery to the village.
  • As a result, cases of sexual exploitation have got suppressed.
  • Moreover, in such circumstances the morality of tribal women is often questioned. The WCDO, Yavatmal holds that the issue of Kumari Matas has been blown out of proportion by the media and that “live-in” relationships were common amongst tribals.
  • Further, the officer stated that the phenomenon was a tribal “community problem” and hence, they should be left to solve it by themselves—as most of the perpetrators belong to the same village as the victim.
  • Another officer from the district Women and Child Development Department stated that “tribal girls/women get into (sexual) relations with consent and later, when they get pregnant, come to register complaints in the hope of some benefits from the government” (personal interview at Yavatmal, 5 December 2015).
  • The officer went on to claim that if (welfare) schemes were introduced (for Kumari Matas) then the number of such cases would only rise—to claim benefits under the schemes.
  • Thus, bureaucratic attitude tilts towards sitting in moral judgment as opposed to realism or pragmatism. The “let alone” approach, in favour of community trial as opposed to judicial processes, by the state has led to further suppression and neglect of the cases.

Revisiting Tribal Culture

  • The above section reveals the prejudices among state agencies and the bureaucracy against tribal culture. This calls for a closer scrutiny of tribal culture, especially with reference to marriage and social sanctions. It is important to understand what types of “live-in” relations are considered legitimate in tribal society.
  • And conversely, what kind of taboos and sanctions exist? What changes has the impact of assimilation with caste society brought about in tribal culture, especially with regards marriage and separation? What are the factors responsible for the deterioration of the status of tribal women?
  • As per the 2011 Census data, the population of Scheduled Tribes in Yavatmal district stands at 5,14,057 or 18.54% of the district population. The same proportion increases in Jhari Jamni and Pandharkawada sub-districts (where majority of cases are reported) to 38.6% and 17.10% respectively.
  • The major tribes in Yavatmal district are Gonds, Kolams, Andhs, Pardhans, Pardhis, Bhils, and Koli Mahadeos amongst others (Tribal Research and Training Institute 2001), where the Kolams have been identified as a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) in Maharashtra for bearing primitive characteristics.
  • Amongst the Gonds of Yavatmal, “live-in” relations were customary practice and the offspring of such relations were considered legitimate. The Gond tribe practised the traditional Gotul system, wherein unmarried girls and boys lived and comingled in dormitories (Karve 1968: 23). Gotul was a socialising institution amongst the Gonds for its young members.
  • Gondi women in the dormitories were free to choose their partner in Gotul by entering into the bachelor’s dormitory and cohabiting with them (Karve 1968). Iravati Karve (1968) notes that this custom was known to the (non-tribal) Marathi-speaking people as “gharghusi.” Gotul was subject to rules and taboos.
  • First, it was a system made available strictly for members of the Gond tribe alone. Second, widows and widowers were debarred from participating in Gotul, that is, from either taking a partner in the dormitory or being taken as a partner by a member of the dormitory.
  • Tribal culture has undergone changes historically due to its proximity to caste society and settled agriculturists (Sarma 1993). Development initiatives and linkages between tribal and non-tribal communities (through transport and communication), too, have facilitated major changes in tribal society.
  • In Yavatmal, the tribals have imbibed non-tribal cultural practices due to cohabitation with non-tribal communities, especially in Jhari Jamni and other Yavatmal blocks. The Gazetteer of Yeotmal District (1974) explained the changes in tribal culture, thus,
  • The Andhas—an aboriginal tribe—have adopted all the practices of Kunbis and can be hardly distinguished in dress and personal appearance from them. They also cultivate in the same manner like Kunbis. They employ Brahmins as their priests and profess as Vaishnavas by religion.
  • Like Andhas, Gonds and Pardhans have also adopted Hindu dress and customs to a larger extent … The tribes speak Gondi language among them but can talk Marathi with outsiders and they dress like the Kunbis. They are tenants and labourers and few are patels [headman] of villages.
  • The Kolams in some respect retain their primitive customs but in dress they can hardly be distinguished from [the] Kunbis … They have a curious survival of marriage by capture. But now this is enacted only as a practice and the whole marriage ceremony resembles that of Kunbis except one of their traditional custom—the bridegroom takes the bride on the lap and their clothes are tied together in two places.
  • The sociological fact is that tribal culture reflects non-tribal cultural elements when it begins to claim social superiority.
  • In tribal culture, women’s freedom was valued such that they were allowed to choose their partners and stay with them. It is well known to sociologists and anthropologists that the flexibility of selection of partners for marriage in tribal culture, widow remarriages, divorce and separation were culturally acceptable and practised.
  • However, due to the assimilation of tribal communities with non-tribal society, the former have imbibed caste patriarchal values. One such element with reference to the marriage systems amongst tribes has been the introduction of dowry.6
  • The giving of gold, gifts, cash, household gadgets, vehicles, electronics, etc, is common practice in caste Hindu marriages in the district and increasingly so, among tribals therein too. In “live-in” relationships amongst tribals, what was valued above all else was the individual freedom to choose partners and lifelong companionship. But in the present context, it is clear that tribal girls are exploited (even by tribal men) and that companionship is rejected by men.
  • Upper-caste men have had structural access to Dalit and Adivasi women for sexual exploitation, exercising this privilege as a matter of routine exercise of power as well as punishment for the latter’s assertions and transgressions (Navsarjan Trust et al 2013).
  • The changing political economy of the region has also rendered tribals dependent on the upper castes for livelihood, credit and accessing benefits from the state. This further accentuates the vulnerability of poor tribal girls and their families to exploitation at the hands of the village elite. As a result, the tribal community too suppresses the cases, rather than acknowledging it and furthermore stigmatising the victims and their families.

Lessons from Kerala

  • The issue of Kumari Matas as we know it now in Maharashtra had a close parallel in Kerala (where they were known as Avivahitharaya Ammamar [unwed mothers]), that too around the same time frame of the 1990s. But the approach of the Kerala government has been qualitatively different in dealing with the issue.
  • The Kerala government constituted the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare Committee 1996–98 to look into the issue of tribal unwed mothers in Idukki and Wayanad districts.7 The committee then submitted its report to the state government on 15 December 1997 with an exhaustive list of 34 recommendations in this regard.
  • The report focused on various aspects of discrimination and exclusion of the tribal women and emphasised on state intervention for legal action against the perpetrators of the crime and rehabilitation of the victims. The responsibility of undertaking the corrective measures was entrusted to the tribal development department.
  • The committee further recommended that the health department look into potential cases of sexually transmitted diseases and develop health awareness amongst tribal girls.
  • The committee also commented on the rampant sexual exploitation of tribal women workers in the tea plantations of Kerala and directed the tribal department to register hired labour in the plantations as well as to prevent outsiders from residing in tribal hamlets to stop the sexual exploitation of tribal women.
  • In order to avoid segregation and stigmatisation of the offsprings of tribal unwed mothers, the committee recommended that the Integrated Child Development Services centres (better known as anganwadis) be strengthened in such a way that their offsprings be treated equally (in comparison to other children) and with dignity.
  • The other recommendations focus on rehabilitation measures such as skill-training in handicrafts, priority for tribal unwed mothers in housing schemes, special attention to check the incidence of dropouts by their children by giving additional remuneration to anganwadi sevikas, etc.
  • The committee suggested the allocation of separate funds for the cause of rehabilitating these women through the above suggested measures.
  • Finally, the committee recommended that a monthly review of the implementation of said schemes and programmes should be undertaken by a committee chaired by the district collector. The social justice and empowerment ministry of Kerala provides a monthly payment of ₹1,000 as pension to 935 tribal unwed mothers in 16 districts of Kerala.8
  • The ministry sanctioned ₹6.89 crore for various schemes for unwed mothers in 2011–12, of which ₹3.03 crore was spent on rehabilitative measures, including provision of milch cows, goats, poultry, sewing machines, ration shop, basket-making training, housing, and funds for house repairs.
  • The gaps in implementation of the above schemes notwithstanding, the Kerala government’s approach is pragmatic and judicious. Here the issue of unwed mothers is dealt with seriousness and sensitivity. Besides outreach schemes, booking the culprits has been taken seriously as DNA tests were asked to be conducted on the offsprings of the affected women. Moreover, reservations/prioritising government jobs for the victims have been done with sincerity.9
  • In Kerala, due to high levels of literacy and awareness, the issue of unwed mothers was brought into the public sphere. The tribal associations have also played a crucial role in acknowledging the cases as that of sexual exploitation and coming forward to register FIRs against the culprits of such crimes.
  • Due to this proactive approach of the tribal community and preventive measures initiated by the police, the number of cases of unwed mothers in Kerala has come down.10 Besides this, the Kerala women’s commission has conducted two studies to assess the issue and suggest rehabilitative measures.
  • The study by P K Rejula, research officer at Kerala Women’s Commission, titled Problem of Unwed Tribal Mothers in Kerala in 2004, has brought out various facts about the issue: for instance, the changing status of tribal women in society, economic status and literacy levels of the victims, reasons for sexual exploitation, classification of culprits, etc.
  • Another study titled On the Cross-roads: Unearthing the Socio-economic Challenges Faced by the Unwed Mothers of the Paniya Tribes of Wyanad District, Kerala by Meena Nair (2007) brings out the gap in mainstream as well as governmental understanding of tribal culture so as to address the issue of unwed tribal mothers.
  • The study emphasises that this is important for effective policy interventions.
  • In Maharashtra, though the issue of Kumari Matas dates back to the 1990s it is clear (from the discussion in earlier sections) that this was suppressed till the visit of the NCW in 2013.
  • Even after this, it is found that in Maharashtra there is no political and/or bureaucratic will in dealing with the issue despite local NGOs, media and the women’s commission raising the issue repeatedly.
  • It is critical to note here that the tribal panchayats in Yavatmal have suppressed the issue unlike their counterparts in Kerala, foreclosing the possibilities of trying and punishing the culprits. There are no studies commissioned by the concerned government agencies though there are some proposals submitted by NGOs and research institutes pending with the Tribal Development Department, Tribal Research and Training Institute Pune, ITDP Pandharkawada, and additional tribal commissioner Amravati.
  • Till date, only one question has been raised in the legislative council of Maharashtra (dated 6 May 2014) on the issue and the following assurance was given by the government in response: initiation of  child-rearing schemes,
  •  Swadhargruha [hostel] to be constructed for rehabilitating Kumari Matas and their children, and
  •  benefit under the cess fund of the zilla parishad to be given to Kumari Matas. It was found that with reference to the Bal Sangopan (child rearing scheme), 72 Kumari Matas (41 from Pandharkawada and 31 from Jhari Jamni) were getting ₹425 per month for their children (0–18 age group).
  • 11 Further, just one training session and distribution of sewing machines to Kumari Matas was undertaken in the Pandharkawada region.12 Therefore, hardly any substantial efforts have been put in terms of preventive and rehabilitative measures for Kumari Matas, leaving the latter with a high sense of resentment.
  • In a meeting held at Nagpur under the chairmanship of Ambrishrao Atram, minister of state for tribal development in Maharashtra on 19 December 2014, 18 major decisions were taken regarding the rehabilitation and skill-training of Kumari Matas, expansion of benefits of social welfare and health schemes, extension of legal aid, counselling and legal awareness amongst tribal women.
  • On the ground, however, besides the survey, counselling, monthly child-rearing allowance, and training and distribution of sewing machines to a few hardly anything substantial has been done with reference to the prevention and rehabilitation of Kumari Matas in Maharashtra.

Conclusions

  • Discrepancies in the figures provided by various reports on the incidence of Kumari Matas suggest that the actual cases on the ground are likely to be more than what the reports suggest. In Maharashtra, the issue was concealed until 2009 with some investigations suggesting that the origins of the phenomenon dated back to the 1990s.
  • The suppression of cases in Maharashtra can be attributed to the tribal panchayats’ and leaders’ fears of inviting defamation and disgrace to the entire village and tribe, the nexus between culprits, local/village leaders—both tribal and non-tribal—and police patils which operates to suppress the crime, and the insensitive approach of the state government.
  • There is a need to understand tribal culture, especially “live-in” relationships therein and the rules surrounding it. The freedom of women and lifelong companionship were highly valued. Both these aspects have suffered in the face of stigmatisation and exclusion of Kumari Matas by the community.
  • The absence of acknowledgment that these are cases of sexual exploitation is further incrimination. In Maharashtra, there is a lack of sensitivity, political will, and sincerity, amongst the bureaucracy (barring a few) to deal with the issue.
  • While, in Kerala, the tribal associations have played a proactive role in reporting the cases, in Maharashtra the tribal associations have been instrumental in suppressing the cases. There is an urgent need to move beyond the frames of patriarchal morality and adopt a pragmatic and judicious approach in Maharashtra for preventive and rehabilitative measures for Kumari Matas.

Climate Disasters Triggered Food Crises Across 23 Countries -World Food Programmes 2018 

There is now growing empirical evidence on how climate change disproportionately affects the poor. With climate change, people face shortage of water and food, resulting in increased competition to access these basic necessities. This increases the chances of the intensification of existing conflicts and also creates new ones.The water crisis in Cape Town began in 2015, and the city continues to live under the threat of becoming the first major city in the world to run out of water. However, the poorer neighbour hoods in the city have not only been dealing with reduced access to water for years now, but are more likely to face the brunt of the crisis.

  • In the Democratic Republic of Congo, shifts in the timing and patterns of rainfall have led to lower food production and greater competition on arable land, increasing ethnic tensions and conflicts in the country. Such conflicts affect the poor the most, and further lead to an increase in poverty and displacement, pushing people into a vicious trap.
  • Frequent floods and droughts caused by climate change lead to food shortages and rise in food prices. This causes ­hunger and malnutrition, the effects of which are felt most strongly by the poor. According to the World Food Programme’s 2018 Global Report on Food Crises, “climate disasters triggered food crises across 23 countries, mostly in Africa, with shocks such as drought leaving more than 39 million people in need of urgent assistance.”
  • According to the 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement, “30.6 million new internal displacements associated with conflict and disasters were recorded in 2017 across 143 countries and territories.” This amounts to 80,000 people being displaced every day. The report identifies floods and storms (mainly, tropical cyclones) as the primary causes of displacement, leading to 8.6 million and 7.5 million displacements, respectively.
  • Climate refugees can be found all over the world, displaced by coastal flooding in Dhaka, by hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, or due to the desertification of Lake Chad in West Africa. It is estimated that the number of people seeking asylum in the European ­Union due to climate change would see a 28% increase by 2100.
  • India ranks fifth globally for the losses it has experienced due to climate change. Around 800 million people in the country live in villages and depend on agriculture and natural resources for their livelihoods. With at least 50% of the farmlands in the country being rain-fed, changes in the pattern of the monsoons will affect their livelihoods the most. Empirical evidence suggests that climate change has led to a decline in wheat yields and has lowered the productivity of workers.
  • Studies reveal that small farmers are aware of the long-term changes in the weather pattern and have changed their practices to deal with the resultant socio-economic changes. Small farmers also lack access to credit and other means of insurance, which makes them more vulnerable to climate change. Thus, climate change will make the existing problems of poverty, malnutrition, and farmer suicides worse.
  • At the Katowice Climate Conference in 2018, India called out the developed nations for reneging on their promises to provide developing countries with the financial support to combat climate change. It is the poor and developing countries that are being affected by the effects of climate change in the worst way, while having contributed next to nothing in creating the crisis of ­climate change.
  • And, it is these very countries that are being left behind both in terms of growth and development and mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change as they try to juggle their commitments to both. If steps are not taken quickly, climate change has the potential to reverse decades of growth and development globally, and particularly in India.
  • The warning bells have been tolling for a while now, and the widening disparities between the developed and the developing countries, the rich and the poor, the global North and the South, are emerging clearer than ever where climate change and its effects are concerned.

India Ranks 29th in the World by Doing Business’s “Getting Credit” Index

Construction of indices are a tricky technique in economics and statistics. Indices seek to provide a way to aggregate diverse attributes. The weights and choice of dimensions tend to override the objective methods of comparison. There are of course “fair” ways of aggregating two attributes, but there is a high possibility of bias influencing results. Certainly, the greatest strength of an index is that it simplifies complex phenomena into comparable numbers.

  • This very simplicity makes ranking popular and hence powerful, making it a dangerous and often misguided tool for policy formulation. While not all stakeholders buy into such rankings, these are widely publicised and become impossible to ignore.
  • While discussions around its methodology hardly get much prominence, the often meaningless movement of ranks gain undue public attention.
  • What is more troubling is when such rankings incentivise governments to tweak their policies in order to go up the ranks. In fact, the Indian government in its output–outcome framework document for 2017–18 for industrial policy and promotion states as its first goal, the desire to reach the 90th rank in the EDB index in 2017–18 and 30th rank by 2020.
  • India, as has been widely reported, now ranks 100, up from 130 last year. Now, for instance, India ranks 29th in the world by Doing Business’s “getting credit” index leading to the impression that India is doing quite well on the access to credit front, contrary to many enterprise survey and research findings.
  • This index actually measures the “strength of credit reporting systems and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending,” and not “access to credit.” Review reports of Doing Business have also noted that it uses misleading terminology that has a far-reaching influence on public perceptions of economies.
  • The terms used suggest that the indices provide a comprehensive measure of business environment, while it only looks at on-paper regulations. The desire to go up the ranks tends to lead governments to change policy in favour of what drives the index, which need not be what their people or economy require.
  • The perception that a better ranking is positively correlated with foreign direct investment is another problematic consequence of these rankings.
  • Importantly, this one-size-fits-all approach to the “ease of doing business” ignores the diverse contexts of development in different countries. If countries fulfil these conditions, disregarding their own contexts and paths of development, they climb up the ranks.
  • This is akin to a world cup football tournament that lays out not only a common set of rules to be played by, but also rewards one strategy over others! Though Doing Business avowedly wants to inform policy, and not prescribe it, nor outline a normative position, its rankings do precisely that.
  • The newest controversy should prompt the World Bank to have another look and to do away with the EDB index altogether.

Mining is the Biggest Source of Electoral Funding in Meghalaya State

This unregulated and hazardous industry has been projected as a “cottage industry” of Meghalaya, till the time the National Green Tribunal (NGT) put a ban on it in 2014. There were no serious efforts to enforce the ban, though. In fact, the ruling parties came to power with the promise to get the ban lifted.Mining is the biggest source of electoral funding in the state, with many of the present ministers and legislators either owing or running the mines. Many candidates in the elections of 2018 had stakes in mining and transport activities. Meghalaya was never exempted from central laws regulating mining, although, now, the government is making efforts to circumvent the “illegality.”

  • Not all locals benefit from mining. It has led to the privatisation of the commons and grabbing of land by a few. It is directly related to the increasing landlessness in the districts in which it is prevalent. There are, on an average, more than 50 mines per square kilometre in the Jaintia Hills.
  • It is a tragedy that coal has become the mainstay of the economy, as other sources of livelihood have dried up because of mining. Those with access to more capital and resources inevitably get more profits, while the locals, in whose name the extraction is done, live at the behest of coal barons.
  • More than 15 workers were trapped in one such black hole on 13 December 2018, as the water of the Lytein river gushed in through a puncture. Rescue operations have continued since then, although the crucial initial time was lost. The pumps to pull out the water from the mine reached the site only after two weeks.
  • The mines were unmapped with no blueprint to aid the rescue work. Even with the navy pressed into action, it was difficult to take out the disintegrating bodies of the miners. Two miners were again killed in the same district on 6 January 2019. A similar incident in the Garo Hills had led to the NGT ban in the first place.
  • Forty men had died in a similar way in 2002, while five miners were crushed to death in 2013. Deaths and injuries from falls, cave-ins, and flooding are an everyday event in the mining area, for which no one is held accountable.
  • Rathole mining has been disastrous for the environment as well. Jaintia Hills has come to be known as the “land of dead rivers,” as the high sulphur and metal wastes have made the rivers toxic and acidic, killing the fish and degrading the soil quality. Thousands of acres of forest have been cleared and fields destroyed for mining or storing the coal.
  • The landscape stands disfigured and ravaged, with the uncovered abandoned pits acting as death traps. With such degradation of the environment, mafia activities, child labour (an estimate putting their numbers at 70,000 in 2010), trafficking, and the lack of concern for workers’ life and safety, the government’s promises of regulation do not invite trust.
  • Scientific mining also does not appear to be the answer, as coal seams are thin and deep inside and spread out, requiring mining over larger areas. The coal is also not of a good quality, undermining the economic viability.
  • Who should take the responsibility of the recurring tragedies in the mining holes and manholes? Such questions have become much more difficult to answer in neo-liberal times. In this specific case of Meghalaya, despite the ban and the knowledge of violations, the business continued unabated, ignoring the fact that humans can enter the mining holes crawling on all fours like rats, but, in the case of inherent disasters, they cannot make their way out like rats.

She Recovered Many Histories – A Tribute to Aparna Basu

The meticulousness and brilliance of Aparna’s scholarly works can be evinced from the fact that her doctoral thesis grew into a published and significant book called The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898–1920. The book, which is the scholarly production of her lively and enthusiastic mind, is thoroughly documented in both unpublished and published primary sources, and is buttressed with maps and tables based on the public and private papers of the administrators, and four important leaders of the national movement.

  • It has two major themes: the Government of India’s attempted control of education, and the development of education under the social pressures of the time. Arising from these two are the effect of will, or the lack of it, upon governmental projects, and the deadening effect of bureaucracy upon all creative activity.
  • Her thesis and the book are significant contributions to the study of the links between education and politics in India about which there are far too many myths, and too little systematic research.
  • She was also the author of another dozen books, biographies as well as anthologies. Some of her significant books were Mridula Sarabhai: Rebel wita Cause, Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference, 1927–1990, Breaking Out of Invisibility: Women in Indian History, etc.
  • In Mridula Sarabhai: Rebel with a Cause, Aparna has skilfully presented the life of the revolutionary heroine of the independence movement, who was born into the Sarabhai family of Ahmedabad in 1911.
  • A non-conformist and a rebel championing unpopular causes, she spurned offers of high office in the political arena of national government.
  • Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference, 1927–1990 narrates in detail the history and the changing nature of activities undertaken by the All India Women’s Conference (AIWC) during its long career from 1927 to the present.
  • Along with Anup Taneja, Aparna utilised some of the rare sources such as the AIWC files, private papers of Muthulakshmi Reddy as well as some hitherto unknown women’s journals.
  • A large number of interviews that she conducted among women threw new facts about women’s activities in the public sphere.
  • Breaking Out of Invisibility: Women in Indian History marks a welcome recognition of the importance of situating women’s history within the broader perspective of social history, and illustrates the wide variety of themes in women’s history on which historians have been working over the last few decades.

Generous Scholarly Guide

  • The 14 essays by leading specialists are a rich insight for the readers into the gendered history of India. But aparna had another credential which is not common amongst high flying scholars, and that was the willingness, the generosity to “bend down” to assist other more action-oriented projects.
  • She responded to so many requests for her guidance and contribution without assessing whether they would add to her credentials or were worthy of her status—just due to the generosity of her spirit. Aparna undertook the leadership of the AIWC at a critical time in its history, causing the organisation to reinvent through newer activities.
  • Even after her term as president was over, she continued to mentor it. Her involvement with Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s work was another area she traversed, no longer really the fashion amongst academics.
  • Undaunted, Aparna took up the chairpersonship of the National Gandhi Museum in 2013 (and held it until her death), changed its character, made it lively by holding meetings, conferences and exhibitions and publishing tracts, all of which brought the institution and its legacy into prominence.
  • The extraordinary fact is that Aparna engaged in all this governance and direction while simultaneously writing well-researched books and informally guiding scholars and academic friends and colleagues. She guided researchers not only on where to look, but how to organise the material.
  • In 2016, she pulled together an outstanding exhibition on Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay’s life at the India International Centre. In 2018, she did the same for an exhibition on the Ahmedabad millworkers’ strike of 1918.
  • Her absence has created a serious gap in the working of many institutions, as well as the recovery of many histories.